December 16, 1950

THE Nation

85TH ANNIVERSARY NUMBER

PEACE WITH RUSSIA

Can it be Negotiated?

DEC 16 1950

STATE COLLEGE
City, Tennessee

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE UNION LABEL—



YOUR GUARANTEE

The Amalgamated union label, in men's clothing, is your guarantee of best values in every price range. It is your guarantee that the clothing you buy was made under decent wage and working conditions.

It is a symbol, too, of labor's fight for more progressive government. It's a symbol of our part in the great election victories of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, in the passage of the Wage-Hour Law, the Social Security Law and many other forward-looking measures.

And it's a symbol of our future aims—repeal of the Taft-Hartley Law, enactment of a civil rights bill incorporating an FEPC, continuance and expansion of Point 4 aid, and the enactment of the President's entire Fair Deal program.

The union label truly stands for the things you stand for. Demand it next time you buy a suit, overcoat or other item of men's wearing apparel.

Look for the union label for best buys in any price range



THE AMALGAMATED CLOTHING WORKERS OF AMERICA

A UNION OF MASTER CRAFTSMEN—IN SUITS • OVERCOATS • UNIFORMS
WORK CLOTHES • SPORTSWEAR • SHIRTS • PAJAMAS • GLOVES • TIES

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MODERN INDUSTRIAL BANK

HENRY MORGENTHAU, Jr.
Chairman of the Board

•

JACOB LEICHTMAN
President

•

Seven Offices Conveniently Located In

MANHATTAN BRONX BROOKLYN

MEMBER OF FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION



Miles of zippers...

In the huge Conmar plant, Conmar zippers are manufactured under precision standards of engineering to meet all exacting specifications in hundreds of industries throughout the world. Conmar zippers can't stick, can't jam...are guaranteed flawless.

Conmar zippers

Conmar, Newark 1, N. J.

Branches: Atlanta • Baltimore • Boston • Chicago • Cincinnati • Cleveland • Dallas Los Angeles • Minneapolis • Philadelphia • Rochester • St. Louis • San Francisco

Charles C. Sherrod Library
EAST TENNESSEE STATE COLLEGE
Johnson City, Tennessee

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Interested In Investing In Israel?

The world's youngest and fastest-growing democracy offers sound investment opportunities for American private capital. Avenues are open for the small as well as the large investor.

For information consult the Economic Department of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, which is prepared to give, without charge, authoritative data on avenues for investment, capital requirements, rates of return, tax liabilities, government regulations, sources of labor and supply and other pertinent investment questions.

Specific Israel proposals for investments in business and industrial enterprises for American investors are available on request.

Contains up-to-date information for investors on industry, trade, agriculture, tourism, labor relations, banking, currency, cost factors, profits, government controls, taxation, etc. 25¢ a copy.

Publications of the Economic Department of the Jewish Agency for Palestine

Monthly bulletin of the Economic Department of the Jewish Agency containing current information and comment on business and investment possibilities and economic developments in Israel. Free subscription upon request.

AMERICAN SECTION
OF THE

Jewish Agency for Palestine

16 EAST 66th STREET NEW YORK 21, N. Y. TRafalgar 9-1300

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTENTS

Eighty-fifth Anniversary Number

A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN 549

THE ISSUE IS SURVIVAL 549

ON "THE NATION'S" ANNIVERSARY 550

SHIELD OF THE REPUBLIC?

THE PROSPECT IN ASIA by Harold R. Isaacs 552

WE NEED ASIA! by Owen Lattimore 556

PLEA FOR A POSITIVE POLICY by James P. Warburg 560

CONTAINMENT RECONSIDERED by H. Stuart Hughes 564

WANTED: HELP NOT PATRONAGE by Gerald Bailey 568

THE MENACE OF A GERMAN ARMY by Carolus 572

RETURN TO POTSDAM? by J. Alvarez del Vayo 575

GREAT-POWER BALANCE SHEET by Fritz Sternberg 579

THE ROLE OF WEAKER NATIONS by Vera Micheles Dean 582

THE CASE FOR NEGOTIATION

HISTORY'S LESSON by Hans J. Morgenthau 587

THE WAR OF IDEAS by Isaac Deutscher 591

WAR OR PEACE: THE UNDEBATED ISSUE by Archibald MacLeish 595

AGREEING TO DISAGREE by R. H. S. Crossman 599

WESTERN EUROPE'S MIDDLE WAY by Claude Bourdet 601

ONE HALF OF THE WORLD

THE SCARS OF IMPERIALISM by Andrew Roth 605

COLONIALISM'S LAST STRONGHOLD by Rayford W. Logan 608

MIDDLE EAST MUDDLE by J. C. Hurewitz 612

ISRAEL'S ROAD TO PEACE by Abba Eban 617

REFLECTIONS OF A LATIN AMERICAN by Jesus Silva Herzog 619

THE MEANING OF ATOMIC WAR by Harrison S. Brown 621

TOWARD PEACE BY AGREEMENT

DEMOCRACY'S WAY OUT by Freda Kirchwey 622

PREREQUISITE TO AGREEMENT by Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam 625

INDIA AND WORLD PEACE by Sir Benegal N. Rau 629

THE ESSENTIALS OF PEACE by Grenville Clark 632

THE VALUE OF NEGOTIATION Quotations from Winston Churchill 638

BOOKS AND THE ARTS

The Reasonable Road to Peace *by Albert Guérard* 647

Two Prophets: Wells and Shaw *by Joseph Wood Krutch* 648

America in Chinese Eyes *by Harold Strauss* 651

Churchill: Volume IV *by J. B. Brebner* 655

The Individual and the State *by Alan Barth* 656

The Uses and Costs of Atomic Power *by Walter Isard* 657

Tory History *by Keith Hutchison* 659

Those German Cartels *by Dewey Anderson* 660

Books in Brief 661

Records *by B. H. Haggin* 663

Editor and Publisher: Freda Kirchwey

Executive Editor: Harold C. Field

Foreign Editor J. Alvarez del Vayo — *Literary Editor* Margaret Marshall

Contributing Editor: Robert Bendiner

Financial Editor: Keith Hutchison

Washington Editor: Willard Shelton

Drama: Joseph Wood Krutch — *Music:* B. H. Haggin

Copy Editor: Gladys Whiteside

Assistant Literary Editor: Caroline Whiting

Staff Contributors

Carey McWilliams, Reinhold Niebuhr, Maxwell S. Stewart
J. King Gordon, Ralph Bates, Andrew Roth

Business & Advertising Manager: Hugo Van Arx

Director of Nation Associates: Lillie Shultz

The Nation, published weekly and copyright, 1950, in the U. S. A. by The Nation Associates, Inc., 20 Vesey St., New York 7, N. Y. Entered as second-class matter, December 13, 1879, at the Post Office of New York, N. Y., under the act of March 3, 1879. Advertising and Circulation Representative for Continental Europe: Publicitas.

Subscription Prices: Domestic—One year $7; Two years $12; Three years $17. Additional postage per year: Foreign and Canadian $1.

Change of Address: Three weeks' notice is required for change of address, which cannot be made without the old address as well as the new.

Information to Libraries: The Nation is indexed in Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature, Book Review Digest, Index to Labor Articles, Public Affairs Information Service, Dramatic Index.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SEVENTY MILLION AMERICANS...

¶ Seventy million Americans are without any religious affiliation. The majority have broken with the traditional religions on intellectual and ethical grounds. Unfortunately the greater number of these have not explored the implications of their dissatisfaction and have gone little beyond rejection. They find themselves caught today between equally intolerable pressures of bitter religious sectarianism and a wide range of secular dogmatisms. Yet they feel a deep need for a consecrating influence in their own lives and in the lives of their children. They seek a faith which would unite men and give them an awareness of their common destiny here on earth rather than in a hereafter.

¶ The Ethical Movement is a religious fellowship in which faith in man is paramount and ethical conduct is regarded as the highest form of worship. It asserts that the real test of religious consecration is not in worship of the supernatural, but in what men do for one another on this earth to achieve mutually creative and liberating relationships. It is a man-centered religion and it rejects as unethical any actions which make man's worth and dignity subservient to other interests, whether they be of doctrine, class, race, or power. It insists that man can direct his own destiny if he will and that he alone is responsible for whatever he makes of his life.

¶ The first Ethical Culture Society and the American Ethical Movement were established in 1876 to reinstate the essential motif of religion through the ages—the shared quest for the good life. The Ethical Movement does not propose to add to the religions of the past in the way that these had divided men, namely, on the basis of differences in belief or creed. Instead, it asserts the supreme importance of ethics and *human* values in *all* the relations of life—personal, social, national and international, apart from theological or metaphysical considerations. Thus it provides a unifying purpose for people of varying philosophical outlooks and every race and background—mutual participation in a continuing effort to make ethical ideals effective in every-day living and to find ways of living compatible with man's changing needs and his highest values. It believes that comradeship in the process of his search will also help individuals to improve the quality of their own lives.

THE AMERICAN ETHICAL UNION coordinates the efforts of the existing Ethical Societies and aids in establishing new Societies. It cooperates with the English Ethical Union and other Societies abroad in regard to matters of common interest. It publishes *The Standard*, a monthly devoted to ethical problems of the individual and society. The American Ethical Union derives a major portion of its support from member Ethical Societies: Brooklyn Society for Ethical Culture, Chicago Ethical Society, New York Society for Ethical Culture, Philadelphia Ethical Society, St. Louis Ethical Society, Washington (D. C.) Ethical Society, Westchester Ethical Society, New Jersey Society for Ethical Culture, Los Angeles Ethical Society, Long Island Society for Ethical Culture.

President
James G. White, Chicago

Eastern Vice-President
Sidney H. Scheuer, New York

Western Vice-President
R. Walston Chubb, St. Louis

Treasurer
Lawrence S. Mayers, New York

Secretary
L. D. MacIntyre, Washington

Executive Secretary
Cornelius Cochrane, New York

Address inquiries for further information to
AMERICAN ETHICAL UNION
2 West 64th Street, New York 23, N. Y.

Fraternity of Ethical Leaders
Dr. David Saville Muzzey,
Chairman

Dr. George E. Beauchamp
Algernon D. Black
Dr. Wilhelm Boerner
Dr. Horace J. Bridges
Dr. Arthur E. Briggs
Percival Chubb
W. Edwin Collier
Dr. Walter Eckstein
Lawrence K. Frank
Dr. Horace L. Friess
Dr. A. Eustace Haydon
Henry B. Herman
James F. Hornback
J. Hutton Hynd
Robert D. Kohn
Alexander S. Langsdorf
Jerome Nathanson
Dr. Henry Neumann
George E. O'Dell
Dr. V. T. Thayer

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE Nation

AMERICA'S LEADING LIBERAL WEEKLY SINCE 1865

VOLUME 171 NEW YORK • SATURDAY • DECEMBER 16, 1950 NUMBER 25

A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

HEARTY congratulations to *The Nation* as it celebrates its eighty-fifth birthday. I have not always agreed with *The Nation*, but I have never doubted its integrity. I hope that its voice will be lifted for many years to come in behalf of the causes in which it believes—even if they may be unpopular at the time.



The Issue Is Survival

THE NATION celebrates its Eighty-fifth Anniversary in a sober mood. To use the occasion for reminiscence or the conventional sorts of self-congratulation would seem both irrelevant and unworthy of this journal's past. Today only one subject is important—the possibility of averting a general war which would wipe out, impartially, the institutions of civilized life and the forces that threaten them.

To that subject we have dedicated our anniversary issue, rejecting, as false and defeatist, counsels of despair that tell us there is no way to break through the evil circles of enmity. Even war itself does not convince us that a greater war is inescapable. The contrary is true. The danger of a new world conflict, arising suddenly out of the war in Korea, has shocked peoples and governments into earnest if belated attempts to find means of escaping the horror that confronts them.

Since its founding in the wake of our own Civil War, *The Nation* has steadily supported all valid efforts to secure and defend peace. It has tried to translate into practice the concepts of human worth and equal rights that struggle was fought to vindicate. Today, in the same spirit, it offers a many-sided answer to the most urgent question of our time: Can a settlement with Russia be reached through negotiation without sacrifice of democratic principle?

There are those who maintain that even to advocate negotiation is appeasement, that we must match power with power before we can hope to strike a satisfactory bargain with our adversaries. This argument is self-answering. If the practice of diplomacy is abandoned for the duration of the arms race, we can be sure that war, not peace, lies at the end of the course. Obviously agreement can be reached only if Russia and the United States, recognizing that mutual annihilation will be the single fruit of a new world war, undertake to resolve their differences in a spirit of conciliatory self-interest.

The articles which follow dig down to the roots of the conflict in Asia, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. They examine the revolutionary ferment in the world and its bearing on the East-West struggle. They consider the policies which must be followed if that ferment is to produce peaceful change rather than uprisings and war. They discuss the clash of ideologies and whether capitalism and communism could coexist in peace. They put forward proposals for solving specific difficulties as well as the over-all conflict. The authors appearing in these pages were selected both as experts in the various fields considered and, above all, as persons free from political commitments, left or right, that would preclude independent judgment.

Sponsored by a distinguished group of citizens, this symposium is presented as a positive contribution to the broadening of the discussion of peace or war in the knowledge that for all nations the issue is survival.

THE EDITORS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On "The Nation's" Anniversary

OSCAR L. CHAPMAN
Secretary of the Interior

The Eighty-fifth Anniversary issue of *The Nation* marks another significant milestone in the distinguished history of one of America's most outstanding journals of liberal opinion. I welcome this opportunity to congratulate *The Nation* on its long record of devotion to considered and forceful expression of independent progressive thinking.

In this time of world decision America needs to mobilize all its resources to meet the threat of Communist imperialism. The threat to peace which confronts us, however, will demand more than mobilization of our material resources. It will require the united effort of all thinking Americans to explore the causes of the present conflict and to find a solution within the framework of peace and our traditional democratic principles of freedom. To this cause, as I believe this issue will demonstrate, *The Nation* can make a vital contribution.

CHARLES F. BRANNAN
Secretary of Agriculture

The long life of *The Nation* attests not only the value of a free press but also the high esteem accorded by the American public to a publication whose aim is the expression of frank opinion on public affairs. Those who read may not always agree, but they weigh and respect the expressions given. They realize the benefits from the stimulus of a clear statement of divergent views.

Your Eighty-fifth Anniversary issue typifies the courage of *The Nation's* editors in tackling fundamental current problems—in this case the prodigious question of the conflict between the East and the West and ways to resolve that conflict without sacrificing democratic principles. This is truly a basic problem, one whose solution challenges our very way of life. I am glad we have such publications as *The Nation* to help us thresh out the facts needed for wise decisions.

ELEANOR ROOSEVELT

I am very glad to send a message to *The Nation* on its Eighty-fifth Anniversary.

My husband sent you one on the occasion of its seventy-fifth anniversary, and one of the paragraphs in his letter, I think, should be repeated now, because it is still, from my point of view, the reason why *The Nation* should be supported and congratulated. He wrote:

"I think no one would ever accuse *The Nation* of seeking to become a popular organ. It has, through its long history, often appeared to stand alone. It does not matter whether one agrees with *The Nation* or not. The important thing is that everywhere and always—particularly in a democracy—minorities shall have a means of expressing themselves, and *The Nation*, as we all know, has often represented minority opinion and mighty unpopular minority opinion at that. It has not seldom vindicated the principle laid down by Voltaire: 'I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.'"

The Nation continues to live up to its standards and to fill a necessary and important role in the community of a democracy.

TRYGVE LIE
Secretary General of the United Nations

I am glad to send my greetings to you on the occasion of the Eighty-fifth Anniversary of *The Nation*. I was especially glad to learn that the anniversary issue, true to *The Nation's* tradition of fearlessly tackling controversial problems, is dedicated to a discussion of the basic causes of conflict between East and West and an examination of how the conflict may be resolved without sacrifice of the principles which underlie the democratic way of life.

This problem constitutes the greatest of the current challenges to the capacity of the United Nations to preserve peace. I am sure a searching examination, such as is proposed for your anniversary issue, will be helpful to clearer thinking on this matter.

CLARENCE E. PICKETT
Honorary Secretary, American Friends Service Committee

The ramifications of relations between Russia and the United States go far beyond the immediate relations between these two great powers. The American navy in Formosan waters, the sharp feelings of India concerning South African treatment of Indians, the visit of representatives of the new China government to the United Nations—all these are manifestations of the complicated nature of the relations between these two countries.

A symposium of data and points of view such as *The Nation* is producing in this issue might add materially, one would hope, to the thoughtful consideration of the serious issues that divide the two countries. While communism as a theory of life is largely blamed for all the ills of mankind, the issues are not that simple. There is probably a more thoroughgoing effort to apply the philosophical theory of communism to social and political life in Yugoslavia than in Russia, and yet one sees little if any of the expansionist policy asserting itself through Yugoslavia. The revival of nationalism and the world-wide rebirth of confidence in arms as a means to security are not confined to communism. There is nothing new in the theory that heavy armament is a protection. The tragedy is that it has never delivered the protection that it proposes to provide. If it goes on unbridled on both sides of this struggle, there is no historical precedent for its producing anything but war. It is therefore of central importance for the world's welfare that an attack upon poverty, illness, and exploitation be quickly and effectively started

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and be accompanied by gradual disarmament. One hopes that this carefully prepared issue of *The Nation* may lead us in that direction.

JACOB S. POTOFSKY
President, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America

Of course you have made enemies—the McCarthys and such other reactionaries—but it is a tribute to *The Nation* that it has made such enemies and triumphed over them. *The Nation's* is a clear, sane voice in the wilderness of hate, greed, regimentation, and exploitation. Its existence is more imperative now than ever before in its long glorious history.

I wish *The Nation* long life to pursue our mutual aims of world peace, prosperity, and security.

BISHOP HENRY K. SHERRILL
Presiding Bishop, Protestant Episcopal Church

It is a privilege to send congratulations and good wishes to *The Nation* upon its Eighty-fifth Anniversary. Free discussion is the very lifeblood of democracy. Thus *The Nation* performs an important function in a day when the dangers of enforced uniformity are so real.

FREDERICK MAY ELIOT
President, American Unitarian Association

For any genuinely liberal institution to survive for eighty-five years, those responsible for its policies must somehow have managed to achieve the exceedingly rare combination of consistency and flexibility; and it is this extraordinary achievement on the part of a succession of editors of *The Nation* that today stirs our deepest admiration and serves as the basis for enthusiastic congratulations and quite unlimited hopes for the future.

At a time when the liberal spirit is, to say the least, out of fashion, one of the most reassuring facts in the present life of America is the survival and the promise of so valiant a champion of human rights and human progress. Liberals in every other area of American endeavor must take heart when they scan the record of these eighty-five years and must return to their own special assignments in the on-going work of the liberal tradition with renewed courage and confidence.

SENATOR FRANK P. GRAHAM

Congratulations to *The Nation* on the birthday of the oldest political weekly in the United States. For eighty-five years *The Nation* has been an open forum of free opinion on the most controversial issues of the times. America is a freer and fairer society because for almost a century *The Nation* has fought for the freedom and equal opportunity of minorities and disinherited peoples in this country and all over the world. At no time has America and the world needed such a journal as *The Nation* more than at this time, critical with the struggles for freedom and human dignity against privilege, monopoly, imperialism, and the totalitarian tyranny which threatens to destroy the precious things of the human spirit for which *The Nation* has stood and fought.

WALTER WHITE
Executive Secretary, N. A. A. C. P.

It is a genuine pleasure to extend the heartiest congratulations of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People to *The Nation* on the occasion of its Eighty-fifth Anniversary as a crusading liberal weekly.

In these crucial times a strengthened democracy at home is America's only hope if it is to emerge victorious in the world-wide struggle against totalitarian ideologies. In saluting *The Nation,* the N. A. A. C. P. takes cognizance of a consistent record of liberalism and unwavering devotion to democratic ideals. Courageously outspoken against the crime of lynching and other expressions of race hatred, *The Nation* raised one of the earliest voices in the fight for civil rights and has made a vital contribution to our progress.

JAMES G. PATTON
President, Farmers' Educational and Cooperative Union

With too many of those who should be keeping up the liberal fight remaining alarmingly quiet these days, it is heartening to know there are a few who do not hesitate to stand up to be heard and counted. *The Nation* deserves applause and gratitude for being of that number.

By fighting for civil liberties, by your clear warnings against doing business with the Francos and the Chiangs, and by your repeated efforts to bring about an awakening of public opinion to full understanding of the nature of the revolution against colonialism, feudalism, and hunger which is shaking Asia, you are providing a breath of hope for all of us. Keep up the good work!

BENJAMIN V. COHEN
Alternate U. S. Delegate to the U. N.

For eighty-five years *The Nation* has served the country by encouraging the fearless and honest expression of uncommon thought. In the period of change and travail through which the world is passing, there is a tendency, a dangerous tendency, for people to accept group thinking or predilection as a substitute for individual thinking. In this period the country needs more than ever *The Nation,* a journal of fearless, honest, uncommon thought.

MARSHALL FIELD

My hearty congratulations to *The Nation* on its Eighty-fifth Anniversary. I hope you will be celebrating many, many more.

DR. NAHUM GOLDMANN
Chairman, American Section, The Jewish Agency

I am very happy to congratulate *The Nation* on its eighty-fifth birthday. Few organs of public opinion in the United States can match *The Nation's* record for consistent liberalism, unswerving honesty, and great courage. Now more than ever its independent approach to domestic and international problems represents an enormously valuable contribution to the molding of public opinion. May *The Nation* continue for many more years to play its role as a pioneer of liberalism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SHIELD OF THE REPUBLIC?

The Prospect in Asia

BY HAROLD R. ISAACS

THE Russian-American conflict hangs heavily over Asia, as it does over the entire globe. It affects all decisions, impinges upon every people and every problem. At this moment, in Korea, it threatens to erupt into a disastrously generalized war. But it is by no means the main source of peacelessness in Asia. If this conflict were effaced from the scene tomorrow, there would still be no peace in Asia. The peoples of that heaving continent would still be seeking to transform their outworn social systems; they would still be struggling to overcome the backwardness which condemns vast and growing populations to chronic poverty. In company with the rest of the world, Asia would still have to be embarking upon the formidable business of raising the standard of living of its people and of reshaping the globe out of the ruins of the age of empire.

There are in all this too many knots that cannot be untangled and have to be cut. There are too many conflicting interests that cannot be resolved by peaceful means alone, as the war in China and the colonial wars in Indonesia and Indo-China have shown. These issues are deeply rooted in Asia's own past, in its relations with the Western world, in the great revolutionary changes through which it is now moving with such travail. They represent some of the greatest human problems of our century. They are an integral part of the world crisis that arises from the fact that the structure under which the world grew and functioned for nearly three centuries has toppled. The old systems and the old forms of power no longer work. They have to be replaced by new systems and new forms of power that will work. In Asia this issue is posed in its most pressing, most spectacular, most explosive form, because in Asia the whole social and economic order based on Western empire has been destroyed.

The question here, therefore, is not what kind of "negotiated settlement" between Russia and America can produce peace in Asia. It is rather what kind of world organization can be created in which these issues can be resolved in the most rational possible way. It is not a matter of what Russians and Americans can agree on, but of what the Asian peoples themselves need and of what they need to do. It is not a matter of defining the terms and boundaries of a new Russian-American balance of power, but of advancing the cause of a new global balance in human affairs, primarily through narrowing the gap between the economically backward and the economically advanced countries of the world.

This transformation would be difficult and violent enough even if the shadows of a new world war were not closing upon us. If the events in Korea touch off the bigger war that everybody fears, obviously it will end any effort to move consciously toward visible goals. We shall in that event simply careen on toward unknown destinations. We are too much at the mercy of irrational factors to be able to know with any decent certainty even what the immediate future holds for us. But assuming, as we doggedly must, that this immediate crisis can be surmounted and that we will win through to the crucially needed interval of time in which to seek more tolerable solutions, we can restate the premise that the basis of an ultimately fruitful peace in Asia will be laid by actions now that advance these objectives:

1. Final elimination of all surviving remnants of imperialist rule and foreign domination.

2. Extension of the national revolutions in Asia, to bring about drastic changes in the systems of land tenure, taxation, and credit, and the creation, directly out of the popular movements in the villages and towns, of new democratic institutions of self-rule at the local as well as the national level.

3. Long-range, large-scale, and internationally integrated plans for economic development, based not on narrowly conceived national economic units but on rationally planned industrialization and an intelligent international division of labor.

4. Provision of large and long-term international credits to be used in U. N. programs of technical assistance and economic development directly and specifically linked to programs of reform.

This is, certainly, a tall order that will take a long time to fill. But Asia is a tall problem that has been a long time growing. In everything that we or the Asians do now, we either move toward these objectives or away from them. Opportunism and corruption in nationalist regimes, the course of events in China, Korea, Indo-China, decisions on Formosa, cannot be regarded eclectically. They all set patterns. They determine mutual attitudes, as between social classes and between nations.

HAROLD R. ISAACS is a foreign correspondent formerly with Newsweek. *He is the author of "No Peace for Asia" and other books.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

They set new forces in motion. They either advance the cause of an ultimate democratic solution for Asian and world problems or they retard it.

In effect, we are either struggling to lay the foundations for a real peace in Asia, and therefore in the world, or we are merely trying to thwart the Russians at this point or that point. There is a big difference. In the one case, if we govern our present actions by our long-term goals, we shall have a chance, whatever the difficulties, dangers, and costs, of achieving our best purposes. In the other case we shall simply continue to pour out our human, material, and moral substance in the sterile battles of a power struggle without end.

FROM the Asian point of view, the Russian-American power struggle is a major obstacle in the path of everything Asia needs and everything Asia needs to do. Nationhood, as such, is a blind alley for everyone, but more particularly for the new nations emerging so tardily in Asia. Their real chance to grow is not in the creation and hardening of their new and bootless sovereignties but in the existence of a hospitable world community engaged in overcoming the anarchy of divided nation-states and clashing national economies. There is no such community in sight: the power struggle is keeping it from being born. That struggle is paralyzing real effort at reconstruction. It is draining off into armaments the resources Asia and the rest of the world need.

Under its impact Asia remains a battleground for contending national interests from the outside, whereas Asians have had more than enough of playing the role of pawns and victims in the wars and rivalries of the West. When all else has been said about Russian cynicism and U. N. morality, this is still the essence of what has happened in Korea. The self-interested maneuvering of the powers, now as in the past, presses Asia's internal struggles into grotesque shapes. Russian pressure prods the North Koreans into a disastrous war. It imposes a totalitarian cast on the Chinese revolution and forces it into an isolation dangerous for China. Everywhere the Kremlin cynically manipulates parties and popular movements to serve Russian national ends. American pressure in the recent past tried to keep Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang regime clamped on the backs of an unwilling people, and today in Indo-China it is supporting a French power that the people reject.

Asian Communists, like the present leaders of China, have of course openly aligned themselves on one side of the conflict. But one can be sure that some among them already know, and more among them will come to know, how damaging this is to their own future prospects. The Chinese Communists will remain wedded to the Russians for a long time, but it will not be a happy marriage nor will its issue serve China well.

In non-Communist minds, on the other hand, an equation is tending to rise between Russian power and American power; they fear and mistrust both. In one sense this is an advance, because in the process a great many non-Communist Asians are shedding some of their past illusions about Russia. In place of the self-professed great friend of the anti-imperialist movements of colonial peoples, they are beginning to see the grim outlines of the new totalitarian imperialism whose object is Russian control of Asia.

But on the other hand most of these same Asians tend to see in the United States the heir to the Western imperialism of the past, the great conservative capitalist colossus, to be feared because of its very size and wealth, shot through with racialism, interested only in extending its power or in countering the expanding power of its Russian rival. Asian support for the morally defensible American action in Korea was diluted by mistrust of accompanying American actions in Formosa and Indo-China. Even the American action in Korea itself has been freely distorted, especially in some Indian thinking, into an act of aggression designed to secure bases for a war against Russia and China. But Korea aside, there is enough truth in the rest of this picture, enough support for it in past and present American actions in Asia, to give Americans pause and to indicate the direction our policy must take if it is to be more fruitful.

It is a matter of putting our finger on the points of contact at which Asian and American self-interest can join and serve common purposes of greater human welfare. This was never a simple matter. In our fumbling around in Asia since the end of the Japanese war we have managed to make it a good deal less simple than it was. In this period the United States, at first the object of the most bounding Asian hopes, has won for itself suspicion, mistrust, and hostility. As though the existing difficulties were not great or numerous enough, we have created new ones to overcome.

In the same interim the non-Communist Asian nationalists have also demonstrated their weaknesses. The gravest of these is their unwillingness or inability to



— Bravo ! Bravo !

— Bravo ! Bravo !

Courtesy *Franc-Tireur*

The Charles C. Sherrod Library
EAST TENNESSEE STATE COLLEGE
Johnson City, Tennessee
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

see their own revolutions through to their logical next steps, especially in the critical spheres of land tenure, rural credit, and taxation. Too many of them have thought that the requirements of the nationalist overturn were satisfied once they had displaced the foreigners in positions of power and profit. They have been unwilling to go on and begin forcing, at the necessary pace, the changes in internal social relations which must follow if a start is to be made in improving the people's lot. Faced with inhospitable anarchy abroad and insistent discontent within, not a few Asian nationalist intellectuals have retreated into a shadowy half-world. They take refuge in a peculiarly hopeless kind of new Asian isolationism. They make false assumptions of moral and cultural superiority by which they try to obscure from themselves the harsh realities of their situation. In this too, as much as in American policy, drastic changes must come if the struggle against totalitarianism in Asia is to have any chance at all.

For this is the essence of the opportunity which the Communists are quick to grasp and then to subvert to their own, and Russian, ends. The conservative nationalists are too closely tied, often, to the landholders, usurers, and other wealthy classes to exact from them the price of revolutionary change. The Communists have no such inhibitions; they offer leadership in bringing about initial changes which at least look like the changes the people want and need. The conservative nationalists tend to see in large-scale foreign aid a way of bringing about needed improvements and development without transforming the social relations they do not wish to disturb. In the absence of such aid they plead their helplessness. The Communists, on the other hand, once they have won popular support, have no hesitation in ruthlessly imposing upon the people themselves the cost of new economic development, however great this proves to be in human life and hardship. This is the essence of totalitarianism—transformation through enslavement.

Because of the size of the problem and the need for extreme solutions, the example of Russia, a backward country which made itself over into a great power in a single generation, powerfully attracts certain types of Asian intellectuals, dedicated, desperate, and, more obscurely, power-hungry. It is not difficult for them to spread a self-deceiving gloss of devotion to a better future over a form of enslavement that parades in the name of liberty, accomplishes its purposes by postponing any actual freedom to a remoter future, and justifies meanwhile the grossest kind of tyranny. The ideas of freedom and mass welfare were in any case never conspicuously present either in the older Asian societies or in Asian experience under Western rule. It is a somber possibility that the totalitarian method will impose itself, almost by default, on the present Asian circumstances. This tends to happen, as it did in China, as the result of wholly indigenous circumstances. Russia does not create these conditions; it simply benefits from them. In the absence of any effective alternative, the sheer pressure of mass misery, swelling populations, and contracting economies may well drive one Asian nation after another down this road, if not under Communist auspices then under other forms of tyranny.

THE problem before us and before the non-Communist Asian nationalists is the problem of the effective alternative. Asian life today is in considerable part what Western imperialism made it. The age of empire bequeathed to Asia a legacy of lopsided and inadequate economies and productive systems, poverty, illiteracy, and a minimum of political institutions and administrative skills from which the new nations might make a fresh start. At the same time the breakup of the world balances created by the age of imperialism has dislocated the economy of the world as a whole. The enormous disparity between the American productive system and the productive level of the rest of the world has opened an abyss into which we can and shall fall unless by heroic efforts in the coming generation we succeed in bridging it. The United States has inherited the power of declining Europe; it has also inherited Europe's accumulated debts to the peoples of the backward continents. The time for payment has come, and world peace will depend on how we settle these accounts.

This raises a series of big questions: Has Western industrial civilization, built by Europe in the first place on empires and the exploitation of colonial resources, the capacity now to create out of itself a new world system in which the backward countries can develop their own productive forces? Has Russian totalitarianism pointed the way out for the backward nations, or are there, in the combined resources of Asian nationalism and the West, the makings of a different approach? Can the gigantic task of overcoming Asian backwardness be achieved by methods based upon the expansion of democratic-popular institutions and human freedom?

The answers to these questions are by no means assured. The evidence to date is not encouraging. Not a single one of the new non-Communist Asian nationalisms has so far shown signs of a real ability to break through the shell of the old society with the speed and dynamism that the situation demands. As for the United States, it has yet to define in its present actions the future toward which it is moving, especially with regard to Asia. The Russian impact and example and the crisis of the backward countries are threatening to drag us into a totalitarian epoch in which, whatever else occurs, human values we want to preserve and extend are menaced with extinction. What we have to see is that this threat is a product of the crisis in our own society. Our problem is to transform our power into a lever that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thomas Mann Sends Congratulations

ON ITS eighty-fifth birthday I offer *The Nation* my hearty congratulations.

I have known *The Nation* for only twelve years of its impressive life span, but during my residence in the United States, first as a guest, then as a citizen, I have scarcely missed an issue of this forthright and militant, yet urbanely literary weekly. In every number I have encountered some piece of criticism so lucid, so meticulously just, so scornful of the applause of the narrow-minded that I have been stimulated, instructed, and lifted up in mind and soul. Not to make the present role of the magazine seem less but to express only the characteristic emotional attitude of a German emigrant, I may say that especially during the Second World War, at the time of the struggle against Hitler, reading *The Nation* was a great comfort.

In changing times the magazine's abhorrence of the most evil concept in political history—fascism—has continued unabated, though elsewhere, with democracy so bewildered by a most unfortunate power grouping, this feeling, all too often, has died down, or evaporated entirely, or has even been changed by a panicky fear of communism into an unhealthy sympathy with fascism.

The men and women who give *The Nation* its character have a keen eye, perhaps the keenest in this country, for the moral dangers to American democracy, and to democracy in general, arising from the disastrous strife known as the "cold war." It is for this that I value them so highly. I find truly praiseworthy their criticism of the weaknesses and moral inconsistencies in our domestic and foreign policy; of our strange tendency to sacrifice democracy when we think we are defending it and to stoop to the methods of communism in fighting it; of our terrifying willingness to abridge civil rights and freedom of thought at home, to enforce an impossible conformity, to give free rein to denunciation, and mercilessly to drive dissidents into the economic desert—while abroad we support with arms and money everything that is bad, rotten, outworn, and hateful to the people, provided it is not Communist. Such criticism, voiced in all loyalty and in the framework of the American tradition, is indeed indispensable. It is basically another way of saying, "What is a man profited if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?"

I am convinced that history will do *The Nation* honor.

THOMAS MANN

will help us and the world move toward more humanly tolerable solutions.

This is the context in which the Russian-American conflict is taking place. This is the gauge by which we can measure the Russian and American relation to the issues facing us and size up what we do against what we seek. This is the way we can continue trying to make sense out of increasingly senseless circumstance.

In the present state of the power struggle there is nothing realistic about seeking "cooperation" from Russia or a settlement that can be negotiated across a conference table. To begin with, there is no such thing as an abstractly reasonable settlement of a power conflict. In the nature of it, there can only be shifts in the relationship of force. "Deals" in this situation are necessarily fragile and are usually at the expense of other peoples who in this day and age are disconcertingly unwilling to bear the cost. The key to the situation lies in the fact that the issues at stake cannot be decided by war either, since we have reached the point where war is universally self-defeating. For all the alarums, Russia certainly is counting upon winning out not by victory in a war but as a result of the self-destruction of the West. We have to undertake not to be obliging in this respect.

The creation of "situations of strength" is one way of defining the course we have to follow; it still has to include the military factor to a substantial extent. But this has to be subordinated to political and economic "situations of strength," without which military force is futile. That was the lesson of what happened in China. That is the lesson being tested again in Korea. It is the lesson we shall learn again, from new disasters, if we pursue our blind effort to keep French force paramount in Indo-China as a "bulwark" against communism.

By slow stages and after many hard knocks American policy-makers have moved a little way toward the premises of a more fruitful policy in Asia. It has taken crashing events to impress upon them that Asia holds a new and primary place in world affairs and has to be brought into a new balance in American thinking. Even now this lesson is only half-learned. But Dean Acheson has spoken several times of identifying this country with the Asian revolutions. President Truman has told us that at Wake he undertook to impress upon General MacArthur that Asia is "more than a military problem," and at San Francisco he said again that what the United States wanted to do was to help Asians raise their standard of living. These are sensible words. But our trouble is not the words; it is the actions to suit them.

We cannot keep on talking about being anti-imperialist and at the same time ally ourselves with the French in Indo-China. We cannot talk about wanting to help Asia and then spend a few millions for a gleaming idea like the Point Four program while we pour billions into arms. We cannot speak of our wish to join hands with progressive forces in Asia and then establish our closest affinities with the forces represented by Chiang Kai-shek, Syngman Rhee, Elpidio Quirino,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bao Dai, and Marshal Pibul of Siam. By doing so we lose our moral credit and, in effect, abdicate to the Communists. The only way to avoid doing this is to make our actions conform to our long-range objectives, assuming that these will serve human welfare in Asia as elsewhere.

The immediate present, however, is completely overshadowed by the imminent threat of an extended war. If that threat materializes, we shall have our choice of disasters, not of policies that can help lead us toward a more fruitful peace. It is because they see this so clearly that at least some officials in Washington have been exerting every effort to avert this outcome. At present it is impossible to know whether General MacArthur's ill-conceived and ill-timed "victory" offensive has rendered all their efforts fruitless. The Chinese Communist aggression in Korea may have been designed to secure more limited objectives, but the Moscow-Peking axis is just as subject as we are to the irrational pull of events out of control. In effect, their move will have forced the bigger conflict upon us.

If, however, this crisis too can be surmounted and we can advance into another period of uneasy but precious time, we can still try to find the way to begin building the basis of a more fruitful partnership between ourselves and the peoples of Asia.

This would mean pursuing a policy toward China that is hard-headed but founded upon a determination to avoid the embroilment that only Russia can ardently desire. It means giving Russian-Chinese relations a chance to nourish all the contradictions and conflicts inherent in them. It means seeking an exit from the trap we are in in Indo-China by finding the means of getting the French out and the U. N. in to give that country a freer chance to determine its own fate. It means in the rest of non-Communist Asia launching a large-scale program of economic aid through the U. N. on the basis of specific and drastic internal reforms.

These are the visible openings leading to the road that can take us toward ultimate peace in Asia. Instead of allowing the Russian-American conflict to fix the terms of our relations with Asia, we should begin to see to it that our relationship with Asia would fix the terms of that conflict. The openings are there, fitfully seen now. By the time this article appears, they may no longer be visible.

We Need Asia!

BY OWEN LATTIMORE

HISTORY will record, I believe, that two events of the past few months marked the beginning of a new age. The first was the action of the United Nations in organizing, under the prompt and courageous leadership of President Truman, the international use of armed force to stop aggression. The second was the revelation in Korea that Asians could fight a form of modern warfare that strained the resources of the greatest power the world has ever seen—the United States.

The character of war in Asia has been revolutionized. "Colonial" wars are no longer wars in which a small Western élite can operate at will among masses of badly armed, untrained "natives." A century ago some 50,000 or 60,000 British troops could put down the Indian Mutiny. Half a century ago, in the Boxer rising, 20,000 men cut their way from the sea to Peking and relieved the besieged Western legations. But now the North Koreans have shown that in a few short years Asians can be taught to handle tanks and artillery with formidable skill. The United States had to mobilize against them forces comparable to those used in North Africa against crack German troops. Resort to war in Asia now requires as serious a decision as resort to war in Europe.

Thus we are faced with a dangerous dilemma. Until we have increased our reserves, we shall not be able safely to divert large forces to other fields of action in Asia. Meanwhile in Europe as well as in Asia, Russia can use the technique of getting us into wars with its satellites, while its own forces are held uncommitted. We and our allies are not prepared to fight a two-front war.

With one threat after another looming on the horizon, panic and hysteria have infected our political life. Both the conduct of foreign policy by the government and discussion of foreign policy by the public have been made difficult and hazardous. The State Department and the intelligence services of this country are staffed with men whom years of training have qualified to understand the languages, politics, and social and economic problems of Asia, but none of these men are able to function normally today. Instead, a weird crew of ex-isolationists, ex-Communists, pro-Nazi propagandists,

---

OWEN LATTIMORE is director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University and author of "The Situation in Asia," "Ordeal by Slander," and other books. This article is based upon an address he delivered in Chicago under the auspices of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fanatics and cranks, working inside and outside Congress and resorting to methods intended to intimidate both government personnel and private citizens, have laid paralyzing hands on the control of foreign policy, especially our Asian policy. A great part of the blame for this falls squarely on the Administration. By failing to enlist the free countries of the world as convinced and enthusiastic allies, it has permitted a vacuum to form—a vacuum of ideas and high policy. Hate-dominated, uninformed sensationalists have poured into this vacuum a devil-theory of international relations as stupid as the Soviet devil-theory of American imperialism.

The Administration has been resolute in insisting upon dollars and guns but timid and inept in formulating policy. It has adopted mighty programs for destroying the enemy of freedom, but made only feeble attempts to inspire and fortify the friends of freedom. It has given the peoples of the world little indication that it is ready to work with them in designing a world of freedom and security. Instead, it has allowed them to feel that they are being offered a Pax Americana, dominated by an American economic and social system. Such an offer is, of course, devastating to the morale of free peoples or peoples struggling to become free. They want America's help and friendship, not its patronage. It is a potential source of disaster that the Administration has either failed to realize this point or has failed to proclaim and act upon it. American policy, as presented to the world, is based too exclusively on the assumption that fear of Russian aggression and Communist subversion is enough to cement a democratic alliance.

The world cannot be handled today as Europe was handled at the Congress of Vienna. We cannot get together with a few cronies and divide among ourselves the raw materials and trade of Asia and Africa. Above all, we must cease to regard the people of Asia as second-class citizens of the world. Up to now we have had a weak and negative policy on the great issues of liberation and equality. Unwilling to treat the Asian countries as equals in a three-way association of Europe, America, and Asia, we have betrayed a lack of faith in our own professed principles of liberty and democracy. As a consequence our relations with Asia have been poisoned by the suspicion that we trust the remnants of European colonial rule more than we do the new national regimes. A further consequence is that nationalist leaders in Asia are afraid to appear to get along with us too cordially lest they be suspected of selling out to us. To protect themselves they try to convince their peoples that they can escape Western control by playing Russia off against us.

Europe's doubt and Asia's disbelief are reflected back into America, where the knowledge that we have uneasy allies increases our own feeling of insecurity. The most terrible result has been a despairing suspicion that our democratic friends in other countries are unreliable and a frantic attempt to make reliable friends out of the most anti-democratic Germans and Japanese.

WE MUST work out a policy that befits a democratic, self-respecting nation with immense world responsibilities. Some of the realities that face us are somber ones, such as the fact that our power alone is not great enough to control Asia. This reality was recognized by Great Britain when it negotiated the emancipation of an India and a Pakistan that could no longer be ruled by British decree. It was faced by General Marshall, who saw that the Kuomintang and the personal rule of Chiang Kai-shek were past salvation, and that all one could hope for was to save a few of the pieces.

This was a tragedy, but it was not our fault. The partial salvage recommended by General Marshall was well within the reach of realistic statesmanship and diplomacy. It was frustrated by the stubbornness of Chiang Kai-shek and the incompetence and corruption of the Kuomintang. It is humiliating to think that the Administration allowed the cancerous lie to be spread around that General Marshall was somehow bamboozled. In fact we could no more have dictated the form of government of China by picking a "strong man" and giving him arms than Britain could have dictated the form of government of India and Pakistan by similar action.

The war itself, not the negotiations of diplomats during and after the war, created an entirely new relationship among Asia, Europe, and America. Up to the war Europe and Japan ruled most of Asia and dominated the rest of it. Japan is now impotent, and Europe no longer dominates any territory in Asia important enough to provide a base for power politics. Up to the war Asia provided Europe and Japan with strategic bases, military man-power, and economic revenue. Since the war Japan has been living on American subsidies, and Europe has vainly exported to Asia its own military man-power.

How can we resume the moral leadership of a free world that we have so nearly forfeited? I believe that three steps are necessary. (1) We must review our present policies, which are mainly defensive, and see how they can be stepped up to provide a dynamic world leadership. (2) We must enlist other countries as allies in a common cause. (3) We must coordinate our policies with those of our allies.

The trouble up to now has been that we have not combined our economic and strategic policies in a way to fire the imagination of people in this country or in other countries. There is no reason for defeatism. We have the beginnings of a common cause with Asia. We can expand it into a great alliance if we are willing to recognize Asia's right to the leadership of the cause of freedom in Asia.

Every non-Communist nation in Asia was shocked by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the aggression that crossed an internationally recognized boundary line in Korea. Every non-Communist nation was frightened by this open attempt to subvert by force a government that had been elected under United Nations auspices. In our search for a common cause, therefore, Korea is one point in our favor; but we have two points against us—our policies in Formosa and Indo-China, for which we do not have general United Nations support. We can improve this position only if we are willing to take part in a wide pooling and adjustment of policies. In such a process we could get most of what we want, but other nations would also have to get some of what they want. And any general adjustment must avoid, for all the nations concerned, the appearance of appeasement or loss of face. It must therefore make use of the channels provided within the United Nations and so strengthen its moral authority and practical efficiency. A stronger United Nations is especially important in Asia. European countries are used to big-power deals, but the nations of Asia are justifiably afraid of them. Asians are convinced that only within the United Nations can the collective strength of the lesser powers be effectively organized.

It is very probable that a negotiated settlement stabilizing relations between the United States and Russia will be achieved, if it can be achieved at all, only as part of a world settlement within the United Nations and not as a direct "deal" between the two giant powers. So great would be the difficulties in the way of such a settlement, even within the United Nations, that it could almost certainly be reached only through several successive steps, and not in one jump; and because "polarization" is less complete in Asia than in Europe, it is likely that the first steps could be taken most successfully in Asia.

The countries of Asia also approve of the fundamental principle that the United Nations is not a club or alliance of similar countries but a structure planned as a meeting place for extremely dissimilar countries. To Asian nationalists independence means not only the right to have a sovereign government but the right to be a different kind of country with its own kind of government. Unless we respect these Asian interests and Asian ways of looking at world problems at least as much as the Russians do, we shall lose out to the Russians in our diplomatic dealings with the various countries of Asia.

THE problem of recognizing and seating the Peking regime in the United Nations should be considered in relation to long-term developments rather than decided in haste in the course of tactical skirmishes with the Russians. A few months ago the new government of China could have been brought into the United Nations as part of a program agreed upon by the United States, Britain, and India, while Russia was boycotting the United Nations. The emphasis would then have been upon a united front and a joint policy among the major democratic nations. Once the Russians had returned to Lake Success, they made it their policy to try to subordinate all other questions in Asia to the China issue. The United States was right in resisting this policy, in refusing to allow the question of Chinese representation to take precedence over other issues. The situation, however, is fluid. If the present crisis is safely passed, it might be desirable to let the China question come to a vote. We have already agreed that admission to the United Nations should be by majority vote and that the veto should not be used. In any case, the long-term advantage should not be lost from view just because the controversy involves impassioned partisanship.

The main fact is that when China fell under Communist rule, we were confronted with a situation that could not be solved by any temporary, cold-war formula. The real question is whether the continuing problems arising out of the existence of a Communist-controlled China can best be dealt with inside or outside the United Nations.

Within and outside that body our policy will for years have to be determined by the struggle to keep world stability from being upset by Russian expansion and Communist techniques of subversion. But we have never frankly faced the fact that very few peoples are enthusiastic about fighting for purely American ideals. This is particularly true of the Asian peoples.

If we are to win the cooperation of these peoples we must make it clear that we are not, like the Russians, trying to force all nations into a uniform mold. We must assure them that faith in a few fundamental values is enough to establish unity between themselves and us. These values are self-determination, representative government, freedom and security for the individual, and respect for the self-determination and representative government of others. On the basis of these simple concepts, honestly adhered to, we can find allies. For on this basis the non-Communist countries of Asia, as well as our nearer allies in Europe, can with confidence cooperate in the work of rehabilitation and de-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

velopment carried on or planned under E. R. P., Point Four, and the military-aid program.

This brings me to the third essential in building a successful policy—coordination of our policies with those of the countries whose strong support we need. The two key countries for this purpose are India and Britain, both of which have ideas that differ from ours on important points—for instance, support of Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa, and the seating of the Peking government in the U. N. On these questions they are backed by the most important non-Communist countries in Asia —Pakistan, Indonesia, Afghanistan, and Burma.

India and Britain and the countries that back them have governments to whom it means a great deal to be able to face their peoples in dignity and independence; they cannot safely admit that they are unable to stand up for their own points of view when negotiating with America. The fact that governments of this kind now exist in Asia as well as in Europe is one of the great changes since World War II, a change affecting not only the balance of power but the nature of world politics. If we want the new, independent nations of Asia as allies, they must be made to feel that they have a part in drawing the blueprints for the future of a free Asia.

HOW are we to make the bid for support and unity that ought to be made; and how can the offer be put in a way that will capture the imagination of our own people and of all free peoples? To answer that question I am going to make a specific suggestion. It may sound dramatic, even sensational, but the dangers that surround us are appalling. If we are to overcome them, a great share of the responsibility must be assumed by the countries of Asia. And if we ask Asia to take a leading role, the appeal must be convincingly presented as a turning-point in our own policy.

I believe, therefore, that President Truman ought to propose going to New Delhi to confer with Prime Minister Nehru. Representatives of other countries of Asia and of Europe could also be brought into the conference, but the first approach should take the form of a request by President Truman for a conference with Nehru in India's capital.

I believe that President Truman should go to that conference by way of the Atlantic, not the Pacific. To go across the Pacific would emphasize the separation between Asia and Europe. To go across the Atlantic would emphasize the point that the common problems of Asia and Europe must be solved in common council. The voyage to India of an American President, for the first time in history, would strikingly symbolize America's repudiation of the old tradition of Western empire over Asia. It would deflate the Russian propaganda that America is trying to impose its policy on Asia.

With such a conference as a beginning, we should be able to disentangle ourselves from our defensive policy of supporting the status quo even against the claims of independence. We should identify ourselves with the Asia that is already free and has a stake in its own freedom—with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, the Philippines. Working from this broad and populous base of free nations, we would have communication and a common cause not only among governments but on many planes: business men with business men, educators with educators, agricultural experts with agricultural experts, the industrial leaders of Asia with the "know-how" men of American industry.

In common council we could solve the problems that face us in Asia much better than we could solve them alone—the great questions of Korean unity, the future of Japan, the stabilization of the turbulent Philippines, the status of Formosa, the termination of the French colonial empire in Indo-China, the relationship between the non-Communist countries of Asia and Communist China. These are questions that vitally concern the United States as a world power, but they are questions that are located in Asia. If we succeed in solving them, we shall no longer need to think in terms of rear-guard actions and defensive positions on peninsulas and islands. These positions can be converted into advance posts of a free, democratic Asia. We can take part in the development of a spreading freedom. It is high time we did so. But we can succeed only by taking part—not by trying to take over. For the future of Asia, in its main outlines, lies in Asian hands.

Salute from India

I SEND you greetings on the Eighty-fifth Anniversary of *The Nation*. During its long life *The Nation* has consistently stood for good causes and for the advancement of democratic freedom all over the world.

Again we face a grave crisis from which none of us, wherever we may be, can escape. That crisis has political, economic, and military aspects, and in resolving it all these have to be borne in mind. But essentially the crisis is of the spirit of man, and it can only be resolved by seeking basic remedies and not relying solely on force. It can never be resolved by hatred and violence. Arms and money go a long way, but they cannot purchase the mind and spirit of man whether it is the individual or in the mass.

In serving humanity and working for its advance we cannot succeed if we ignore the very things for which humanity stands and at which human progress is aimed. Good results will not come through evil men. It is therefore only in a spirit of understanding and tolerance and by adherence to the ideals for which democracy stands that we can ultimately serve the causes that we proclaim.

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Plea for a Positive Policy

BY JAMES P. WARBURG

THE point of view from which this article is written can be stated in two short paragraphs: If the present crisis in Korea can be surmounted, peace is still attainable, without appeasement, and without increasing the clear and present danger to the free world and to the survival of the human race.

The world's hope of peace rests, at this moment, upon the rapid emergence of a new, affirmative American leadership. While it is true that we alone cannot do the job, the job cannot be done at all without a drastic change in American foreign policy.

Contrary to our intentions, we are at present leading, or dragging, the free world along a road which leads either to an atomic war, in which there can be no victory and after which there can be no enduring peace, or else to losing the struggle against totalitarianism without a Russian soldier having fired a shot. This is because our present foreign policy is negative, fear-inspired, and based upon an oversimplified devil-theory concerning the nature of the world crisis.

The present crisis is the product of a number of major forces which have been in train throughout the first half of our century. To mention only a few: the center of gravity in the Western world has been shifting from Europe to America, leaving a power vacuum in those parts of the world formerly controlled by the nations of Western Europe; Asia has been and is in a state of revolution against foreign rule and indigenous semi-feudal tyranny; the progress of science and technology have made men everywhere conscious that the means exist by which hunger, poverty, disease, and ignorance may be lessened if not eliminated altogether; at the same time the peoples of the world are aware that obsolete social, political, and economic methods still prevent the majority of mankind from participating in the benefits of what we proudly call the age of science and technology. Finally, our world of so-called sovereign nation-states has come to the end of the long road of international anarchy, in which physical force has supplied the ultimate sanction, and is now beginning to realize that nations can no longer commit murder without simultaneously committing suicide.

Faced with a world-wide social revolution stirring within the outworn world political system, faced with the power vacuum left by the decline of Western Europe, our government sees only the ruthless, power-hungry Russian regime seeking to exploit these conditions for its own ends. We have adopted the easy theory that all would be well were it not—in the words of the President—that "one nation, and one nation alone, has obstructed the making of a just and honorable peace." It is not surprising that the policy which derives from such a theory should be primarily negative—aimed less at doing something ourselves than at stopping Russia from doing what it wants to do. A policy which seeks to "create situations of strength" sounds affirmative but actually means nothing more than digging trenches and rearing barricades to contain the expansive drive of the Kremlin. We have lost both our sense of direction and our landmarks in the fog generated by our fears. We are frittering away our power and the power of our friends in a series of panic-inspired improvisations all over the face of the globe.

Moreover, we have been pursuing this negative policy with means neither suitable nor adequate to the accomplishment of our purpose. We have sought to effect "containment" primarily by physical force, and in so doing we have undertaken ill-considered commitments beyond our power to fulfil, assumed a military posture without military strength, and stultified our own efforts by entertaining delusions of grandeur paradoxically accompanied by penny-pinching timidity. We have reversed the wise maxim of Theodore Roosevelt: "Speak softly and carry a Big Stick." We have shouted our intentions from the housetops and carried around only a rather expensive photograph of a Big Stick.

Last summer the chickens came home to roost in Korea. Overnight we were forced to realize that our costly military establishment, on which we had spent some fifty billion dollars since the war ended, was wholly unsuited to the global policeman's job to which we had elected ourselves under the containment doctrine. We are now in the process of trying to build up military power commensurate with our far-flung guaranties in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. In so doing, we have embarked upon four dangerous courses of action:

1. We have taken the first timid steps toward becoming a garrison state. We have not undertaken a full mobilization of our power. We do not even plan to double our present puny combat strength of ten divisions. Nevertheless, we have initiated enough military expansion to endanger our domestic economy unless

---

JAMES P. WARBURG was deputy director of the Overseas Division of the OWI during the war. He is the author of "Germany: Bridge or Battleground," "Last Call for Common Sense," and other books.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

far stricter controls are instituted than now seem contemplated. On the other hand, the institution of controls adequate to protect our economy might well lead many Americans to feel—no matter how irrationally—that even war would be preferable to the protracted pressures and privations of living in a garrison state.

2. We have promised to send to Western Europe a large part of the increased combat force we propose to create. In making this decision we have given up our freedom of strategic action in a possible war with Russia by committing ourselves to a pre-announced strategy of holding a position in central Germany. Unless this commitment is backed up with sufficient power to make the position tenable against something like 175 Russian divisions, we run the risk of being driven into the sea if war comes—of reenacting Dunkirk on a gigantic scale. In Asia we have pledged ourselves to defend the Philippines, Okinawa, and Japan—which could mean, among other things, feeding eighty million Japanese across five thousand miles of ocean while fighting a two-front war!

3. Having decided that we can have guns as well as butter here at home, we are engaged in the process of trying to persuade our friends in Western Europe that they can do the same—rearm without arresting their hard-won recovery. This course involves a twofold danger: in trying to protect their economies, our friends may not rearm enough; on the other hand, by rearming at all, they may reopen the door to Communist exploitation of economic distress and political instability.

4. Having realized that the guns-and-butter policy cannot in fact produce enough guns, we have decided to do something which, until a short time ago, we assured the world we would never contemplate—namely, rearm the Germans and the Japanese. Not only will this procedure fail to produce a defense force capable of holding off Russian invasion, but it will actually weaken the position of the non-Communist world, stultify its cause, and destroy all hope of the eventual emergence of peaceful, democratic societies in Germany and Japan. Moreover, rearming Germany will probably convert the nations of Eastern Europe from reluctant Russian satellites into enthusiastic allies, whereas rearming Japan may well alienate our few remaining friends in Asia.

Taken together, these four post-Korea decisions raise the very serious question whether the course upon which we have now embarked may not actually provoke the very war we seek to prevent. The Kremlin may decide that our plans, if completed, would constitute so great a menace to Russia itself that it must attack and overrun Western Europe before our defense force can be recruited, trained, equipped, and stationed on the line of the Elbe River.

Granted that we cannot accept permanent impotence out of fear lest strength provoke aggression, our present course, unless supplemented by affirmative policies, seems more than likely to lead either to war or to Russia's gradual absorption of Europe and Asia without war. It seems clear that, while we might lose the present struggle through physical weakness, we cannot win it by physical strength alone. Mere power, no matter how great, will remain an illusion until it is harnessed to positive purpose and faith in the attainability of that purpose.

THE change in American foreign policy which must rapidly come about if the last best hope of peace is not to be squandered consists primarily in a reorientation toward two objectives which will command the allegiance of the majority of mankind.

In the realm of politics our problem is to get the world started toward the development of a new order in which universal disarmament becomes a practical possibility and war becomes a practical impossibility. We are at present in a situation in which our commitments and our power are hopelessly out of balance. We cannot increase our power—even by becoming a full garrison state—to the point where we could defend both Europe and Asia, once war with Russia breaks out. We cannot withdraw from our existing commitments without inviting aggression by our withdrawal, as we did in Korea.

The only way out of this dilemma is to disengage ourselves from our self-appointed job as global policeman just as rapidly as we can effectively transfer the responsibility for maintaining peace either to a strengthened United Nations or to the free world effectively organized within the United Nations. At present we are doing neither. We persist in the notion that the existing structure of the United Nations would be adequate to preserve the peace if only the Russians would allow a just peace to be made. We have not yet been willing to recognize the fact that, even if there were no Russians in the world, lasting peace would be unattainable so long as the only assurance against aggression lay in a multilateral treaty among fully sovereign nation-states. We have not yet been willing to recognize that no effective disarmament or limitation of armaments will be possible until the United Nations is transformed into an organization capable of enacting, administering, and enforcing world law. Oddly enough, we did recognize this fact with regard to atomic weapons. Our proposal for the supra-national control of atomic energy was in effect a proposal for world government in the limited field of atomic development. But we are still in the anomalous position of understanding what is required with regard to A- and H-bombs, while clinging to outworn and useless concepts with regard to TNT bombs and those other

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

means of mass destruction which are politely called conventional armaments.

Here, then, is one of the two major changes needed in American policy. Unless our negative efforts to prevent aggression are quickly supplemented by an affirmative policy designed to remove the means of aggression from the reach of any national government, those efforts are bound to fail. Unless our efforts to outlaw certain weapons of war are transformed into an effort to outlaw war itself, by creating world law and world law enforcement, there can be no reasonable hope of peace.

To say that such a transformation of the United Nations would be vetoed by Russia is no answer to the challenge which confronts us. The probability of Russian resistance merely makes the task more difficult. It means that we must not only determine to accomplish the objective but must invent ways of accomplishing it by a step-wise procedure. The recently adopted proposal of our Secretary of State to strengthen the power of the General Assembly might prove a useful beginning had it been put forward as a first step toward the avowed goal of making the United Nations into a world government of defined and limited powers. Put forward, as it was, merely to circumvent the Russian veto, the Acheson proposal seems to this writer as barren as our whole negative policy of containment.

THIS brings us to the second major requirement in a new affirmative policy. The effort to create the kind of political structure in which mankind could live at peace can succeed only if it is accompanied by an equally determined effort to ameliorate those social and economic evils which arouse men to a sense of injustice and to acts of violence. We have, it is true, made certain laudable beginnings in this direction. The Marshall Plan was launched with a sentence that might have foreshadowed a truly affirmative approach to the world's problems: its author stated, on June 5, 1947, "Our policy is not directed against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos." More recently, President Truman, in announcing the principles of his so-called Point Four program, sounded a similar note of high purpose and statesman-like vision. But the Marshall Plan was never conceived as a world-wide program of reconstruction and development. It was conceived in the shadow of the Truman Doctrine, as a plan for Europe, and became—owing to Russian obstruction—a plan for only the western half of Europe and soon was perverted into an instrument in the cold war. The Point Four program has so far developed into little more than a minimal and niggardly gesture in the direction indicated by the President.

The affirmative policy required at this crucial moment demands a wholly new approach to the world economic problem. In such an approach the following three factors are essential:

1. We must recognize that it is no longer possible to deal with isolated segments of the world economy. Whatever political divisions exist in the world, its economy is one economy. For example, we have been struggling to "integrate" Western Europe; but parts of Western Europe are more closely integrated with parts of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East than they are with one another. It makes no sense to deal with Western Europe as if it were a little world in itself. It makes even less sense to attempt to deal with Asia in terms of the exigencies of West European economy. Europe can grow strong only in the context of a changed world, in which Asia, no longer a colonial dependency, grows strong in its newly won freedom. Asia can grow strong only if its problems are met in Asian terms, yet in the context of world economy as a whole. The same is true of every other part of the globe.

2. A world-wide program of economic reconstruction and development must be cooperatively planned by all the nations, channeled through a central agency, and carried out through decentralized but coordinated operations. Our efforts to date have been circumscribed and rendered largely ineffective by the notion that the United States, as the world's richest nation, must do this job—or as much of the job as it can—single-handed. There are two fallacies in this notion.

The first is a misconception as to the world's available resources. Actually we have less than we think, and the world has more than we think. We have enough surplus resources at present to help get the world's far greater resources mobilized—but the United States itself needs a "Point Four" program in order to develop its latent power for the benefit of the world. If living standards in the earth's depressed areas are to be raised, then living standards in the developed areas must be maintained and enabled to rise farther—otherwise the whole assistance effort will collapse in failure.

The second fallacy is the dangerous tendency to equate our preponderant economic strength with an assumed corresponding preponderance in brains and experience—and, worse yet, with some right to impose our judgment on the rest of the world. This tends to alienate the people we are trying to help and gives rise to the Communist-propagated slogan of American imperialism. New, affirmative American leadership must combine humility with strength.

3. The final element in a successful attack upon the causes of misery and discontent is the realization that a cooperative, world-wide economic program can succeed only if it draws its stimulus from indigenous revolt against intolerable conditions. This means, bluntly stated, that such a program must ally itself with social

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

change and even with social revolution, instead of seeking to suppress revolution and preserve the status quo. This is perhaps the most difficult hurdle for us to surmount. Our present tendency is to seek to hang on to what we have, to resist change, and so to ally ourselves throughout the world with others interested in preserving their present advantages.

The two affirmative purposes just outlined could be put into the form of a resolution by our Congress empowering the American delegation to the United Nations to propose ending the present armament race through a universal disarmament agreement which would give the United Nations effective and enforceable powers to inspect and control *all* weapons. To make this possible the delegation must also be empowered to cooperate in amending the Charter, even if such changes may necessitate an amendment to our own Constitution.

Congress should further pledge itself to full cooperation in a world-wide program of economic reconstruction and development, to be planned and channeled through the United Nations, which would raise the living standards in depressed areas without lowering standards in the more developed areas. This program should include promotion of the peaceful development of atomic energy along with other natural resources, with emphasis on technical assistance to and capital investment in underdeveloped areas. This country should, as evidence of its good faith, promise to launch such a program immediately and, after disarmament has been achieved, should pledge itself to contribute to the program's support whatever sum may be saved on armaments in the five subsequent years.

This plea for a new look at the world problem—for new creative American leadership—is not to be confused with the commonly heard demand that we should state our case more persuasively—and more loudly. We need leadership, not salesmanship. The reason the "Voice of America" is today a mere whisper is not so much its lack of volume as its lack of substance. We may very well need more radio transmitters and more skilful broadcasters. But what we need most of all is an affirmative American policy for the "Voice" to explain and exploit. Benjamin Franklin said long ago: "It is difficult to make an empty sack stand upright." Denouncing Soviet lies and expounding "the truth" will avail us little so long as the truth consists in a listing of Soviet sins and a catalogue of what we conceive to be American virtues. A creative policy of liberation, such as is here briefly outlined, will not bring us overnight into the safe harbor of peace. It can only set our course toward that harbor. It can only slowly create that synthesis of faith, purpose, and power which, once attained, will make the free world invincible and, ultimately, render the whole world immune to conflict.

YOU'VE MEANT TO DO IT!

You know that your civil liberties are under attack today as never before. You know that there is only one organization devoted full time to the fight for your constitutional rights—that's the American Civil Liberties Union. You probably feel that you are a member of the ACLU *in spirit*; you've probably always intended to become a member *in fact* as well.

NOW IS THE TIME TO DO IT!

With anti-democratic forces on the far right and the far left becoming more aggressive than ever, the ACLU Board of Directors, staff and corps of volunteer lawyers need your active support to:

. . . combat those extreme measures which, though brought on by fears of Communist infiltration and aimed at Communists, threaten everybody's civil liberties—yours included.

. . . lead in the struggle to make a realistic, comprehensive civil rights program the law of the land.

HERE'S HOW YOU CAN DO IT!

You can join the fight for your civil liberties merely by becoming a member of ACLU. Choose from among these membership categories: Sustaining ($25); Supporting ($10); Contributing ($5); Associate ($2). Fill in the coupon below and mail it to us with your contribution.

All members receive *Civil Liberties*, our monthly newspaper, and our detailed annual report on U. S. liberties. $5 members and up are entitled to complete publications service (your choice of 30 thought-provoking pamphlets); $10 members and up may also receive the ACLU weekly bulletin on request.

FREE IF YOU DO IT NOW:

If you join ACLU by using the coupon at the bottom of this ad, you will receive without charge the booklet called "The Free and the Brave," a reasoned analysis of the Mundt-Nixon section of the McCarran Act, by Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., Professor at Harvard University Law School.

Act TODAY to Maintain and Extend American Freedom

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
170 Fifth Avenue, Room 909, New York 10, N. Y.

☐ Enroll me as a member of ACLU. My membership contribution of $_____ is enclosed. I understand I am to receive the booklet "The Free and the Brave" without charge.

☐ I want to know more about ACLU; send me information without obligation.

NAME_____

ADDRESS_____

CITY_____ ZONE_____ STATE_____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Containment Reconsidered

BY H. STUART HUGHES

THE American policy of containment—of a continuous, shifting, flexible holding operation along the whole periphery of Soviet domination—is now nearly four years old. Launched in March, 1947, with the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, the policy received its theoretical elaboration four months later in the now celebrated article in *Foreign Affairs*, by a Mr. X, soon identified as George F. Kennan, chief of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State. The strategy of containment stands at the center of current American policy. Its beginning marked the end of the effort to "get along" with the Soviet Union—an effort pursued with ever-diminishing returns and ever-increasing skepticism during the first year and a half of the Truman Administration. Since then, containment has remained the stable core of policy: it has provided the chief element of consistency through recurring phases of hesitation or changes in tactics. On it the present Administration deserves primarily to be judged. A balance sheet of the containment strategy offers the nearest thing to an objective index for estimating the record of Truman, Marshall, and Acheson in their conduct of American foreign relations.

At its inception, this policy aroused serious misgivings among most left-of-center opinion and a few independent commentators like Walter Lippmann. Such misgivings were based on a number of predictions as to the consequences of the containment strategy. As the years have passed, these consequences have failed to materialize—at least to anything like the extent originally predicted. Yet the criticism has persisted. Can this be ascribed to mere blindness or obstinate loyalty to a *parti pris*? I think not. The continuance of this type of criticism is due primarily to intellectual inertia—a tendency to repeat on each successive occasion the comments that have served for its predecessors without stopping to add up the totality of occasions and to question whether their sum may not necessitate a substantial revision of the original judgment. It is time for critics to attempt a reevaluation of the containment policy in the light of four years of experience.

The original doubts fell under three main heads: first, that the United States had taken on too much and would prove physically unable to resist Communist penetration along the whole periphery; second, that this policy would antagonize other peoples, particularly those balancing between the Soviet Union and the West; third, that it would accelerate the drift toward war. Let us look at these predictions in the light of what has actually happened.

If we leave aside the case of China—where the possibility of a non-Communist solution was already irretrievably lost at the time the containment policy was proclaimed—the Western coalition has held its own during the last four years. No government not directly under the threat of the Red Army has succumbed to Communist pressure. Of the three most dramatic examples of containment in action—Greece, the Berlin air lift, and Korea—two have ended in American victories; the third is now hanging in the balance. Far from demonstrating the physical impossibility of holding the line at all points, they have tended to prove the very opposite—that the United States was able to exert decisive pressure in three widely separated areas of conflict, by three substantially different techniques, during three successive years.

Nineteen forty-eight saw the beginning of the systematic suppression of the Greek guerrillas—a rather baffling police operation executed by indigenous forces, with the United States supplying only material aid and technical advice. Nineteen forty-nine was the year that turned the tide in Berlin—through a massive logistic effort carried out primarily by the Americans themselves. The current year has seen United Nations intervention in Korea, again an operation in which American forces have played the leading role. These examples suggest that the number of *active* danger spots at any one time is limited, and that it is possible to shift the emphasis and to divert resources from one place to another nearly as rapidly as the Soviet Union can itself shift its point of attack. The resources, the technique, perhaps some of the same planes that won the struggle for Berlin went into the air movements of troops and supplies that contributed so decisively to the American advance in Korea. In sum, the containment policy rests on the idea of a strategic reserve—a flexible concept as opposed to the static and impossible notion of simply manning a wall.

Such a concept is, of course, an expensive and wearying affair, in which the Soviet Union will continue to call the turns. And, one may ask, what would happen if the areas of conflict should increase in number, if the Communists should decide to strike at several points at once? This danger exists, but it transcends the scope of

---

H. STUART HUGHES is assistant professor of history and assistant director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard. He is the author of "An Essay for Our Times."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the containment policy. For the present, there are only a limited number of areas in which the Communists can hope to score successes on the cheap without running the risk of a general war. Yugoslavia, for example, is definitely not one of them. Nor would Korea, for that matter, have been such if the American press had not so openly advertised the reluctance of the American military to defend it and thus virtually invited an invasion from the north. If the Soviet Union and its satellites should embark on a series of unsure and expensive ventures, then the nature of the problem would change entirely. In this event, they would be risking a situation in which the United States would find its military resources inadequate for all theaters at once, and thereby be driven to exasperation. And the leaders of the Soviet Union know that the price of exasperating the Americans is an atomic attack on the major centers of Russian industry. If Stalin and his colleagues should invite this retaliation, then the policy of containment would be obsolete. Through no fault of its own, it would give way to the necessities of general war.

THE second count against containment—the threat of antagonizing other peoples—since it rests on human imponderables, cannot be confirmed or refuted with any precision. Here the most relevant question to ask is this: which has antagonized more people—the policy of the United States or the policy of the Soviet Union? Among the so-called neutrals, the events of recent months have decisively tipped the balance in favor of the Americans. Surely the Indians have shown themselves more vexed and worried by the Chinese Communist move on Tibet than by any "imperialist" activity on the part of the United States. Within the opposing camps the state of opinion, open or guessed at, points to the same conclusion. Europeans have failed to take alarm at the new American awareness of the military facts of life: for every Western European shocked by the bombings in Korea perhaps two have been favorably impressed by the proof that the United States is ready to fight in defense of its allies. The Western coalition has suffered no loss in allegiance comparable to the defection of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc. On the other side of the ideological dividing line it is impossible for us to know to what extent the peoples of the satellite states are accepting the Cominform interpretation of the Korean affair and its predecessors. But certainly the signs of internal dissatisfaction are far from being on the wane.

The Western governments enjoy the advantage of knowing their internal enemies—of being able to identify and number them. To these, the Communists and the near Communists, the policy of containment is all evil. But their hostility has nothing to do with containment itself. To this substantial minority of Western Europeans, the policy of the United States is necessarily wrong—whatever it may be. And the same is true of the smaller independent fringe of opinion which is antagonized by the nature of the American economic and social system. A diminution in the military alertness of the United States would not reduce to any appreciable extent the hostility of either of these groups. Informed Americans are finally coming to the reluctant realization that there is an irreducible minimum of Western Europeans—including the bulk of the organized poor of France and Italy—who will remain opposed to any American policy short of frank appeasement. This opposition narrowly limits the possible shifts in opinion that any alteration of the containment strategy might be able to bring about.

Finally, has the containment policy accelerated the drift toward war? Without question, the United States is more militarized, more ready for war, physically and psychologically, than it was four years ago. In that sense, we have advanced closer to the verge of hostilities. But to say this much is simply to recognize the obvious fact that the United States has at length begun a serious effort to counterbalance the military strength of the Soviet Union. The argument that containment leads to war boils down to a rejection of the risks that any such effort necessarily entails. It amounts to an acceptance of Soviet military supremacy. Obviously, even the most extensive American—or Western—plans for rearmament fall impressively short of the comparable Soviet goals. President Truman and Secretary Acheson

Last Chance?

EAST and West are being asked to understand each other. Good. But to begin with, each will do well to understand itself—what it has been, what it now is, and what it hopes to be. You cannot understand a stranger if you don't know who you are. The chances are that he is more like you than you suppose. At any rate, the possibility ought to be investigated. The East is said to have repudiated its past in favor of ours—it believes in equality, and teaches its millions to read: "All men are created equal." We said that once, and we might try to discover whether we still know what it means. Does the East itself know, or are its masters only pretending? Meanwhile we had better not pretend; we had better make up our minds; this may be the faith we are seeking to recover. Genuine possession of it releases power, the kind of power, perhaps—though we should make sure of this—that worries us today whenever we look East. Time runs on, but we still are free to remember Herbert Agar's suggestion of eight years ago that now may be the last chance for the white race to join the human race as an equal.

MARK VAN DOREN

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are on firm ground when they maintain that a realistic negotiation with the Soviet Union can take place only when the military strength of the United States has approached somewhere near to that of its adversary—that preparation for war and preparation for negotiation are essentially the same thing.

In the perspective of four years, then, the containment policy has proved itself. But we cannot leave the question there. Dangers still confront us—if not precisely the dangers originally predicted. Applied mechanically and without imagination, the containment strategy could eventually defeat itself. An American policy that is both realistic and sensitive to the ideological susceptibilities of foreign nations will derive from the basic concept of containment at least four essential corollaries.

FIRST, if the United States is to maintain the confidence and loyalty of its allies, it will have to make its intentions transparently clear. It will be obliged to state in fairly precise terms where and under what circumstances it plans to apply the containment strategy. The Western coalition can scarcely afford a repetition of the abrupt American change of policy on Korea—the dramatic reversal in June of the decision of the previous December to aid the South Korean government with arms shipments alone. The European allies, in particular, have been clamoring for more precision. And since they alone offer a solid base for coalition strategy, they deserve a firm commitment that the defense of Europe has first priority in the containment scheme. The concept of a holding operation all along the line is not incompatible with a scale of priorities. Both ideological affinities and a realistic evaluation of relative military contributions dictate an emphasis on European needs.

The two key events of the past month—the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea and the Republican success in the Congressional elections—have combined to revive the Asia-first school. And they have demonstrated a further aspect of the need for clear intentions: the need to know when to stop—to gauge the moment when an American intervention has substantially achieved its aim and when to go farther would invite a dangerous extension of the conflict. The function of making such a decision belongs to the responsible statesmen at home—and to them alone. It cannot be usurped by a commander in the field without straining nearly to the breaking-point the loyalty of the major European allies.

Second, the containment policy does not exclude the possibility of negotiation with the Soviet Union. The United States would be displaying an alarming rigidity of outlook if through stubbornness or intoxication with its own propaganda it should pass up a legitimate opportunity for negotiation. Such opportunities are doubtless very few. Yet occasions do arise on which, for its own peculiar reasons, the Soviet Union feels inclined to arrive at some partial settlement. Such agreements, to be effective, can scarcely be more than local, short-range, and of unquestioned advantage to each side. Yet their elaboration and development offer the only feeble hope we have for giving the world some measure of order during the present period of armed truce.

In approaching this sort of settlement, American negotiators can ill afford to undervalue the ideology of their adversaries or of the peoples whose fate is under consideration. It would be unwise to go into a negotiation with the idea that communism is a technique of tyranny and nothing more. The fashionable notion of communism as a merely malevolent international plot—a trick to delude the simple-minded—has done nearly irreparable harm to American understanding of the world outside. It has put blinders on the American people; it has drastically limited the range of discussion at home and confined the public utterances of American statesmen to innocuous banalities. A sensible foreign policy can be based only on the recognition that Communists—on both sides of the iron curtain—have real and pressing reasons for being what they are.

THIS brings us to our third corollary. In certain border areas the United States need not require ideological uniformity or a full alliance from those nations to which it gives economic aid and which it regards as its friends. Indeed, to do so would be to undermine their value to the Western coalition. India and Yugoslavia are the chief cases in point. Within the United Nations the existence of a loyal opposition—as opposed to the disloyal opposition of the Soviet bloc and the parochial maneuvering of the Arabs and certain Latin Americans—offers the only convincing answer to the allegation that that organization is nothing more than a screen for United States policy. This sort of opposition India, under Nehru's leadership, provides. If Nehru did not exist it would be necessary to invent someone resembling him. Only through some such formula as his will there be even a remote chance of reconciling the leaders of Asian nationalism with the former colonial powers. To push Nehru hard, to try to force him to adhere more closely to the American line, is to invite disaster. Americans need to appreciate more fully Nehru's problem at home and the pressure he is withstanding from the more extreme anti-Westerners among his own followers. The policy he is currently pursuing is oriented just about as far West as he can safely go. If Nehru, through too close an adherence to the Western line, should succumb to his own extremists, then surely we should have lost our best hope not only for a reconciliation between Asia and the West, but also, ultimately, for the peace of the whole world.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

. . . FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND HIGHER LEARNING IN ISRAEL . . .

TELAVIV 87 26 VIA RADIOISRAEL
PROF. ALBERT EINSTEIN
250 WEST 57 STREET NEWYORKCITY NY

DELIGHTED TO HEAR OF YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRESIDENCY OF THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY, WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE, AND TECHNION. HAPPY AND GRATEFUL TO KNOW YOU SHARE WITH ME THE CONVICTION THAT OUR PEOPLE CAN SURVIVE THIS PERIOD OF TRIAL AND TRIBULATION ONLY BY THE SPIRIT OF SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL EFFORT. THE DEEPEST JUSTIFICATION OF OUR WORK LIES IN THE CONTRIBUTION TO HUMAN PROGRESS WHICH IS BOUND TO COME FROM OUR SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS.

CHAIM WEIZMANN.

▶ An important milestone in Israel's educational endeavor was reached this year in the establishment of the American Committee for the Hebrew University, Weizmann Institute of Science, and Technion, creating a single channel for support of Israel's outstanding academic institutions.

▶ Israel is poor in all the natural resources except one: the intellectual power of its people. Americans can help develop that resource by giving their generous support to U. I. T.

▶ This is not a job that can wait. We cannot shape the body of a people and then inject a mind into the physical being. Both must grow together—with mutual influence and interdependence.

▶ Support of U. I. T. is not to the neglect of present problems, but to their solution on a more lasting basis, for the classrooms and laboratories of these institutions are fashioning the future of Israel.



"The courage and fortitude of the founders, faculty and students of our three institutions will, I feel confident, be matched by friends of the University, the Weizmann Institute, and Technion throughout the world, so that learning, knowledge and a little wisdom may be brought to mankind."

—ALBERT EINSTEIN,
President, U. I. T.

GIVE TODAY TO

U. I. T.

AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY, WEIZMANN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE, AND TECHNION

Room 1226 250 West 57th Street New York 19, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Similar considerations apply in the case of Tito. As a heretic Communist, Tito is far more valuable to the West than he would be as a late convert to capitalism. Only by remaining ideologically "pure," only by resisting the blandishments of "reactionaries," can Tito hope to pursue with success his policy of inspiring dissension in the Communist camp. Indeed, his professions of Marxist orthodoxy are his best weapons in the ideological struggle. And this struggle offers the sole realistic chance for a happy exit from the present international impasse. Only a major split *within* the Communist coalition could tip the present even balance in favor of the West. Too close an overt tie between Tito and the United States would ruin everything. For in the case of Yugoslavia as in that of India, a full military alliance is both unnecessary and inadvisable. Everyone knows that in the event of a showdown both nations would find themselves on the side of the West. Whether this support would be active or merely potential would naturally depend on the scope and direction of the Soviet threat that had precipitated hostilities.

Our final corollary sets the necessary limits to what we can sensibly expect from the containment policy. Obviously this policy offers simply a technique for living with problems, not a solution to them. It is nothing more than a strategy for gaining time. What the United States—and the Western coalition—does with this time is a quite different question. And here the relevant areas of action lie within each country of the alliance, not in the field of foreign relations. Throughout Western Europe—more particularly in France and Italy—and everywhere in Asia the social conditions from which communism has arisen still present the basic problem confronting each government. They will continue to plague us until the laboring classes of the West shall have achieved a balance between economic expectation and attainment more satisfactory to them than their present lot. In the absence of some such stabilization of society, the Western coalition will remain basically a military alliance, potent in resources and technical proficiency, but resting on insecure foundations.

Wanted: Help Not Patronage

BY GERALD BAILEY

NEARLY two years have elapsed since President Truman in the fourth point of his Inaugural Address proposed a bold and expanding program of economic aid to improve conditions of livelihood in the underdeveloped areas of the world. Whatever the motives which led to the formulation of Point Four, it constituted the most hopeful concept which had emerged in world affairs since World War II came to a close. Unless and until the fate of the less privileged peoples becomes the active concern of the more privileged and the concept of a common humanity is reflected in more nearly equal living standards and in a more general realization of human rights, there can be no stability in the world and no peace that is worth the name.

If the fruits of this bold imagining are so far negligible, this is not to be attributed to indifference to the President's lead. No international issue of recent times has been more fully debated; volumes of speeches have been devoted to it and mountains of documents have accumulated around it in Lake Success, Washington, London, Geneva, and elsewhere. Appropriations to implement Point Four have been made and remade in Congress, leaving the observer in some bewilderment as to what is and is not likely to be accomplished. At Lake Success, it is true, the modest Technical Assistance Program has been launched and its operations begun, but a more far-reaching scheme of aid through capital development is still in its embryonic stage, and not even the most optimistic estimate—assuming that the necessary resources are not to be wholly absorbed by the armaments race—offers hope of any solid outcome in the foreseeable future.

There has been, that is to say, a disappointing disparity between promise and performance. But the delay will be profitable if it makes possible a more realistic assessment, not of the practical difficulties, which are obvious enough, but of the less tangible implications of this concept of economic aid from one group of countries to another. So far the economic and technical problems have been thoroughly explored, but at the expense of the sociological, psychological, and political factors on which the fate of any mutual-aid program must largely depend.

Some of these considerations were raised in the conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations held recently in Lucknow, India, and it is to be hoped that the findings of this meeting will be widely publicized and studied, especially in those Western countries whose

---

GERALD BAILEY was director of the British National Peace Council from 1930 to 1949. He is a member of the Friends' World Committee for Consultation and acting chairman of the International Liaison Committee of Peace Organizations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An Investment for International Peace

The establishment of the State of Israel stands out as one of the notable achievements of the first fifty years of this century.

It has written finis to the wanderings of two millennia and given a new lease on life to a people mourning the death of one-third of its number.

It has made possible a significant national experiment in new social and economic forms, combining the virtues of a cooperative society and individual initiative.

It has introduced a democratic, progressive ferment into the stagnant Middle East—supplying its submerged millions with a hope and a model for a better, freer future.

The State of Israel is not serving Jews alone. It is acting as the spearhead of freedom in a region so depressed as to constitute a menace to international security and stability.

Combating vast and manifold economic problems, the new State inevitably looks for aid to America, most powerful of the world's free nations. Israel's economic structure must be enlarged and strengthened if it is to play worthily and effectively a creative, democratic role in the Middle East.

Few investments for international peace and democracy can be more beneficial than aid to Israel. Our government, concerned now with the cementing of the free world, should put aid to Israel high on its list of priorities.

A grant-in-aid to Israel is an investment in the cause of freedom everywhere.

AMERICAN ZIONIST COUNCIL

342 MADISON AVENUE

NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

business it is to prepare assistance programs and put them into effect. A similar approach was made by a conference in a Western setting held at Royaumont near Paris early in September under the auspices of the International Liaison Committee of Peace Organizations. The Royaumont conference met to consider the problems of the so-called "backward" areas of the world in their relation to the establishment of peace. The meeting had the advantage of the leadership of anthropologists such as Dr. Alfred Metraux of UNESCO, and trained observers of Asian and African affairs such as Andrew Roth, correspondent of *The Nation*, Robert Guillain, foreign editor of *Le Monde*, Dr. Solomon Trone, an American engineeer with wide experience in problems of industrial development in Russia, India, China, Japan, and South America, and Dr. Rita Hinden of the Colonial Bureau of the Fabian Society in Britain. There joined also in its discussions Japanese, Indians, and Africans, including in this last category leaders of nationalist movements in Morocco and Madagascar. The meeting was able, therefore, to judge how economic aid is viewed from the receiving end.

There was a vivid awareness at Royaumont, as there was at Lucknow, that unless the West correctly estimates the strength of nationalism in the underdeveloped areas of the world today and its dominance over all ideological or economic factors, it will woefully misjudge current trends in Asia and Africa and the reactions of Asian and African peoples to offers of Western economic aid. However stringent their economic needs, the governments and peoples of Asia and Africa will not, save under the severest necessity, barter their national independence—or their struggle to win it—for the benefits, attractive though they may be, of external economic assistance. They are determined to run their own affairs, or where, as in India, they already have political independence, to insure that this independence is not compromised in the economic field. It is a primary necessity of Western policy, therefore, that it should remove from the minds of the receiving peoples the suspicion that the real motive of Western economic help is the perpetuation of colonialism or the establishment of a new form of pooled imperialism scarcely distinguishable from the old. The controlling idea in any scheme involving foreign aid must be, not a thinly veiled self-interest, but a disinterested concern for social justice.

IT IS no less important that the West should think straight about the relation of projects for economic assistance to the purpose of resisting the spread of communism. It is axiomatic that communism thrives on human misery and hopelessness, and if the West should succeed in lightening the burden of existence for millions of people in Asia and Africa, it would probably incline them toward democracy on the Western model and correspondingly strengthen their immunity to the appeal of communism. And since the "Western" democrat obviously hopes to see his kind of democracy prevail, he cannot be indifferent to this aspect of the problem.

Even so, it is necessary to warn against allowing opposition to communism to become the dominant motivation in this effort. If the West makes this appear its primary purpose, it will fail not only to win the desired response to its economic projects but also to win political support. To the masses of Asia and Africa communism promises a release from intolerable conditions of daily living. Those who have enjoyed liberties will struggle to retain them. For those who have never enjoyed them the issue scarcely exists. To expect them to participate in a crusade against communism is to cry for the moon. If this is what we ask as we come "bearing gifts," we shall assuredly be disappointed. To conceive of the defense of democracy in terms of resistance to communism is in any case to court defeat—in the West no less than the East. Ultimately the only way to preserve democratic values is for the democracies to uphold those values where their own jurisdictions run—in their home countries and in the still unfree territories which they control. In all conscience that will keep them busy enough.

One other idea is worth bringing in at this point. No economic program, we may be sure, can be put into effect well enough or quickly enough to disarm communism or nullify its propaganda on the theme of Western "warmongering" or "imperialism"; we are deceiving ourselves if we think that it can. Unwarranted assumptions are too often made, especially in America, about the effect the Marshall Plan has had on the growth of communism in Europe. Certainly Marshall aid weakened the efforts of European Communists to exploit postwar difficulties for their political ends. But no one could seriously claim that Marshall aid has disposed of the problem or insured once and for all the survival of democracy. Still less can it be claimed that economic aid alone could achieve these results in Asia or Africa. What is needed is a much more complete and consistent application, in Asia, Africa, and at home, of the principles they profess, together with a policy of disarmament and peace for the world at large.

Three further considerations bearing on the organization and the distribution of economic aid should be mentioned. The first is relevant to what has already been said about the need for a dynamic democracy whose attractions are self-evident and which commends itself by its practices rather than its professions. In considering its responsibilities toward the underprivileged, it is not enough for the West to think in terms of material benefits, however urgently necessary. It is important also to recognize and satisfy the demand of the human spirit for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a sense of purpose in living which transcends the purely material. Communism has moved into the moral and political confusion which the West has allowed to develop in Asia and elsewhere, bringing not only promises of justice and equality but also a philosophy and a method of action which is drastic, simple, and clear. If the non-Communist democracies are to commend themselves in these areas they must evolve an appeal and a technique which are no less effective. They too must offer faith, as well as hope, to the destitute.

Golden

The second consideration is akin to the first, but it applies particularly to the more primitive areas requiring technical assistance. Not the least important, though often the most neglected, desideratum in programs for development in such areas is that the planning should take into account both the wishes of the peoples concerned and their native cultures. Progress demands too high a price if it wantonly destroys a functioning society without enabling a better, but still an appropriate society to take its place.

The third consideration would stress the necessity of thinking of economic assistance not in terms of governmental or intergovernmental action operating at a level remote from the peoples to be helped but preeminently in terms of human relationships and of the contribution which unofficial organizations and even individuals can make to the total effort. Wherever possible, the distribution of economic assistance should be made with the cooperation of local groups and associations. In addition, certain projects could be carried through by international teams of volunteers working side by side with the people of the area concerned. The American Friends Service Committee, which has a long experience in relief activity in all parts of the world, is already informally considering the possibility of cooperating in this way with the governmental and inter-governmental action under discussion at Lake Success and elsewhere. Such participation might go a long way toward disarming the fears and suspicions of the peoples concerned. *Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes* is a sentiment to be reckoned with no less today than of old.

It is perhaps fruitless, at this stage, to speculate on the prospect of putting into operation any aid program of world-wide dimensions in the early future. Britain and its partners in the Commonwealth are now committed to a considerable project—considerable, that is, in the light of their available resources—of financial and other assistance to Southeast Asia, not only Commonwealth countries but dependent territories as well. It would be impertinent for a non-American to discuss, vital though the question is, how substantial a contribution the United States is likely to make to the overall effort, though one may properly share American anxieties on this score in the light of recent Congressional elections.

Whether what is accomplished by these various approaches will amount to a grand design, commensurate with the size and urgency of the need, remains extremely doubtful. The obstacles are formidable. There is indifference or hostility in many places which amounts to isolationism, though it is not now respectable to use the term. There is a genuine fear, especially among American taxpayers but among British and others as well, that the financial burden would be insupportable. There is, above all, the extremely pertinent factor of rearmament on an unprecedented scale. As long as so vast a proportion of world resources is being absorbed in military preparation, the job can never be done properly. This was the governing assumption of Senator McMahon's resolution linking radical, general, and controlled disarmament with a program of economic aid and peaceful development. It was also the premise of the Indian resolution introduced in the Political Committee of the General Assembly, stressing the threat to stability and peace in "the prevalence of hunger, disease, and want" and "the existence of large armaments," and calling for "the creation of a United Nations Peace Fund for the development of underdeveloped areas" and the preparation before March, 1951, by each member of the United Nations of a "scheme setting forth the principles and the scale on which it would be prepared progressively to reduce its armaments and contribute to the above-mentioned fund." The Indians withdrew this particular resolution on tactical grounds, but there is no reason to believe that they have abandoned it. A linked program of disarmament and mutual welfare, vigorously pursued and universally applied, is in fact the only truly realistic peace policy open to the West today.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Menace of a German Army

BY CAROLUS

TO CRUSH German imperialism, to extirpate German militarism, raised to the highest and most fearsome power by the Nazi regime—such was the purpose of World Wars I and II. Once the goal had been attained, Germany ceased to exist. All that was left was an eastern zone occupied by Soviet Russia and a western zone split into three parts by the Western powers. "Any German," reads Paragraph 13-a of the Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism decreed in the American zone in 1945 and not rescinded to this day, "who by spreading National Socialist, militarist, or racial ideas, or by other activities on behalf of National Socialism and militarism, impedes the reconstruction of a peaceful, democratic state, or endangers the peace of the world, is liable to punishment."

Five years later tens of thousands of young men in Germany's eastern zone are being pressed into a military force designated the "People's Police." In the western zone the *Neue Zeitung*, organ of the American occupation authorities, on November 4, 1950, published an article, identified only by three asterisks but originating in the office of High Commissioner McCloy, which states:

> The United States alone cannot provide the defensive strength necessary to guard against Communist aggression. Indeed, the volume of its contribution will essentially depend on the contributions of the other nations of Europe, Germany among them. It is evident that the United States will make available strong forces in Germany only if the Germans themselves participate in the defense of their country.

The issue between East and West that developed at Potsdam has now taken such a turn that it is apparently the Germans who have the power to tip the balance one way or the other. "Muster thirty divisions," Churchill has been exhorting the Western Germans for months, "or Europe will be Russian!" The *Neue Zeitung* says to them without mincing words, "In the American view, there is no time left for petty bickering or haggling over the price of collaboration." The Germans are being given the hot-and-cold water treatment, as though the safety of the West depended on them. Would Hitler have won the war if on May 1, 1945, he had had a few extra divisions at his disposal? The Germans are quite willing to play the balance-tipping role assigned to them, and this lends a farcical twist, such as the world has rarely witnessed, to the tragedy of our time.

It seems well worth while to reexamine this latest ally of the Western powers in the light of recent events. Dr. Heinemann, the recalcitrant Minister of the Interior in the Adenauer government, has quit. A Moderator of the Synod of the Evangelical Church, he said on his departure: "God did not twice strike the sword from the hands of the Germans, only to have them pick it up a third time." Rid of this evangelist, Chancellor Adenauer, on the occasion of the debate on German rearmament at Bonn on November 8, was able to declare:

> The Federal Government views the Pleven plan as a valuable contribution toward the integration of Europe. It is of the opinion that a general peace settlement must be brought about through negotiations with the Soviet Union, but that such negotiations will stand a chance of success only when a defensive front of the Western powers is built up that is at least as strong as the Soviet threat. The Federal Government is of the opinion that the Federal Republic of Germany, if requested by the Western powers, must be prepared to make an appropriate contribution toward the creation of such a defensive front. . . . A condition is that Germany shall enjoy complete equality with the other powers that participate in this defensive front and furthermore that this defensive front shall be strong enough to make any Russian aggression impossible.

As early as August 29 the Chancellor, in an unsolicited letter withheld from the German people to this day, advised the State Department that the Adenauer government, which represents big business, desired a German army—under certain conditions. Just how, in view of the situation in the Far East and French resistance to German rearmament, Dr. Adenauer's conditions are to be met is another question. What the German government had in mind, at least for the time being, was proclaimed by the new and practical-minded Minister of the Interior, Dr. Lehr, who told a meeting: "We need an army not merely for defense against the East but also for defense against the excessive wage demands of the trade unions."

Another ambiguity in the declarations of government spokesmen is how "complete equality for Germany" can be reconciled with the Pleven plan. Coupled with this plan is acceptance of the Schuman plan, strongly urged in Washington. Yet the big industrialists of the Ruhr and the Rhine have little interest left in the Schuman

---

CAROLUS is a West German liberal who was exiled from Hitler's Reich. Since the war he has been active in West German politics and for that reason prefers to write under a pseudonym.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

plan, which was so impetuously indorsed only yesterday. Since the war in Korea began, everything is changed. Today, even without a Schuman plan, there is again a world market for German industry, a steel production virtually without limitations, American import credits, an unexpected industrial boom. Since Korea the German production index has risen from 101 to 125, as against 100 in 1936. The Schuman plan was to be signed in August. Now Christmas is knocking at the door, but it would seem that the good little boy Robert Schuman may have to wait far beyond the holidays for his Santa Claus from Germany—if, indeed, he may not wait altogether in vain.

Meanwhile the gentlemen of the Rhineland and the Ruhr are clamoring more and more insistently in their press for the Allies to return control of German decartelization and deconcentration to the "German authorities." In other words, Washington is to set the fox to mind the sheep. If the Schuman plan should come into being under such auspices, the great vertical German coal and steel trust, with its vast productive capacity and low wage scales, would be confronted by corresponding industries in Belgium, Luxembourg, and ultimately even France of such inferiority that these partners in the Schuman plan would have no choice but to capitulate before the Germans. A concentrated German army would have at its disposal a concentrated German industry, provided by the Marshall Plan with all necessary imports. Dollars earned by German exports would, to a considerable degree, be safely locked up in foreign vaults. Even now domestic capital stringency is such that the German discount rate has had to be raised to 6 per cent, while already at least half a billion dollars in German accounts, the fruit of exports, rests safely in foreign banks. Economic power backed by an army—that is the political formula of which the gentlemen represented by Dr. Adenauer and his government majority have dreamed from the beginning, the formula which has been applied so fatefully in two world wars and will be applied again tomorrow.

What this reborn economic power of trusts and cartels means to democracy is readily seen from the organizations and "brotherhoods" that meet Sunday after Sunday to listen to the aims proclaimed by the ex-generals, former Nazi leaders, and war criminals who are rolling off the Allied amnesty assembly-line. "We were grenadiers against communism and not the devil's grenadiers," as Panzer General Eberbach put it on November 2. Simultaneously a "Reich Brotherhood" which dabbles in European politics was meeting in Bielefeld. Among the guests of honor were Himmler's daughter, Hitler's Youth Leader, Axmann, and the former Nazi Women's Leader, Frau von Scholtz-Klink, while Europe was represented by Sir Oswald Mosley, who was able

Freedom Through Understanding

❖ We in the Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, have opposed communism as long and as vigorously as we have opposed fascism. We have never been willing to compromise with one form of totalitarian oppression in order to combat another, nor are we willing to do so today.

❖ Yet we recognize that liberty cannot be imposed by force of arms. The ultimate triumph of freedom throughout the world can be achieved only if all the peoples of the world come to understand the true nature of a democratic society.

❖ In seeking to explore the means through which such understanding can be attained, The Nation is striking at the root of the problem. Let us hope the effort will be a source of new ideas and inspiration for our country's statesmen, as The Nation has so often been in the past.

TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, CIO

EMIL RIEVE
General President

GEORGE BALDANZI
Executive Vice-President

WILLIAM POLLOCK
General Secretary-Treasurer

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to do no more than send a warm telegram from Spain. And all this at a time when Dr. Adenauer had only just announced his "contribution to the defense of Western civilization"! The character of these gentlemen is highlighted by the fact that they are at the same time flirting with Soviet Russia and a German brand of "National Bolshevism." The picture is rounded out by the Minister for All German Questions, Herr Kaiser, who delivers Sunday addresses before audiences of expelled Silesians and East Prussians running into the tens of thousands and promises them that they shall soon return.

VIEWED in this light, the question fails to remain as naive or simple as Washington would make it seem: "Is Europe to become Bolshevized and Russianized?" No, indeed! Moscow has forced Washington to consider another choice: "Shall the European continent be dominated tomorrow by Russia or by Germany?" To vanquish Russia—according to the formula proposed by General McCloy—would only mean handing Europe over to the Germans. Or does anyone imagine that Germany, once it has rendered a vital "contribution" toward victory over Russia, could ever be reduced to its status of 1945-50? Or that the United States would be willing again to intervene in Europe if its German ally engaged in aggression against a neighboring country? This alternative of a Russian or a German Europe is utterly hateful to France, Italy, Belgium, Sweden, and all the other nations of Europe; nor do the German masses loathe it any less. The German masses are afraid of their own shadow, of the militarism that has cost them so dear; and the ruins of their cities have taught them to shun a new war as a burned child shuns the fire. That is why the great speech, with its resounding "no" to remilitarization, delivered to the Bonn Parliament on November 8 by Dr. Schumacher—this Jacobin patriot—found such a wide echo among the people, almost as though it had been the speech of a Danton before the French Convention.

Is it then true that the fate of Europe hangs by the slender thread of thirty German divisions? What a comical delusion to believe that Russia could be held in check by two or three dozen divisions, that Europe and the world could be thus defended against Soviet conquest.

Russia has foreseen the danger of a remilitarized and economically reinvigorated Germany ever since its victorious soldiers marched through the Brandenburg Gate in 1945. It was this danger that kindled the conflict between East and West, that gave rise to the Berlin blockade, a separate West Germany, a Russian satellite state, the remilitarization of East Germany, the remilitarization of West Germany. Each wedge opened the way for the next—but at the beginning stood Russian fear. And now this reinvigorated West Germany, to be remilitarized tomorrow, is actually to become the great ally of the United States! What of the role to which such a development consigns a France that is even today far weaker than Germany, let alone Italy and the smaller Continental nations? A remilitarized West Germany would mean the end of any balance of power on the Continent, would ultimately render war against the East inevitable, whether the United States desired it or not.

The fate of Europe and possibly of the world could be determined by thirty German divisions only if those divisions were inseparably mingled with the divisions of the United States. Still enjoying freedom of action today, the United States, in creating a German army, would tomorrow be the prisoner of that army—the prisoner of Dr. Adenauer and his German industry. Such a German army would be bound to lead a life of its own, to sweep the United States into any and all military adventures, to expose it to all manner of blackmail and threats, *even the threat of a Russo-German alliance*. The whole German question has arisen only because Russia and the United States have dug themselves in on either side of the Elbe. And it is because they are unable to come to an agreement that the German divisions may determine the fate of the world. Hence German pacifism, the fear of the masses that their country may once again be turned into a battlefield, is the only ray of light in these somber days.



Courtesy *Franc-Tireur*

"What's happening?"
"Somebody called the police."

Pastor Niemöller, now engaged in a great peace campaign, recently exclaimed:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Adenauer is no better than Pieck [Russia's handyman in the East German satellite state]. A plague on both of them." Niemöller and his friends have proposed that Russian, American, British, and French troops be withdrawn from Germany, to be replaced by neutral United Nations forces. Free, equal, and secret elections to an all-German parliament would then take place under the supervision of these forces, and the resultant new, demilitarized Germany would become a neutral territory separating East and West. It is a good proposal that represents one method of stamping out the smoldering fire between East and West in Germany, of once again investing the German question with that meaning for the sake of which millions of young Americans and Russians, together with their allies, went to their mass graves in two world wars. The resolutions adopted by the satellite countries at Prague may be dubious, one-sided, and imperfect; but Moscow has made them the basis for its proposed four-power conference, and that conference should be held. The peoples of Europe are anxiously waiting for it. The fate of the world rests with such a conference—not in the hands of thirty German divisions.

Return to Potsdam?

BY J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO

ANY serious approach to a negotiated peace with Russia must take Germany as its starting-point. However critical the situation in other parts of the world, the future status of the now divided Reich is the primary issue between East and West, and the success or failure of efforts to resolve it will decide whether we face peace or war.

Developments in Asia have distracted people's attention from Germany. The tremendous question of German remilitarization has been considered chiefly in connection with France's differences on this score with Washington. The fact that the rearmament of Germany is a direct threat to Russia and a major obstacle to an agreement has been largely overlooked. It is actually such an insuperable obstacle that it might even become a cause of war. While the existence of an armed East German police force has doubtless been a factor in the decision of the Atlantic powers to create West German divisions as part of a "European army," the chief reason is the supposed threat of Russian invasion. The ironic possibility, however, is that the prospect of a rearmed Germany allied with the West may precipitate rather than prevent Russian attack.

During the whole period of tension and dispute which began with the great powers' occupation of the Reich, the Soviet Union has been adamant against allowing Germany to rebuild its military power. Last summer in Paris I was told of a remark made privately by a Soviet marshal in Berlin to a French general, before relations between the former allies had cooled to the present glacial stage. "You must realize," said the Russian, "that just as the Americans can never permit us to reach the Atlantic, we can never tolerate the resurrection of an armed Germany. This is one of the permanent articles of our foreign policy."

Even before the war ended, when the Allies first engaged in a general discussion of what peace should mean, Russia would make no concessions on this point. The Americans went to Yalta with the Japanese conflict dominant in their thoughts. The British were chiefly interested in how to mitigate the effect of the war on their empire. The Russians concentrated on obtaining assurances that an aggressive Germany should not rise again to threaten the security of its neighbors. They yielded on many other matters, as was revealed in the papers of Harry Hopkins, but were intransigent on Germany.

The first steps toward a plan for the joint occupation and control of Germany after the Hitler regime should be destroyed were taken at the conference of Foreign Ministers held at Moscow in 1943. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who presented the American views about Germany to Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov, did not conceal his opinion that the Allies would find it hard to work together, but he hoped the sufferings inflicted on all by the Nazi aggressor would cause them to sink their differences. Once the German question was settled, the other post-war problems would appear relatively minor, and he believed therefore that the three big powers—France was not a party to the discussions—must do everything possible to maintain their unity against an enemy whose bellicose energies had survived every defeat.

To understand the origin and disastrous development of the split that appeared later between the victors, one must recall the decisions on Germany taken at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. At Yalta—February 4 to 12, 1945—the feelings aroused by five years of war and the

---

J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO, foreign editor of The Nation, *was a well-known European journalist before he became Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Spanish Republic. He is the author of "The Last Optimist: A Spanish Democrat Tells His Story."*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

death of millions of men and women on the battlefields and in Hitler's concentration camps found expression in the solemn declaration: "It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism, and to insure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world." This pledge should have ruled all future deliberations about the treatment of Germany, but it has been largely forgotten in the endless controversy over who is responsible for the mounting threat of another war.

Yalta also produced some precise, practical directives. Germany was to be permitted no armed forces, no general staff, no military equipment; Nazi and militarist elements were to be "removed from public offices and from the economic life of the German people"; German industry that could be adapted to war production was to be dismantled or placed under international control. "Only when Nazism and militarism have been extirpated" would Germany be received into the comity of nations.



When the heads of the Big Three met again—at Potsdam, July 17 to August 2, 1945—the situation had been changed by the unconditional surrender of Germany. I am not one of those who believe that the demand for unconditional surrender, formulated originally, and most emphatically, by President Roosevelt, had fatal consequences. The dissension that so soon arose had its origin rather in the provisional character of the support given to the Yalta and Potsdam agreements from the beginning. However, Potsdam confirmed Yalta. The preamble to the Potsdam agreement reads: "The purpose of this agreement is to carry out the Crimean [Yalta] declaration on Germany. German militarism and Nazism will be extirpated and the Allies *will take in agreement together, now and in the future,* the other measures necessary to assure that Germany will never again threaten her neighbors or the peace of the world" (italics mine). The Potsdam decisions not only demanded abolition of current manifestations of German militarism and fascism, but sought to uncover the underlying causes of the German threat. Their goal was the destruction of the continuing elements in German society which had enabled the Reich to rearm after each war and make new attempts to subjugate the world by violence—namely, the great landed proprietors and the great industrial trusts.

It is impossible in the space of an article to recount the many disagreements that gradually wore away the Yalta and Potsdam decisions. It is difficult, too, to establish the responsibility. Russians and Americans, Grotewohl and Adenauer, Communists and anti-Communists have tossed the blame for what has happened back and forth between them. Mistakes were made at the beginning, such as the division of Germany into four parts, the dangers of which were pointed out by Churchill, and the vacillation between the Morgenthau plan for the "pastoralization" of the country and the opposite extreme of restoring its industrial capacity. The exclusion of France from the Potsdam conference resulted in further complications, since the French refused to be bound by the Potsdam agreement.

The Anglo-Americans maintain that in all important matters the Russians were the first to take unilateral measures—citing in particular Soviet dismantlings of German industrial plants, nationalization of industries, the levying of reparations upon current production, and the drastic land reforms. But future historians may challenge this contention, for the record shows that Anglo-American action in some cases and French action in many preceded corresponding Soviet measures. For example, a bizonal economic council was set up in the west on May 29, 1947; a similar council was set up in the east on June 15. The Charter of Frankfurt establishing a bizonal economic administration with legislative and executive branches was promulgated on February 9, 1948; three days later a Soviet decree empowered a German economic commission to issue directives to the whole east zone. The fact is the Potsdam agreement was whittled away, bit by bit, by both sides; the initial breaches cannot be attributed solely to the Russians.

THE Foreign Ministers' conference at Moscow in May, 1947, and at London in December, 1947, preceding the definite abandonment of a four-power policy in Germany, exposed clearly the underlying reasons for the break which was to come, and at the same time pointed the way to a possible return to collaboration. From the beginning of the occupation two antagonistic tendencies have characterized the policy of Russia and the Western powers. Russia has never ceased demanding the political unity of Germany. The Americans and British have tried again and again to get the Russians to accept economic unification. Political unity versus economic unity: this issue is roughly the boundary line between the two approaches to the problem of Germany.

The Moscow conference deadlocked ostensibly on the questions of industry levels and reparations. But

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COMMONWEALTH *Plastics* CORP.

OVER A QUARTER CENTURY OF DEVELOPMENT IN PLASTICS

LEOMINSTER
MASSACHUSETTS

HARRY LEVINE, ***President***

The ELITE SILK COMPANY

Manufacturers of Textile Fabrics

468 FOURTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 16, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

throughout the seven endless weeks of discussion all the problems—political structure, demilitarization, economic unity, reparations—appeared inseparably mingled. However, Moscow began in an atmosphere of amiability: Vishinsky smiled, Molotov unbent, the foreign correspondents were permitted to file their dispatches uncensored. But two days after the conference opened, Mr. Truman proclaimed his "doctrine" of containing communism, by force if necessary, and the mood at Moscow changed. The dispute over reparations became stubborn and acrimonious. The Russians insisted on reparations taken from current German production in addition to expropriation of German property in the eastern zone. Marshall and Bevin refused to yield an inch on reparations and wrangled endlessly over the amounts each victor had taken already. The unwillingness of the Western Allies to bargain on the reparations issue doomed the conference. But perhaps it was doomed anyway by each side's growing suspicions of the other's ultimate aims.

These suspicions dominated the London conference which followed. There the chief matters in dispute were the form and prerogatives of a provisional German government. All four powers favored—or pretended to favor—a politically unified Germany. But only in principle, and on terms that would secure the interests of each. Actually, as related above, the division of Germany had already begun and Potsdam had been scrapped. The London conference revealed the dangerous intention that lay behind the arguments. Britain, the United States, and, in particular, France wanted a loose federation, with large powers left to the constituent states; Russia wanted a centralized Germany. But each side was already preparing to use Germany, even at the cost of strengthening it, to defeat the power policies of the other.

When the conference began to go to pieces, Molotov tried a maneuver to rescue it, becoming suddenly aware that the end of four-power rule in Germany was imminent. He put forward a series of proposals for the creation of German administrative departments—finance, currency, trade, and so forth—as foreseen in the Potsdam declaration, plus a plan for a consultative assembly in Berlin composed of representatives of the *Länder*, the democratic parties, and the trade unions. But the Western Ministers rejected this as a typical Russian move to win time and divide the Allies. And then unexpectedly, on the demand of General Marshall, the London conference adjourned *sine die* with a terse announcement that the Western powers, in view of the impossibility of coming to an understanding on any vital point with the Soviet delegates, reserved the right to proceed with the economic consolidation of their part of Germany—plus the Russian zone if Moscow chose to come along; without it, if not.

The break at London marked the real end of four-power control in Germany and the real beginning of undisguised cold war. From diplomacy Moscow passed to counter-action. On March 20, 1948, Marshal Sokolovsky, after a bitter tirade against the Western powers for wrecking the four-power system, marched out of the room where the Council of Control was meeting. The stage was set for the blockade of Berlin, the air lift, and the suicidal competition for German favors.

AS THE situation worsened, Germany became at once the principal bone of contention and the arbiter of Europe. No one has characterized this development more incisively than Senator George G. Sadowski of Michigan. "It would truly appear," he said, "that Germany has divided the Allies into four zones. Instead of the Big Four being strong enough to decide the fate of Germany, it is the Germans who in the long run will decide the fate of the Allies." The total failure to carry out the purposes formulated at Potsdam must be clear to all readers of *The Nation* from the articles by "Carolus" that have been appearing in this magazine over the past two years. No keener analyses have been printed by an American publication.

Moscow's reaction to the final collapse of Potsdam was to "put the squeeze" on the Western powers in Berlin. Although the Berlin blockade and the subsequent Allied air lift ostensibly resulted from a dispute over the use of a railway and over Russia's claim that Allied currency was being smuggled into the Soviet zone, its fatal consequence was the creation of two entirely separate Germanys, each with its own currency and eventually with its own government. And both of the new German states have learned that the hostility between the two blocs gives them the opportunity to play a decisive part in European politics.

The problem of Germany would appear hopeless but for certain indications that Russia wants to find a solution. Even during the Paris session of the U. N. Assembly in the autumn of 1948, when the Berlin blockade dominated the thinking of all delegates, Foreign Minister Bramuglia of Argentina, at that time president of the Security Council and principal mediator between East and West, declared: "The difficulties have not been caused by the Russians." The prevailing view in Paris was that the immediate differences leading to the blockade could probably have been conciliated if the Allies had not made up their minds to the creation of a West German state, a final blow to the Potsdam concept of political unity. To discuss those differences in the context of the whole German issue, as Russia demanded, would have forced the Western powers to reconsider their strategy, to return to the idea of unification, a peace treaty, and a withdrawal of the armies of occupation. By the fall of 1948 all of these alternatives had become unacceptable. Suspicion of Russia's purposes, to-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gether with the whole program of consolidating the Western bloc—West Germany included—had gone too far to permit a new attempt at conciliation; at least until the Western alliance should be crystallized.

FOR all these reasons, the initiative had to come from the Russians if new negotiations between Moscow and the West were to be attempted. Given the political situation existing in the United States and the temper of the country, the first move could not be made by Washington. The theory had been laid down that negotiations were possible only between equals; that until the West was as well armed as the East there was no use discussing a settlement.

On November 3, in Moscow, Mr. Gromyko proposed that the Big Four meet to consider Germany. Obviously this was the first question demanding negotiation, the one which has been from the beginning the focus of the whole European conflict. Implied in Gromyko's statement was at least some advance toward acceptance of the idea of federating the two Germanys. Sources close to the Russian embassy in Paris have intimated that the Kremlin demand for "equality" of the western and eastern areas in a federal govermnent should not be taken literally; the principle of equality invoked by the Foreign Ministers of the Eastern bloc when they met at Prague on October 22 might be interpreted to mean representation in proportion to population.

To dismiss Russia's proposal as just another obstructive maneuver is to ignore the fact that the Kremlin has never felt sure of the loyalty of East Germany and has not forgotten the lessons of the past. Stalin once told Benes that he "would not even trust a Communist Germany." The Russians, like the French, have experienced more than one German invasion, and the horror of the summer of 1941 is still a vivid memory. The division of Germany into two states, each with its own army, or security police, or whatever it may be called, cannot please Moscow. The most immediate danger is offered by West Germany, inflamed by anti-Communist propaganda and coveting the fertile fields of the East; but East Germany could be aroused by a call for the reconquest of the frontier provinces now incorporated in Poland. Two German states constitute a permanent double peril. Thus in proposing a return to Potsdam, at least in the sense of restoring a policy of collaboration among the Big Four to prevent the rise of German military power, Russia is only serving its own interests. These interests are also those of the West. The specter of a remilitarized Reich haunts every European Foreign Office.

If the United States rejects a negotiated agreement with Moscow on the German issue, it will not only risk a third world war, to be fought not on the borders of Asia but in the heart of Europe; it will also risk fighting the war without dependable allies.

Great-Power Balance Sheet

BY FRITZ STERNBERG

AMERICA'S industrial strength is at present three to four times as great as that of Russia, and it will still be considerably greater after fifteen to twenty years of maximum industrial effort on the part of Russia. These are the most striking facts in any evaluation of the relative strength of the two powers.

Russian industrial development gained great momentum after World War I. Czarist Russia's heavy industry had produced only about one-fourth as much as Germany's. However, by World War II, the ratio of German to Russian coal, iron, and steel production was merely ten to eight, although German per capita production was still about three times the Soviet rate.

The gap between Russian and American heavy industry today is about as great as it was between Russian and German during World War I. The United States produces about 100,000,000 tons of steel annually, the Soviet Union 25,000,000 tons—figures which serve as an approximate measure of the two countries' total strength.

Why is the gap between American and Russian production so much greater than that between Germany and Russia during World War II? One reason is that productivity per man-hour is very much higher in America than it was in Germany. Moreover, Germany's population of 80,000,000 was only half that of the Russian population of the period, while America's present population of more than 150,000,000 is only about 25 per cent less than that of Russia, with approximately 190,000,000. The tremendous difference between American and Soviet productivity corresponds almost exactly with the difference in absolute production.

This gap can be reduced in another ten to twenty years but cannot be closed, even assuming the most favorable variant for the Russians—that their plans for industrial expansion are entirely successful. Stalin in one

FRITZ STERNBERG, author of "How to Stop the Russians Without War," will bring out a new book next spring, to be called "Capitalism and Socialism on Trial" and to be published in this country, England, and Germany.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of his speeches predicted that after the completion of three or four five-year plans, Russia would produce 60,000,000 tons of steel, 50,000,000 tons of pig iron, and 500,000,000 tons of coal. But even if the Russians should increase their steel production to 60,000,000 tons by 1970, this would represent only 60 per cent of the present American output.

Moreover, there is no doubt that during this period America, too, can considerably increase its production. This country has never had any difficulty in raising its output more than 3 per cent per year; with an all-out effort, a 5 per cent increase is not too optimistic an expectation. Leon Keyserling, in a recent speech, actually predicted a 25 per cent increase in the next five years. In other words, if no major crisis occurs, the United States will maintain its tremendous industrial superiority even if Soviet industry fully meets the goals set in the projected five-year plans.

Is the picture altered when the production of Russia's satellites is added to its own? If Russia receives total economic support from its satellites, to what extent will its strength be augmented? The satellite countries are at very different stages of industrial development. Czechoslovakia is at more or less the same stage as the highly developed countries of Western Europe. The Balkan countries, on the other hand, are very backward. The percentage share of these countries in world industrial production is probably about the same as it was before the war. At that time the figures were as follows: Czechoslovakia, 1.6; Poland, .75; Hungary, .36; Rumania, .3; Bulgaria, .1; totaling 3.11.

To this total must be added the production of East Germany and of those German regions incorporated into Poland since the war. Some of those regions were highly developed industrially, for example, Upper Silesia. Russia's satellites plus East Germany accounted for more than 6 per cent of total world production before the last war. Since Russia alone accounted for about 10 per cent, it has brought into its orbit countries producing two-thirds as much as itself. This means that the Soviet bloc in Europe produces far more in relation to the industrial output of the Soviet Union than any previous "empire" ever produced in relation to its ruling state. The output of the British dominions and colonies was never anything like two-thirds as large as Great Britain's, and the same is true of France's colonial empire.

However, even with its European satellites, Russia can only hope to reduce, not to overcome, America's advantage. The fact that China supports Soviet foreign policy will not change the situation in the foreseeable future. China, like some other Asian countries, may gain tremendous importance as time goes on, but its strength at present is nominal. To illustrate the Asian lag: China, including Manchuria, produces fewer industrial goods than Belgium, while West Germany with its population of 48,000,000 produces more than the entire Asiatic continent, whose population totals over a billion.

America's advantage over the Soviet Union and its satellites appears even more impressive when the strength of our European allies is taken into account. Britain's production alone is not much less than Russia's, and it exceeds that of all the Soviet satellites combined. If the production of France, the smaller countries, and West Germany is added to that of Great Britain, the total surpasses that of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The indications are that this advantage will still exist ten or fifteen years from now. Therefore if Soviet expansion is stopped at its present European frontiers, Russia cannot hope to catch up with the United States within any predictable future; indeed, it will hardly be able to match the combined output of the countries of Western Europe.

However, if Russia were to draw all Germany into its orbit, it would become much stronger than any purely European combination and would even stand a chance of catching up with this country. The control of Germany is therefore of central importance for the entire balance of power in the world. Without West Germany the Soviet Union wil continue to be merely world power number two; if the industrial countries of Europe are willing and able to pool their resources, it may fall to number three.

We cannot say with any assurance to which of the two rival states the industrial strength of the countries of Europe, aside from Great Britain, wil be added in time of war. The answer depends not merely on political but on military considerations.

WHAT is the comparative military strength of the two great powers? It is a decisive error to believe that America's industrial superiority over the Soviet Union points to an equivalent military superiority. That is simply not so, for the following reasons:

First, Russia has devoted a far greater proportion of its economy to military purposes than the United States. Russian demobilization was considerably less than that of America, and Soviet armament production has remained much higher; its research work and invention of new weapons were considerably stepped up after the war. Russia succeeded in making atomic bombs more rapidly than was expected chiefly because of the continued strength of its war production. The peace-time military strength of the Soviet Union in relation to that of America is therefore very much greater than any mechanical comparison of their respective industrial capacities would lead one to suppose. With its higher starting level, the Soviet Union can be expected to reach the peak of its potential armament production with far greater ease than the United States.

Secondly, Russia has a geographical advantage over America. The whole of Europe is within range of Soviet

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LIPSCHUTZ
&
GUTWIRTH

Diamonds & Precious Stones
All Sizes and Qualities
Manufacturers
Importers
Exporters

630 FIFTH AVENUE • NEW YORK 20, N. Y.

THE CHURCH PEACE UNION

RALPH W. SOCKMAN, *President*
HENRY A. ATKINSON, *General Secretary*
JOHN R. INMAN, *Assistant Secretary*
A. WILLIAM LOOS, *Education Secretary*

THE WORLD ALLIANCE FOR INTERNATIONAL FRIENDSHIP THROUGH RELIGION
WALTER D. HEAD, *President*

Interfaith organizations, which have pioneered for peace since 1914, extend congratulations to *The Nation* for its century of courageous service on behalf of liberal ideas.

• *CURRENT PUBLICATIONS* •

The Nature of Man: His World, His Spiritual Resources, His Destiny — A discussion by leading scientists, theologians and philosophers — $1.00

What Can Unite the World? — Kathleen W. MacArthur — $ .35

Religious Ethics and the Politics of Power — Vernon H. Holloway — $ .50

World Alliance News Letter — Ten issues a year — $1.00

For further information address:

170 EAST 64th STREET • NEW YORK 21, N. Y.
Telephone: TEmpleton 8-4120

Nettie Rosenstein

Couture
Handbags
Jewelry
Perfumes
Hosiery

SOSY
NEW YORK

Congratulations to
THE NATION
for 85 years the Standard of American Liberalism!
CHICAGO NORTHSIDE NEWSPAPERS
7519 N. Ashland Avenue, Chicago 26, Illinois
Leo A. Lerner, Editor and Publisher

Two Important Titles for Every Poetry Library
POETRY SOCIETY OF AMERICA ANTHOLOGY
Introduction by J. DONALD ADAMS $3.50
IN FEALTY TO APOLLO
Edited and Compiled by GUSTAV DAVIDSON $2.50
THE FINE EDITIONS PRESS
227 EAST 45th STREET, NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bombers and could be rapidly overrun by Soviet armies. This means that if the relative military power of the two blocs remains as it is, Russia could, in the event of war, quickly incorporate the greater part of Europe's industrial potential into its own economy.

Finally, industrial potential must be translated into military strength. It is not enough that America can produce three or four times more steel than the Soviet Union. That steel must be turned into weapons which can be used by armies on a battlefield; and the armies, their weapons, and other supplies must be transported to the scene of action.

It was the difficult problem of military transport which hampered the German army after its initial successes in Russia. German military supplies had to be carried a long distance, while Soviet industries were, at least in part, quite near the battle front. If war should come, America's transport problem would be many times greater than was Germany's, for its armies and their equipment would have to be carried a minimum of 5,000 miles to reach the probable battle area. The transportation problem would consume a good deal of our industrial effort. Of course, if the Russians had to conduct military operations far from their industrial centers, their military potential would be proportionately reduced. Indeed, the Russians would not have the faintest chance of winning a war that had to be carried to the United States.

Clearly, the combination of the three factors mentioned above—the tremendous concentration of the Soviet economy on military production, the highly favorable geographical position of Russia for military operations in Europe and Asia, and the distances the American army would have to travel to fight in Europe or Asia—greatly reduces the superiority the United States enjoys by reason of its industrial capacity. However, if a conflict should last for some time, the relative strength of the American bloc would sharply increase.

This estimate of relative strength deliberately omits the question of atomic weapons, about which no satisfactory figures are available. It is assumed that while Russia has begun to produce atomic bombs, its output is far behind that of the United States and will continue to be so. It is probably still too small to impede the translation of American industrial strength into military strength.

The conclusions to be drawn from the foregoing rough balance sheet can be summed up as follows:

1. Russia could not possibly win a war against the United States, for the victory would have to be won on the American continent. To do that, Russia—because of its geographical position—would have to be industrially two to three times as strong as America, instead of one-third or one-fourth as strong, as it is today.

2. America would have a good chance of winning a war against Russia in Europe and in Asia, though its military superiority would always be far less than its industrial superiority. Even if Russia should succeed in conquering a large part of Europe, the devastation the United States could visit upon the Soviet Union would be tremendous, not only in Europe but, in contrast to World War II, also in its Asiatic provinces. These two facts may help to increase the chance of peace whether or not a negotiated settlement is reached.

The Role of Weaker Nations

BY VERA MICHELES DEAN

AS THE rapid succession of events threatening a third world war assumes the aspect of an avalanche, thoughtful people in all countries ask themselves: "At what point did the miscalculation about the possibility of a stable post-war international community occur? What is the missing link that makes it impossible to operate the machinery of international organization so hopefully embodied in the United Nations Charter?"

To these questions each will return an answer according to his particular beliefs or biases. The most simplified answer of all is that Russia, and Russia alone, is the root of the evil; once that recalcitrant country has been somehow removed or made impotent, mankind will right itself and the world will be happy ever after. If this diagnosis is correct, then the indicated prescription would seem to be the most drastic measures now practicable against Russia, up to and including the A-bomb, the H-bomb, and any other bombs yet to receive alphabetical designation.

A less impassioned but more convincing explanation was given by Walter Lippmann in the October *Ladies' Home Journal*, where he stated with admirable forthrightness that his own miscalculation about the viability of the post-war world order was due to the belief that Britain would emerge from World War II with far greater strength than it actually proved able to command and would thus be in a position to play a significant role

---

VERA MICHELES DEAN is research director for the Foreign Policy Association. Her latest book is "Europe and the United States."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

alongside the United States and the U. S. S. R. in creating and maintaining a new balance of power. Had Lippmann's belief been justified by events, the world would not have witnessed the spectacle of two great powers—now referred to as "super-powers"—engaged in a contest for influence all over the globe in areas where no other nation has yet succeeded in becoming a significant challenge to either Washington or Moscow.

Whenever Americans discuss this contest, they show an understandable tendency to say: "But how can you compare two incomparables? Russia is out to achieve world domination—whether for the Russian national state or for international communism is irrelevant—while the United States only desires peace and security, has no ambitions of its own, and is eager to help less fortunate peoples achieve political independence and economic well-being." This description of American policy sounds fairly convincing when viewed from our vantage point. The trouble, however, is that our vantage point is not that of all other nations—and right now the description is vigorously disputed by Russia and China, which also lay claim to peaceful intentions and disinterested concern about the welfare of peoples. It is true that to us these claims, when stated on the Moscow or Peking radio, seem false. But are we sure that our claims, when stated by the Voice of America, are persuasive to listeners in Russia or China—or to listeners in all other countries? Many Asian leaders, as they listen to the propaganda point-counter-point of broadcasts from the capitals of the two super-powers, shake their heads and say, as an Indonesian diplomat said to me this autumn: "If I did not know I was listening to two widely separated sources I would be hard put to it to recognize a difference in views. Both you and the Russians always talk in terms of black and white. Can't either of you see that in relations between nations there are many shades of gray—that no nation is wholly guilty or wholly innocent?"

The trouble is that no matter how benevolent and self-denying a great power may be—and the United States, considering the enormous potential power at its command, has displayed both benevolence and self-denial—its mere existence, the mere knowledge on the part of weaker nations that it can wield life-and-death authority, already vitiates its best intentions. When Lord Acton declared that "power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely," he was thinking of governments in relation to their citizens. But his dictum holds true also of great nations in their relations with smaller or weaker members of the international community; and today, given the dramatic change wrought by World War II in the world ratio of power, great nations like Britain and China are in that category. Even if we start our discussion by assuming that American motives are invariably pure, we cannot but observe that this country is today active in many areas of the globe where, before 1939, its interests were either limited or non-existent. Our eyesight, sharpened by an anxiety new in American history about this country's vulnerability to external attack, takes note of every nook and cranny where Russian influence or control has penetrated since 1945. Many of us are less apt to notice that the United States is now involved, in greater or less degree, in Germany and Austria, in Italy, Greece, and Turkey, in the Near and Middle East, in Indo-China and Japan—not to speak of our traditional involvement in the Western Hemisphere, from which at the outset we barred other nations under the Monroe Doctrine.

What has happened is that, with the defeat of Germany and Japan, the decline of France and Italy, and especially the weakening of Britain, vacuum areas have appeared all over the globe. Since great nations, like nature, abhor a vacuum, the two super-powers, Russia and America, have gravitated more and more into the world's various no man's lands, the twilight zones that have changed hands again and again through the centuries as today's victors became tomorrow's victims. It is often assumed in this country that had no ideological conflicts arisen between capitalist democracy and dictatorial communism, the United States and the Soviet Union would have had no occasion to clash in spite of the post-war expansion of their influence and physical power. History offers little evidence to support this assumption. When imperial Britain, for at least two centuries, sought to "contain" czarist Russia in the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Dardanelles, the Near and Middle East, along the northern border of India, in Afghanistan and Tibet, it did so not for ideological reasons but for reasons of strategic security. Nor were czarist Russia's repeated efforts to break through British containment due to any sinister desire to overthrow Britain's political and economic system.

WE HAVE now reached a stage in the post-war struggle for a new balance of power where the United States must either decide to have a military showdown with Russia or consider the possibility of learning some lessons from Britain's containment policy. For Britain was eminently successful in keeping Russia in check at many points with a minimum expenditure of effort and without resort to war, except for the relatively brief Crimean campaign of 1854-55. The British did so well in fact that in the first decade of the twentieth century they enlisted their erstwhile rival on their side in the Triple Entente.

How did the British do it? They did it by methods which have hitherto been vigorously deprecated in the United States, where "balance of power" and even "power" pure and simple have been equated with evil. Churchill's proposal in June, 1944, six months before the Yalta conference, for a division with Russia for military purposes of Yugoslavia (50-50), Hungary and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rumania (80 per cent for Russia, 20 for Britain), and Greece (100 per cent for Britain) was thoroughly in line with traditional British policy. This proposal, however, shocked Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who in this respect certainly reflected prevailing American opinion.

But in any case, whether or not a sphere-of-influence division between the super-powers may appear desirable today, it is no longer practicable. With the rise of nationalist sentiment in most countries in the former twilight zones and achievement of independence by some of them, it would be hazardous for the great powers to urge territorial bargains that could only arouse opposition on the part of the peoples slated for this diplomatic operation. At the same time it becomes increasingly clear that neither of the two super-powers is in a position, assuming it has such an objective, to gain dominion over the entire world. It thus becomes imperative to find some new method of stabilization which would give both the United States and the Soviet Union assurance that neither is planning to annihilate the other.

The only practicable possibility is to enhance, by all means at our disposal, the strength and sense of independence of smaller nations, as well as of potentially great nations, like India and China, which are weak only because of their economic backwardness. Secretary of State Acheson has repeatedly declared that it is the intention of the United States to create "situations of strength" all over the world in the hope that then it will prove possible for this country to open negotiations with the U. S. S. R. on a basis of equality. This is a sound policy—but only provided that in helping smaller or weaker nations to achieve "positions of strength" we do not expect them to accept our views and to follow the course we set. For then the real value of what we are trying to accomplish would be lost. The world has become so contracted that the twilight zones, the former buffer states or areas, can no longer hope to remain aloof or neutral. What they seek is not neutrality in the sense of taking no position whatever on controversial issues but freedom to decide for themselves the position they will take. If not Russia alone but the United States also insists that it is a case of "we or they," then all hope of keeping the principal contestants apart will vanish, and sooner or later—probably all too soon—the battle of the super-powers will be joined, with weaker nations having no prospect but to be engulfed in the conflict.

IT IS incredibly hard for a great power to keep from reaching that point of no return where the possibility of a truce yields to the probability of war. The best hope for a more or less sane consideration of the world crisis lies with the weaker nations, which by very reason of their weakness have been schooled to develop a sense of limits, of what conceivably can be done and what it is utterly idle to demand or expect. The weaker nations can yet help to save the great powers from the excesses into which they are tempted by the resources at their command. But they cannot do so if the great powers deny them independence of judgment and either explicitly or implicitly attempt to coerce them, as Russia has done with its neighbors, or purchase their acquiescence, as the United States has done by promising financial and military aid to countries that would oppose Russia and communism. In the five years of the United Nations' existence the middle and smaller powers have on many occasions demonstrated courage, realism, and a sense of proportion, just the qualities most urgently needed to restore the world to reason. It would be naive to assume that smallness or weakness is of itself a guaranty of infallibility. Australia can be just as stubborn as the United States; India can make as grievous mistakes as Russia. But their errors or misdeeds are not compounded, like those of the great nations, by the apparatus of overwhelming power and vast interests. They are freer to change their minds, less affected by the necessity of "saving face." At the very least, the questions they ask, the accommodations they propose, serve to delay irrevocable decisions pointed toward war.

If a new division of the weaker nations into spheres of influence is to be averted, these nations themselves must become adequate buffer areas. This already seems possible in the case of China, India, and Pakistan, of some of the countries of Eastern Europe, and of Turkey. It may even become possible in the case of Western Europe. But this hope can be realized only if the United States and Russia are brought to acknowledge the practical limits of their strength—the fact that neither can become the Roman Empire of the twentieth century, that the effort to do so spells war—and decide to seek insurance against their own ultimate destruction by strengthening the position of the lesser powers within the framework of the United Nations.

Then, and only then, will the smaller and weaker nations be in a position to demonstrate real independence and make decisions, not out of deference to the United States or the Soviet Union, but on the merits of each given issue. Then, too, the nations which lag behind in economic, social, and political development can be aided by the United Nations without fear that their progress may in some way menace the security of one or other of the super-powers. The best-laid plans for world government are open to question because they usually assume that the great powers, here and now, can be welded with the smaller nations into an administrative apparatus comparable to that of a well-governed federal state. The objective of world government can be achieved, but only after experience has demonstrated to the great powers that they cannot control the apparatus of international organization for their own ends, no matter how praiseworthy these ends may be.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AIDS TO INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

BOOKS

Three reports on economic and social conditions in key countries. Essential background information for judging economic and political plans and policies in the explosive Middle East and Latin America.

BRAZIL: An Expanding Economy

by George Wythe, with Royce A. Wight and Harold M. Midkiff

This study digs deeply into both the present economic situation of Brazil, and its future possibilities, considering particularly the ways in which capital and skills from the United States might be useful in raising Brazilian living standards. 1949 • $3.50

TURKEY: An Economic Appraisal

by Max Weston Thornburg, Graham Spry, and George Soule

Turkey is a land of great resources, but a burdensome taxation system and the policy of State control are formidable obstacles to effective aid from the outside. Constructive and specific suggestions are made, however, looking toward the application of American skills and capital in the development of a free and strong Turkish economy. 1949 • $3.50

REPORT ON THE GREEKS

by Frank Smothers, William Hardy McNeill, and Elizabeth Darbishire McNeill

This is a first-hand, eye-witness account of postwar conditions in Greece, by a team of investigators sent by the Twentieth Century Fund in the spring of 1947 to go behind official pronouncements to the life of the people themselves. 1948 • $2.50

An economic survey of Costa Rica is in preparation.

★ ★ ★

REBUILDING THE WORLD ECONOMY

by Norman S. Buchanan and Friedrich A. Lutz

This book surveys previous American experience in world trade and foreign investment; the hazards of foreign investment under postwar world conditions; and the need for multilateral trade and the obstacles in its path, with a challenging program for action by a distinguished committee. 1947 • $3.50

Two studies in the controversial field of cartels which throw useful light on American economic policies abroad—especially in Germany.

CARTELS IN ACTION

by George W. Stocking and Myron W. Watkins

A factual account of the origins and operations of international cartel arrangements in eight fields in which they have played an important role: sugar, rubber, nitrogen, steel, aluminum, magnesium, incandescent electric lamps, and chemicals. 1946 • $4.00

CARTELS OR COMPETITION?

by George W. Stocking and Myron W. Watkins

This volume, based upon the factual study above, analyzes the methods and effects of cartels as an economic institution, and appraises alternative public policies. It includes the recommendations of the Fund's Committee on Cartels for a constructive U. S. policy in this field. 1948 • $4.00

★ ★ ★

FILMS

Two 16mm. motion pictures which high-spot findings of Fund studies that bear on international problems of today.

PRODUCTIVITY: Key to Plenty

produced by the Twentieth Century Fund and Encyclopaedia Britannica Films

A dramatic panorama of industrial achievement since 1850, which reveals the secret of America's high standard of living and has a direct bearing on European recovery and on aid to underdeveloped countries. Two reels, sound. 1949 • $85.00. Rental, $5.00

ROUND TRIP: The U. S. A. in World Trade

A warm, human portrayal of America's stake in world trade . . . how it contributes to higher standards of living and to peaceful relations with other countries. Two reels, sound. 1947 • $57.50. Rental, $3.50

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND

330 West 42nd Street New York 18, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for Pure Enjoyment—

WELCH'S
GRAPE JUICE

and Fresh Frozen Grape Juice, Grapelade
and Jelly - *and* Preserves - Jellies - Honey

Are The Best — at moderate prices

THE TRUBEK LABORATORIES
EAST RUTHERFORD
NEW JERSEY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CASE FOR NEGOTIATION

History's Lesson

BY HANS J. MORGENTHAU

THE conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is a historical event of unprecedented magnitude. It is of such great magnitude because the rise of Russia to the position of one of the two greatest world powers coincides with, and is a manifestation of, the tremendous political, technological, and moral revolutions which have transformed the world in our time.

The political revolution has destroyed the European state system, which for four centuries had been composed of a multiplicity of nations of approximately equal strength, kept in check through the balance of power. This political world has been replaced by a bi-polar system in which neither of the two super-powers can be restrained by any possible combination of other powers. The technological revolution has in the last century brought about changes in transportation, communications, and warfare more far-reaching than any that have occurred in all of previous history. Modern communications have for all practical purposes eliminated the element of time; the new weapons of warfare have enormously increased the destructiveness of war. The moral revolution has destroyed the moral unity of the Western world and transformed political philosophies into political religions. The common "system of arts, and laws, and manners" to which Gibbon could refer with pride has been replaced by two incompatible ways of life which compete with each other for dominance. In Asia the moral revolution has taken on the peculiar aspect of a revolt against the West undertaken in the name of national self-determination and social justice, principles which the West itself brought to Asia.

For the foreign policy of the United States these three great revolutions of our age are epitomized in the rise of the Soviet Union to the position of the other leading world power. It is by virtue of the destruction of the European balance of power that the Soviet Union stands today in the heart of Europe, unchallengeable by the forces of Western Europe alone. It is by virtue of that same political revolution which has emancipated the peoples of Asia from European domination that the balance of power in Asia, symbolized for the United States in the principle of the Open Door in China, no longer exists and that the door of China is today closed to the West and wide open to the Soviet Union. It is by virtue of Lenin's and Stalin's equation of bolshevization with industrialization that Russia has developed into a first-class power. Communism in Russia has meant first of all the transformation of society by the technological revolution. It was Lenin who said that "bolshevism means electrification," and it was Stalin who subordinated all other considerations to the introduction of modern technology into Russian industry and agriculture. Finally, the threat of the Western world emanating from the Soviet Union, as well as the attraction of Russia for millions of people outside its borders, derives also from the revolutionary force centered in Moscow which promises salvation for all the world.

Wherever American power is challenged today, it is to Moscow that the challenge can be traced. Wherever the moral ideals of America are doubted, that doubt finds its justification in Moscow's creed. What, then, are the issues at stake between the United States and the Soviet Union with which the foreign policy of the United States can and must deal?

Three answers are logically possible. One can say that no real political issue separates the United States and the Soviet Union, and that if only suspicion and false propaganda were eliminated, nothing would stand in the way of peaceful relations. One can say that the issue between them is world revolution, to which the Soviet government is irrevocably committed. Or one can say that from the point of view of the United States the issue is Russion imperialism, which uses for its purposes the instrument of world revolution.

IT IS obvious that the choice of the policies to be pursued by the United States will depend upon which of these three answers is accepted. If it is believed that there is no real political issue, United States policy must concentrate either upon penetrating the iron curtain with propaganda or upon narrowing the gap in well-being between East and West by economic aid. If it is believed that as long as the Soviet government reigns in Moscow we face the threat of world revolution, we must meet that threat by extirpating the evil at its roots. If Rus-

---

HANS J. MORGENTHAU is professor of political science and director of the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy at the University of Chicago. He is the author of "Scientific Man vs. Power Politics" and "Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



sian imperialism is assumed to be the issue, the traditional military and political methods will be employed to meet it. In the first instance peace can be brought to the world on the strengthened waves of the Voice of America or bought with ten or twenty billion dollars. In the second, the problem is not how to preserve peace but when to go to war; and the idea of a preventive war is a legitimate one. In the third, military preparations must be joined with an accommodating diplomacy; while preparing for the worst we must work for a peaceful settlement.

The dilemma in which these alternatives place the United States today is not new in the history of the Western world. The same problem was posed for British statesmen in the last decade of the eighteenth century by the expansionist policies of revolutionary France, and a lucid and penetrating exposition of it is provided by the three-cornered debate among Burke, Fox, and Pitt. To grasp the contemporary relevance of that debate one need only substitute for France, the Soviet Union; for Jacobinism, communism; for England, the United States; for Napoleon, Stalin.

The immediate question in that debate was the participation of Great Britain in the war against France. Fox, the leader of one faction of the Whigs, believed that Great Britain was not threatened by France or, for that matter, by the principles of the French Revolution and had therefore no reason to join the coalition. He would show, he said, according to the record of the House of Commons for February 1, 1793,

> that all the topics to which he had adverted were introduced into the debate to blind the judgment, by arousing the passions, and were none of them the just grounds of war. . . . What, then, remained but the internal government of France, always disavowed, but ever kept in mind, and constantly mentioned? The destruction of that government was the avowed object of the combined powers whom it was hoped we were to join. . . . He thought the present state of government in France anything rather than an object of imitation; but he maintained as a principle inviolable that the government of every independent state was to be settled by those who were to live under it, and not by a foreign force.

Fox's summary of his position has in more than one respect a contemporary ring:

> He knew that he himself should now be represented the partisan of France, as he had been formerly represented the partisan of America. He was no stranger to the industry with which these and other calumnies were circulated against him, and therefore he was not surprised; but he really was surprised to find that he could not walk the streets without hearing whispers that he and some of his friends had been engaged in improper correspondence with persons in France. If there were any foundation for such a charge, the source of the information could be mentioned. If it were true, it was capable of proof. If any man believed this, he called upon him to state the reasons of his belief. If any man had proofs, he challenged him to produce them. But, to what was this owing? The people had been told by their representatives in Parliament that they were surrounded with dangers, and had been shown none. They were, therefore, full of suspicion and prompt of belief. All this had a material tendency to impede freedom of discussion, for men would speak with reserve, or not speak at all, under the terror of calumny. But he found by a letter in a newspaper, from Mr. Law, that he lived in a town where a set of men associated with and calling themselves gentlemen . . . not only received anonymous letters reflecting on individuals but corresponded with the writers of such letters and even sometimes transmitted their slanders to the Secretary of State. He could not be much surprised at any aspersion on his character, knowing this; and therefore he hoped the House would give him the credit of being innocent till an open charge was made; and that if any man heard improper correspondence imputed to him in private, he would believe that he heard a falsehood which he who circulated it in secret durst not utter in public.

In contrast to this position, Burke, the leader of another faction of the Whigs, looks on the war against France as "the cause of humanity itself."

> The present evil of our time, though in a great measure an evil of ambition, is not one of common political ambition but in many respects entirely different. It is not the cause of nation as against nation but . . . the cause of mankind against those who have projected the subversion of that order of things under which our part of the world has so long flourished. . . . If I conceive rightly of the spirit of the present combination, it is not

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

at war with France but with Jacobinism. They cannot think it right that a second kingdom should be struck out of the system of Europe, either by destroying its independence or by suffering it to have such a *form* in its independence as to keep it as a perpetual fund of revolutions in the very center of Europe. . . .

We are at war with a *principle* and with an example which there is no shutting out by fortresses or excluding by territorial limits. No lines of demarcation can bound the Jacobin empire. It must be extirpated in the place of its origin, or it will not be confined to that place. In the whole circle of military arrangements and of political expedients, I fear that there cannot be found any sort of *merely defensive plan* of the least force against the effect of the *example* which has been given in France. That *example* has shown, for the first time in the history of the world, that it is very possible to subvert the whole frame and order of the best constructed states by corrupting the common people with the spoil of the superior classes. . . . The effect of *erroneous doctrines* may be soon done away, but the example of *successful pillage* is . . . a thing which speaks more forcibly to the interests and passions of the corrupt and unthinking part of mankind than a thousand theories.

When the war against France had been in progress for seven years, a supporter of Fox asked Pitt, the Prime Minister and leader of the Tories in the House of Commons, what the war was all about. Was Jacobinism not dead, and was Napoleon not indifferent to the principles of the French Revolution? Here is Pitt's reply, representing the third answer which can be given to our question:

The honorable gentleman defies me to state, in one sentence, what is the object of the war. In one word, I tell him that it is security—security against a danger, the greatest that ever threatened the world, security against a danger which never existed in any past period of society. This country alone of all the nations of Europe presented barriers the best fitted to resist its progress. We alone recognized the necessity of open war, as well with the principles as the practice of the French Revolution. We saw that it was to be resisted no less by arms abroad than by precaution at home; that we were to look for protection no less to the courage of our forces than to the wisdom of our councils, no less to military effort than to legislative enactment. At the moment when those who now admit the dangers of Jacobinism while they contend that it is extinct used to palliate this atrocity, this House wisely saw that it was necessary to erect a double safeguard against a danger that wrought no less by undisguised hostility than by secret machination.

The United States has taken all these three positions toward the Soviet Union, either simultaneously or successively. From 1917 to the entrance of the Soviet Union into the Second World War in 1941, we looked at the Soviet Union primarily with the eyes of Burke. We saw in it and its adherents in foreign countries a threat to the established moral and social order of the West. What the United States feared and opposed during that period was the Soviet Union, the instigator and master-mind of world revolution, not Russia, the great power; for as a great power Russia did not then exist, and its potentialities as such were hardly recognized in this country.

From June, 1941, to the breakdown of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements in 1946, the Soviet Union appeared to the United States as revolutionary France had appeared to Fox. The Soviet Union was considered to be no threat to the United States either as the fountainhead of world revolution or as a great imperialistic power. It was supposed to have lost its revolutionary fervor and to possess enough territory to keep it satisfied, and in any case to be so weakened by the devastations of war as to be unable to embark upon imperialistic ventures even if it wanted to.

Since the breakdown of the war and post-war agreements with the Soviet Union, public opinion in the United States has reverted to the pattern established in the years following 1917. To American public opinion the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union appears first of all as a struggle between two systems of political morality, two political philosophies, two ways of life. Good and evil are linked in mortal combat, and the struggle can only end, as it is bound to end, with the complete victory of the forces of good over the forces of evil. The policies of the Administration, after creating and supporting this popular conception of the nature of the conflict with the Soviet Union, have sporadically and sometimes half-heartedly endeavored to counteract it.

Drawings by Daumier

Charles C. Sherrod Library
EAST TENNESSEE STATE COLLEGE
Johnson City, Tennessee

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mr. Acheson, in particular, has generally emphasized a primary concern with Russian imperialism, of which Communist world revolution is a mere instrument. His speeches before the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, and at Freedom House on October 8, 1950, suggest the attitude of Pitt rather than of Fox or Burke.

A SIMPLE test will show which of these three conceptions of the East-West conflict is mistaken and which is correct. Let us suppose for a moment that Lenin and Trotsky had died in exile, unknown members of a Marxist sect, and that the Czar was still reigning over a Russia politically and technologically situated as it is today. Does anybody believe that it would be a matter of indifference for the United States to see the Russian armies hardly more than a hundred miles from the Rhine and actually in the Balkans, Russian influence dominant in China and threatening to engulf the rest of Asia? Is anybody bold enough to assert that the United States would be indifferent if Russian imperialism marched forward, as it did in the nineteenth century, under the ideological banner of Christianity rather than of bolshevism?

One can turn that same question around and ask whether anybody in the United States would need to be concerned about the American Communist Party if it were not a tool in the hands of the Kremlin and, hence, the vanguard of Russian imperialism. The power of Russia gives the American Communists an importance they would not have otherwise, and their importance is that of potential treason, not of revolution. If American communism were to disappear tomorrow without a trace, Russian imperialism would be deprived of one of its minor weapons in the struggle with the United States, but the issue which faces the United States would not have been altered in the least.

The confusion between the issue of Russian imperialism and that of communism feeds on four sources. First, the public at large tends to view politics, domestic and international, in the simple contrast of black and white, defined in moral terms. Thus the public is always prone to transform an election contest or an international conflict into a moral crusade carried on in the name of virtue by one's own party or nation against an evil party or nation. Secondly, this genuine confusion is aggravated by Russian propaganda, which rationalizes its imperialistic moves in the universal terms of the Marxist dogma. The Western counter-crusade, taking the revolutionary stereotypes of Russian propaganda at their face value, thus becomes the victim of that propaganda, unwittingly taking for the real issue what is but a tactical instrument, if it is not mere propaganda.

The real issue between the United States and the Soviet Union is still further obscured by the ambiguity of the terms "communism" and "Communist revolution." If those who proclaim communism as the real issue have primarily Europe in mind, they are at least partially right, for in every Russian satellite country of Europe, Communist seizure of the government has been a by-product of conquest by the Red Army and an instrument for perpetuating Russian power. What has been true in the past in Eastern and Central Europe is likely to be true for the foreseeable future in the Western world. The Soviet Union can attain the goal of world revolution only by conquering the Western world first and making it Communist afterward. In the West, then, opposition to communism is an integral part of resistance to Russian imperialism.

If those who refer to communism as the real issue have primarily the revolutions in Asia in mind, they speak of something fundamentally different. While the Communist revolution could not have succeeded and will not succeed in any European country without the intervention of the Red Army, in Asia revolutionary situations would exist even if bolshevism had never been heard of. The revolutions in Europe are phony revolutions; the revolutions in Asia are genuine ones. In consequence, while opposition to revolution in Europe is a particular aspect of the defense of the West against Russian imperialism, opposition to revolution in Asia is counter-revolution in Metternich's sense, resistance to change in behalf of an obsolescent status quo. In Asia, then, revolution should not be opposed as such; instead, its national and social objectives should be supported, for that very support will prevent revolution from becoming an instrument of Russian imperialism.

The confusion is nourished—and here lies its greatest danger for the political well-being of the United States—by a widespread fear not of revolution but of change. In embarking upon a holy crusade to extirpate the evil of bolshevism powerful groups attempt to outlaw morally and legally all popular movements favoring social reform and thus to make the status quo impregnable to change. The non-existent threat of Communist revolution becomes, as it was for German and Italian fascism, a convenient device for rallying a confused and patriotic citizenry to the defense of what seems to be the security of the United States but is actually the maintenance of the status quo. That such a movement, if it were ever able to determine the domestic and international policies of the United States, would jeopardize both the nation's security and the domestic status quo only adds tragic irony to the confusion of thought and action.

WHAT makes the task of American foreign policy so difficult is not only the fact that the expanding power of Russia is inextricably bound up with the three great revolutions of our age but the necessity of dealing separately with four intertwined factors—Russian imperialism, revolution as an instrument of Russian imperialism, revolution as genuine popular aspiration, and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

use of the international crisis for the purposes of domestic reaction. Here again the experience of history can give us insight and courage.

The task before the United States today is different only in magnitude from that which confronted British foreign policy under the leadership of Castlereagh in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars. Then as now victory had been won by a coalition, from which Russia had emerged as the dominant power. Russian imperialism had established itself firmly in Eastern Europe, using a device similar to that of the Yalta agreement to placate Western misgivings. Russian power threatened to spread through Central Europe and the Balkans, using the principles of Christianity and counter-revolutionary slogans to pave its way. But in marked difference to the gullibility of our leaders, Castlereagh recognized the menace for what it was and counteracted it even while the war against Napoleon was still in progress. And when the war was over, he refused steadfastly to be swayed either by Russia's invocation of Christian principles or by the revolutionary appeal to the tenets of liberalism. He never allowed his eyes to wander from the real issue—the threat of Russian imperialism using a counter-revolutionary ideology for its imperialistic purposes.

On the day of Castlereagh's funeral the confused masses rejoiced in the streets of London at the departure of a leader who seemed to be so impervious to the ideological issues of the day and so devoid of the crusading spirit. Yet a grateful posterity recognizes that through the peaceful methods of a wise and strong diplomacy he saved Britain and with it Western civilization from the barbarian onslaught, seeing the issue between Great Britain and Russia for what it was and not as an emotional and moralizing public opinion wanted to see it. A foreign policy such as Castlereagh's, moving slowly and deviously in the narrow lanes of political calculation rather than storming ahead on the wings of ideological enthusiasms, is bound to be unpopular; yet no other can be successful. Mr. Acheson has frequently spoken like Castlereagh and Pitt and has sometimes acted like Metternich. May he take heart from the example of those illustrious men of state who preceded him in the defense of the West: wise in their knowledge of the issue at stake, preferring to submit to the burden of misunderstanding and vilification rather than buy a fleeting popularity with the eternal shame of failure, and—what counts most in the statesman—setting out to do what needed to be done and carrying the task to its consummation.

The War of Ideas

BY ISAAC DEUTSCHER

CAN capitalism and communism exist side by side in peace? Even in the fervor of the most intense ideological warfare the leaders of both camps keep on answering this question in the affirmative. In his recent speeches at Flushing Meadow Mr. Vishinsky missed no opportunity to remind his audience of Stalin's statements to this effect. He also recalled Stalin's emphatic disavowals of any intention on Russia's part to export revolution. The leaders of the Western powers urge their people to prepare for war if they want peace, but peace, they say, is the objective.

Yet agreement on the possibility and desirability of "peaceful coexistence" fails to span the gulf of antagonism and distrust. Washington, London, and Paris dismiss Moscow's professions of good faith: "Has not Lenin himself stated that the two systems cannot exist peacefully side by side? Has Stalin not promoted the export of communism to all countries within the Soviet orbit?" Moscow repays with the same coin: "Have not the capitalist governments, democratic and fascist, made repeated attempts to destroy us? Are they not allying themselves with communism's and Russia's sworn enemies everywhere? So the dialogue goes on, until the crescendo of suspicion and hatred nearly swamps the refrain about peaceful coexistence.

In a sense, these declarations about the possibility of accommodation between capitalism and communism are hollow. The two systems are in fact antagonistic. Hardly any member of Stalin's Politbureau believes in their eventual reconciliation. Hardly any Western Tory does. That both Tory and Stalinist, who between them wield decisive social and economic power in the world today, believe their ways of life to be irreconcilable is a fact which by itself makes for their irreconcilability. To this extent, then, each side is justified in questioning the other's intentions: "Their own hard dealing teaches them to suspect the thoughts of others."

What is meant by the peaceful coexistence of the two worlds? Certainly not a millennium of ideological harmony. The question is rather whether peace, pure and simple, is possible. Can the two worlds reach an accommodation which would allow each to evolve in its own

---

ISAAC DEUTSCHER is on the staff of the London Economist. *Formerly a roving reporter for the London* Sunday Observer, *he has a thorough knowledge of the political currents in Eastern Europe. He is the author of "Stalin, a Political Biography."*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

way, to develop its potentialities, and to seek a solution to its problems? Can the shadow of atomic doom be lifted from this generation, so that it can strive for a better future and the next generation need not fear the recurrence of the menace? Can the contest between capitalism and communism run its course without world war as the decisive phase?

Lenin may have forecast the clash of the two worlds. Nevertheless, after the collapse of anti-Bolshevik intervention and the Red Army's defeat at the gates of Warsaw in 1920, a state of relative peace did exist between them for about two decades. Among the factors that made that peace possible were the parallel isolationisms of the United States and the Soviet Union, each of which for a variety of historical reasons was half-unaware of its gigantic strength, and the fact that there was no vacuum between these two future poles of world power. Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and even smaller nations still acted as great powers, either because they still commanded great resources or because they were animated by memories of past greatness. The many-sided interplay of their interests and ambitions endowed the international system, at least for a time, with its buttresses, buffers, neutralizing elements, and defenses. The plurality of the power centers itself dispersed and diffused all sorts of tensions. Even when World War II broke out, the clash between capitalism and communism was one of its powerful undercurrents, not its dominant characteristic.

WORLD WAR II has brought about the extreme polarization of power, a process not likely to be reversed. The buffers and neutralizing elements have gone. Apart from all ideological antagonism, such a situation must be fraught with immense danger. Two giants, each with a freshly awakened awareness of its power, confronting each other across a virtual vacuum, would tend to collide anyhow. The impulses toward collision are tremendously intensified when the antagonists claim to represent opposed principles of social and political organization. The split is further complicated because the Stalinist brand of planned economy is unfortunately identified with political totalitarianism, which enables Western toryism to fight its battles ostensibly under the flags of freedom and democracy, and thus to rally to its side forces which would have otherwise refused to follow it.

The only kind of peace that this coincident polarization of all sorts of antagonisms makes possible is armed peace. Only on this basis can the major opponents hope to maintain a balance of power. An equilibrium of this kind is necessarily unstable. What may counteract its instability is the world's war weariness and its awareness of the frightful risk of atomic self-annihilation.

The concept of armed peace is perhaps not very clear. Europe lived in armed peace for about forty years, from the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 till World War I. This precedent is only partly relevant to our situation; and it carries its own warning. The social background to the armed peace of 1871-1914 was a flourishing Victorian capitalism. Who will forecast so "idyllic" a period ahead of us? And even that armed peace led to world war. The grim possibility must be kept in mind that a new armed peace may also be a prelude to Armageddon, unless the peoples of the world use their lease on life to make it a prelude to real peace.

Armed peace, however, is not war. It is not even cold war. It implies settlement of differences among the powers by negotiation, even if the negotiators have to parley with atomic bombs in their hands. Nor does armed peace mean commercial and cultural boycotts by the nations. On the contrary, it is compatible with intensive trade and cultural contacts.

Since armed peace has been almost inseparable from European history, this concept is not novel to Europeans. But as an eminent French writer recently pointed out, it may be less familiar to Americans. Throughout its history the United States has armed only for immediate war and has disarmed for peace. The American people have been traditionally reluctant to arm in peace time. But this traditional pacifism—so some Europeans, even very right-wing ones, fear—may now dangerously affect the American national temper: the old pacifism may be transforming itself into feverish bellicosity. The American people may view or be led to view their government's armament drive, not as a means to create those "situations of strength" from which their government might negotiate with Russia, but as a signal for inevitable war. Will the United States learn to combine arms and patient diplomacy?

Armed peace may give the world nothing more than a chance to settle its problems. But this chance is real. In the course of a decade or two some of the factors that have created the present tensions may disappear or change their nature. The ideological contest may become separated from the power rivalry of two giant nations, and the international alignments may shift. Let us examine the direction which such changes must take in order to make permanent peace possible.

LET us look at the Russian scene first. The reason why Stalin's assurances that he does not intend to export revolution are received with such incredulity by the West is obvious. Stalin's Russia has exported its brand of revolution whenever the opportunity has offered. In this, the course of the Russian Revolution has not been very different from that of the French. The similarity has indeed been so striking that often one needs merely to change the names in the tales of French historians to make those tales fit contemporary Russia.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> The French Republicans [Albert Sorel writes in his great work "Europe and the French Revolution"] believed themselves to be cosmopolitans [as the Stalinists believe themselves to be internationalists]. But they were this only in their speeches; they felt, they thought, they acted, they interpreted their universal ideas and their abstract principles with the traditions of a conquering monarchy behind them. . . . They confused . . . advocacy of the new doctrines with the expansion of French power, the emancipation of mankind with the grandeur of their own republic, the reign of reason with the rule of France, the liberation of peoples with the conquest of states, the European revolution with the domination of the French Revolution in Europe. . . . The revolution degenerated into armed propaganda and then into conquest.

This is the classical description of that "carrying of the revolution on the points of bayonets," to which Stalin has lent his bayonets, his guns, and his tanks, despite all the Marxist warnings against such experiments. How real or how lasting are the gains which communism has thus made only history can show. They may be shaky in the extreme. Mankind is still not inclined to confound its own emancipation with the grandeur of one country or to identify the reign of reason with the rule of Russia. In our day, just as a century and a half ago, a revolution which degenerates into armed propaganda and conquest tends to arouse an overwhelming reaction against it. The peoples whom revolutionary France once reduced to the role of satellites—so Sorel tells us—could easily understand the language of French ideas; "they also understood the example which France gave them in 1792. What they could no longer understand was that France, using that language and giving that example, should aspire to subjugate and exploit them." Must the world now learn to see in the Russian Revolution also only a conqueror?

We cannot give up the hope that the men who rule Russia are not unaware of this danger. The period during which Stalin could export revolution without provoking world war is over. The revolutions exported by Russia, as by France, "have lacked precisely that quality which made for the originality of the mother-revolution . . . , which was the motif of her greatness and the excuse for her aberrations; they have lacked the enthusiasm, the generous élan . . . the ray of disinterestedness." Even so, in the satellite countries "united to her territory or constituted on her own image, she has proclaimed her principles, destroyed the feudal system, and introduced her laws. After the inevitable disorders of war and the first excesses of conquest, this revolution is of immense benefit for those peoples. That is why the conquests of the revolution should not be confused with the conquests of the old regime" (Sorel).

But the issue which is now crucial for the world's future is whether the labor movements and progress in Europe and Asia can be dissociated from a narrowly Russian interest and point of view. A long spell of peace is needed to produce enough ideological ferment, enough new ideas and new people, to achieve this and to regain for labor its original independence and élan.

A long spell of peace may even be able to change the face of Russia itself. We often hear that this cannot happen, that totalitarian regimes are self-perpetuating, that they must be destroyed from outside. Those who think so pay a peculiar tribute to the metaphysics of totalitarianism. Soviet totalitarianism is primarily the result of a situation in which the most advanced experiment in social organization was undertaken in a backward, semi-European, semi-Asiatic country. But another decade or two of industrialization and education should give the Russian people so high a standard of living and so strong a sense of independence that they will have no use for Beria's concentration camps and spies, for *Pravda's* Byzantine language, and for an iron curtain designed to prevent them from making comparisons between their own and other people's conditions of existence. The rulers may then change with the people, or the people will have no use for unteachable rulers. The earth moves on, and Russia moves with the earth. Russia needs time, and again time, to find its balance, its own new mind, and its own real language.

CONFUSION of national interests, expansionist ambition, and ideological pretensions is not characteristic of Russia alone. We see a similar confusion, differently expressed, at the other pole of the world-wide conflict—in the United States.

Much of the present antagonism between the United



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

States and Russia would have come to the surface no matter what the system of government in Russia. It is enough to recall with what anxiety American leaders watched Russia's ascendancy in the Far East toward the end of the last century and with what sympathy they regarded Japan's challenge to Russia before, in 1904, they became alarmed by Japan's ascendancy. The same rivalries and fears have been operating again, this time in reverse order. Some of the statements about Russian "falsity and treachery" made by Secretary of State Hay at the turn of the century might have been made by one of his successors in our days. In his attitude to Russia Mr. Truman is not unlike Theodore Roosevelt before he became mediator between Russia and Japan.

The old antagonism is reproduced today in much more acute form and on a global scale—the antagonists, both of them, represent so much more dynamic power than they did in earlier times. The danger is decisively increased by the fact that just as Stalin's Russia considers itself the head of a supra-national revolutionary interest, so the United States, since it has abandoned isolationism, has been moving into the position of head of the counter-revolutionary interest all over the world.

This identification of two world powers with two ideological principles is half real and half illusory. It is real in so far as it is true that if a great power proclaims itself the defender and promoter of an ideology, it becomes this up to a point. But the identification is unreal in a different and more profound sense. Just as the aspirations of all the multi-national forces arrayed against capitalism cannot in the long run be harnessed and sacrificed to a purely Russian ambition, so the national interest of the American people cannot in the long run be tied to those forces whose only purpose is to defend the social status quo or to fight for the world's return to the state it was in before the Russian Revolution and even before the rise of bourgeois liberalism.

The logic of the present situation drives the United States to seek allies in German militarism and nationalism, in Eastern European landlordism, in General Franco and his like in Europe, and in Chiang Kai-shek, Bao Dai, and Syngman Rhee and their like in Asia. Western statesmen may abhor the institutions, political methods, and caste or class prejudices for which these names stand. But the force of the identification of the West with anti-communism is stronger than their likes or dislikes. Just as in the struggle against Nazism, Western liberalism could not but ally itself with communism, so in the struggle against communism, Western liberalism relies more and more upon that motley of fascist and quasi-fascist forces which it has just helped to defeat. Nothing can blur the significance of the fact that only five years after the defeat of the Third Reich, authentic Nazis have crept back into ministerial offices in West Germany.

No doubt in terms of the anti-Communist crusade some awkward alliances may have a practical justification. It may be granted, for the sake of the argument, that the re-creation of German military power and the galvanizing of every retrograde interest in Europe and Asia might contribute to the military defeat of Russia and the repulse of communism. But this realism is extremely shortsighted.

By underwriting nearly every counter-revolutionary interest in Europe and Asia, Western statesmanship ties its own hands and makes it more and more difficult for itself to strive for a negotiated settlement with Russia. But even in case of war, and in the event of a Russian defeat, the Western nations would find themselves wrecked by their own victory. The legacy of a new world war would be global pandemonium, compared with which the present era of unsettlement would be nostalgically remembered as an era of peace and order. And even the convulsed, shattered world that would emerge from World War III would still refuse to be ridden by German Junkers and heavy industrialists, East European landlords, and Asian war lords; and each of these allies would, like a millstone, drag down the West into chaos.

Nor is this merely a question of dangerous alliances. Democratic freedoms must of course be defended against the encroachments of Stalinism. But is not democracy imperceptibly being undermined and destroyed in its own name? Are intolerance and fanaticism not steadily gaining ground even in nations accustomed to cherish tolerance and fair play as their national virtues? Is not the face of the Statue of Liberty now distorted by the witch-hunter's grimace?

It is as vital for the American people that they should dissociate their national interest from international counter-revolution as it is for other peoples that they should not allow their progressive aspirations to be exploited by Russian despotism. To find a new balance, to dissociate the ideological issues from the power conflicts and to form new and more hopeful alignments, the world needs peace, decades of peace; and this can be obtained only through negotiation between the governments such as they are. That is why so many hopes are still focused on the possibility of peaceful coexistence of the two systems. That is why, before the minds of the peoples have closed upon one another, before the nations have risen in arms, it is the supreme duty of statesmen and leaders to explore every possible avenue toward a negotiated settlement.

Unfortunately, the sands are running out quickly. The minds of governments and nations are closing, and soon they may be dominated by the desperate idea that an end with terror is preferable to terror without end. This idea has often been wrong in the past, but never has it been so pernicious and vicious as it is today. For the alternative to a negotiated settlement and to the peaceful coexistence of the two systems is not the victory of one over the other but their mutual destruction.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

War or Peace: The Undebated Issue

BY ARCHIBALD MACLEISH

THIS is November 17, 1950. It may already be too late to discuss means of avoiding the unspeakable catastrophe of atomic war. The Chinese and Russian regimes are beating the drums of hate in every village across the north of Asia. Chinese soldiers have crossed the Yalu River in force. The army of the United Nations will not evacuate the peninsula and could not if it would. Nothing but a Chinese withdrawal, either by choice or under pressure, can now prevent a conflict which would be no longer Korean but continental, and not continental only but world-wide.

But if the events of the past few days have made it more difficult to think and talk of peace, they have made it easier to discuss *negotiation as a means to peace.* For the events of the past few days have demonstrated that the peace policy to which we have been committed for the last three years—the policy of peace by containment, the policy of peace by the maintenance of stocks of atomic and other weapons, the policy of peace by making it too risky for the Russians to break the peace—will not work alone. Our stock of atomic weapons is presumed to be vastly larger than the Russians'. Our military power is far greater than it was when the containment policy was defined. Our army and air force in Korea have demonstrated their ability, under the most difficult circumstances, to fight off and eventually to annihilate just such armies as the Chinese Communists possess. And nevertheless the Russians have not hesitated, out of fear for their satellites or even for themselves, to risk—indeed to invite—a world atomic war.

The effect is to leave negotiation as the only practicable method of escaping such a war, if war can still, at this last hour, be avoided. As long as it was possible to believe in peace by containment, peace by might, peace by forces in being, the discussion of negotiation was unrealistic. All the Russians respected, all that would restrain the Russians, we agreed, was force. Now that it is apparent that force—any force we are likely to be able to mount in the foreseeable future—will not *of itself* restrain the Russians, negotiation becomes not only *a* realistic means of avoiding war but *the* realistic means. The only alternative is the policy of brag and bluster and bust, based on the proposition that if we will turn MacArthur loose to invade China—with what by way of army we are not told—Russia will capitulate overnight.

But if this is so—if negotiation with the Russians is now the one realistic means of avoiding atomic war—then the critical question, the question upon which our lives depend, becomes the question whether negotiation with the Russians is possible.

That question we commonly consider to be a question for the Russians to answer—not ourselves. What makes negotiation with the Russians difficult is Russian brutality, Russian hypocrisy, Russian deceit. If the Russians propose to continue to talk out of one side of their mouths about peace and decency while with the other they order their stooges to overrun the earth, then clearly we can't sit down at the same table with them. If they are going to go on filling the minds of their own people, and such other peoples as they can reach through their propaganda, with hatred of the United States and its people—the kind of hatred which, pumped into the nervous system of a Korean peasant soldier, expresses itself in the torture and massacre of American prisoners—then diplomatic conversations are inconceivable. If they insist on debating jesuitical verbal formulas instead of effective and enforceable agreements—if they insist on "outlawing atomic weapons" instead of discussing the ways by which the use of atomic weapons can be prevented—then no worth-while end would be served by attempting to bargain with them.

BUT though all this is true enough, it is not the whole truth. There are other obstacles to negotiation than the brutality of the Russian rulers, and the most serious of these is the present state of mind of the people of the United States. Under the pounding of persistent newspaper propaganda and the bludgeoning of a new and effective form of political intimidation, a considerable number of Americans have come to believe that any attempt to negotiate with the Russians about the prevention of war would be unpatriotic and un-American. And for what they regard as a self-evident reason: the Russians are Communists, and communism can only be defeated by force of arms.

That simple theory appeals as a matter of course to the immature and the unthinking. But it does not appeal to the unthinking alone. It has come to appeal also to mature, intelligent men and women who have accepted without examination the vociferations of the newspaper and radio propagandists and the political intimidators. And it has produced in their minds the same opinion it

---

ARCHIBALD MACLEISH was formerly Librarian of Congress and is now a professor at Harvard. He is also a well-known poet.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has produced in the minds of the thoughtless. If you hate communism as the American people do hate it, and if you accept the assurance that communism can only be put down by force of arms, then negotiation with the Russians for the elimination of war is not only a waste of time but something worse. It is treason.

The consequence is that even if the Russians were willing to negotiate, and even if they gave proof of a change of tactics which would make that step possible, a considerable body of American opinion would still oppose negotiation. And would oppose it even though no other practicable means of avoiding a catastrophic war existed. We cannot negotiate, should not negotiate, and will not negotiate the issue of communism. We have no concessions to make on that point and we will accept no compromise. If, then, communism can only be put down by guns and bombs, guns and bombs cannot be negotiable. Nor atomic weapons. Nor biological warfare. Nor life and death.

That is the conclusion to which the undebated assumption that we can fight communism only with arms necessarily leads. And that, it is now begin- to appear, is the conclusion to which the propagandists of the undebated assumption intend that it shall lead. The politicians and the manufacturers of public opinion who are responsible for the general acceptance of the belief that force alone will suffice are men who want force to suffice—or who represent groups and institutions which want it. Like their opposite numbers in the Kremlin, who also want Holy War, they have put their party interests or their institutional interests or their group advantage above the interests of their country and their human kind. Though they talk in terms of American patriotism and American loyalty, it is not to any America known to John Adams or to Thomas Jefferson that their loyalties run, but to something very different—an America most Americans now living would repudiate with passion could they see its face.

It must be obvious to anyone who looks back over the slimy trail of the current attack on the Department of State that the purpose of the directors of that discreditable operation has not been political only but ideological as well. Specifically their purpose has been to silence all debate on the fundamental question of the tactics of the struggle against communism and to suppress any opinion but the opinion that the use of force is the sole solution.

Acheson's crime was not Communist sympathy—not even the mentality of a McCarthy could seriously conceive of the author of the Truman Doctrine as sympathetic to communism. Acheson's crime was the development of a policy aimed at the prevention of war. An editorial in *Life* for November 20 puts that magazine's case against the Secretary in so many incredible words: "[Mr. Acheson] has neither abandoned nor materially qualified his conviction that the problem is how to get along with Soviet communism—not how to rid the world of it."

The same thing is true of the rest of the indictment. The crime of the men on the China desk was not Communist sympathy—not even McCarthy's standard of decency and truthfulness could stretch as far as that. The crime of the men on the China desk was their belief that communism in Asia could be opposed by something more effective and less dangerous to the peace of the world than an American invasion force. Mr. Owen Lattimore's crime was not Communist espionage —even McCarthy's conscience suggested a retraction of that charge. Mr. Lattimore's crime was the conviction that the Communist issue in the Far East is an issue related to the whole political and social and economic situation in that part of the world—a political issue, and to be approached as such.

IT WAS to discredit such opinions as these, and to foreclose debate on the one question the American people should have been debating, that the campaign of vilification and character assassination was launched. That it has succeeded as well as it has must be a matter of concern to every believing American. But something more than concern, something more than a sense of shame and self-reproach, is now demanded of us. If we are to avoid disaster we must reopen the issue and reopen vigorously the debate which the advocates of the Holy War have attempted to foreclose. We must examine, honestly and courageously, and without regard to the epithets of the public slanderers, the question of the tactics of the struggle against communism. We must *inspect* the basic assumption that force is the only effective weapon against communism. We must inspect it not by the smoke of dogma but by the light of truth. And we must reach our conclusions with the interests of this people, and of the peoples of the earth, in view, not the interests of a particular group or a favored institution.

The real question is not the question the Holy Warriors keep propounding in their public inquisitions of their fellow-citizens. The real question is not whether we as a people are opposed to communism. Except for a contemptible fraction—contemptible in size as well as in intelligence—we are solidly against communism. The real question is *how* we should be against communism—with what means, and where applied and when. To "get tough" with communism is not a policy; it is an advertising slogan. If you really mean to overcome that dangerous and resourceful enemy you will think not with your adrenalin glands but with your head. And if you think with your head you will ask yourself certain honest questions and attempt to find honest answers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

You will ask yourself how communism has made the gains it has scored in Asia—whether by arms or by other means. And you will reply that it has used both arms and other means. You will ask yourself whether the tactics to be employed against Communist aggression by arms should or should not differ from the tactics employed against Communist infiltration by propaganda and by political and economic and social programs. And you will reply that there should be a difference—that when communism takes arms it must be stopped by arms, as the United Nations, on the appeal of this government, undertook to stop it in Korea; but that when communism moves by political and social infiltration it must be stopped by other means than arms. You cannot shoot a promise of reform when it presents itself to people who want reform: if you try you will not destroy the promiser, you will sanctify him.

The fundamental fact which the suppression of the great debate has obscured and was intended to obscure is, of course, the fact that ours is a revolutionary epoch; that, in Willkie's phrase, "the peoples of the world are on the march"; that the revolutionary impulse in the world today is technological and cultural; that communism is not its begetter but its reactionary exploiter. American technology is far more directly responsible for the passion for change in the Far East than Russian doctrine and dogma. As Acheson has pointed out on more than one occasion, the men and women of the underdeveloped areas of the earth are no longer willing to put up with the poverty and hunger and ignorance and oppression which have been the order of their lives for centuries. They know—they know *from us*—that they need no longer put up with these things, and they are determined not to put up with them. There can now be enough food, enough clothing, enough education, enough machinery for all of them, and they know it.

When, therefore, they are approached by Communists who offer to tell them how they can secure for themselves and for their children what men and women elsewhere have secured, they listen. And when they are offered no other way of getting what they are determined to have but the Communist way, they take the Communist way. They are not impressed by the bullying oratory of American politicians who give them no reason for rejecting communism but the threat that they will be burned to death in atomic fire if they don't. Or rather, they *are* impressed. They are persuaded that if men like Knowland and McCarran and McCarthy speak for America, then America is the kind of country for which men like Knowland and McCarran and McCarthy speak.

Open, free, and honest debate on the issue could have only one result—the one result the propagandists and intimidators dread—the general recognition throughout the United States that the underlying assumption of the advocates of Holy War is false: that force is *not* the sole solution; that the struggle against communism cannot be won with arms alone or primarily with arms; that the effective answer to communism is military preparedness *and* an imaginative, courageous, and vigorous American *participation in the world revolution* in the hope of directing it toward its true goal of individual realization and self-respect and manhood, instead of the false goal, the debased goal, of authoritarianism; that a truly Bold New Program of this character, not the timid shadow of a Bold New Program we have now approved, would deprive world communism of the greatest asset it possesses—the opportunity for infiltration in Asia and elsewhere which our hard-handed, soft-headed, bully-and-bomb misconception of the nature of our time has given it.

The urgent question at this moment is whether we shall continue to permit special interests in American politics and American journalism to blackmail and slander us into silence which can only end in war. I do not know whether negotiation with the Russians is possible. I am certain negotiation is not possible unless the Russians change their tactics. But if we, on our side, permit that last, slight possibility of peace to be lost because we lack the manhood to shake off the lie which ignorance and bigotry and selfishness have forced upon us, because we lack the manhood to declare that Holy War is not a necessity but an evil thing, because we are afraid to shout it out as God's truth that the struggle against communism can and must be won in terms worthy of our people and our past—then we shall deserve the responsibility history, if there is to be a history of our time, will let us bear.

Slow March for the Holy War

Man in the West,
Man in the East,
Man lives best
Who loves life least,
Says the Priest in the West.

Man in the East,
Man in the West,
Man in the flesh,
Man in the ghost,
Man lives best
Who fears death most,
Says the Priest in the East.

Man in the East,
Man in the West,
Man in the flesh,
Man in the ghost,
Man at the lash,
Man at the Host,
Man lives best
Who loves life most,
Who fears death least,
Says the Man to the Priest
In the East: in the West.

ARCHIBALD MACLEISH

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



It has been truly said that "One machine may do the work of fifty men —but NO machine can do the work of one extraordinary man"... In the business of real estate there is no substitute for vision, plus the ability to make that vision a reality . . . Buyers and sellers of real estate who are represented by Albert M. Greenfield & Co. have greatly profited by the knowledge, foresight and facilities of this organization.

ALBERT M. GREENFIELD & CO.
A COMPLETE REAL ESTATE INSTITUTION

Philadelphia

New York Newark Pittsburgh Atlantic City

ROSEWAL
MANUFACTURING
COMPANY

158 West 27th Street, New York 1, N. Y.

CENTRAL OVERALL SUPPLY CO.

7043 EAST PALMER

Detroit, Michigan

Morris L. Schaver

INDEPENDENT PRESS
SINCE 1813
Printing
Speeches, Pamphlets, Books, Leaflets

GOSHEN, NEW YORK

Compliments of

Albert Gitlow

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Agreeing to Disagree

BY R. H. S. CROSSMAN

OF ALL Molotov's achievements, none is more remarkable than the spiritual conversion of British socialism which he has wrought in the last five years. In 1945 the foreign-policy plank in Labor's election program could be summed up in two sentences: A Tory government would divide the world into two rival blocs and make Britain the junior partner in an Anglo-American alliance. Only a Socialist government can prevent this fatal development and mediate successfully between capitalist America and Communist Russia.

This was not merely a plank in an election platform. It was a passionate conviction, the conviction with which Ernest Bevin entered the Foreign Office. Although Bevin, through his trade-union experience, was always a convinced anti-Communist, he was not at that time in any way anti-Russian. Indeed, the oration which he made at the Labor Party conference at Blackpool in the spring of 1945 contained the famous assertion "Left speaks to Left," and an equally significant but almost forgotten assurance that British Labor recognized Russia's claims in the Dardanelles. Bevin became anti-Russian only when he discovered that Stalin's aim was to achieve a bilateral American-Russian agreement at the expense of the British Commonwealth and, in the first instance, of Britain's Middle Eastern interests. The Russian-inspired insurrection in Azerbaijan in the spring of 1946 gave him his opportunity to swing the United States into support of a vital British interest. But even after this he painfully sought to regain his mediating position, and the final break only came in the summer of 1947, when Molotov walked out of the Paris conference and told Ernest Bevin to his face that Russia would break any Western European nation which dared to accept Marshall Plan aid.

Since then the official attitude of the British Labor government toward Russia has crystallized into a reluctant acceptance of the Anglo-American alliance. This acceptance, however, is always conditioned by the hope that, given the necessary social and economic strengthening of the non-Communist world, the Russians may be brought to accept an "agreement to disagree." This phrase, first formulated, I think, by the *New Statesman and Nation*, was taken over by Bevin at the 1949 Labor Party conference and is now the basis of party policy.

What does an "agreement to disagree" add up to? In the first place, it involves accepting something very distasteful to the left of the Labor Party—that collaboration between Socialists and Communists, either within a single state, as members of a coalition, or between two states, must be ruled out. The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia provided the first premise for this gloomy conclusion. After all, the British government had put every pressure on the Czech Socialists to encourage them to work in a Popular Front with the Communists, and the terrible fate which has befallen every democratic Socialist, not only in Czechoslovakia but in all the countries behind the iron curtain, is partly our responsibility. It has driven Laborites to see that the foreign Communist is as untrustworthy as the home-grown variety.

On the other hand, British Labor is not prepared to adopt the anti-Marxist dogmatism of ex-Communists, such as James Burnham and Arthur Koestler. Our brand of socialism, compounded of practical Fabianism and Christian principle, has always been skeptical of Marxist dialecticians eager to prove that there is an inherent contradiction in capitalism and that gradualism is impossible. For just fifty years the British Labor Party has been busy disproving such dogmatic conclusions from dubious economic laws. We are not likely, therefore, to take the ex-Communists very seriously when they turn Marx upside down and "prove" the inevitability of war and the inherent impossibility of Communist and non-Communist states existing alongside one another. Fifty years ago, when the Labor Party was founded, British Labor asserted, in defiance of all the Continental pundits of socialism, that it was possible to abolish the class war by peaceful means and to achieve socialism through parliamentary democracy. In 1950 history has proved that the Fabians were right and the Marxists were wrong on this issue. The whole tradition of the British Labor movement makes us reluctant to accept either the belief that war is inevitable or the assertion that any attempt to do business with the Russians is an act of appeasement.

DOES this mean we believe a general peace settlement with Russia can be negotiated? If that implies an agreement on all outstanding problems, the answer is almost certainly no. But the reason why such a happy conclusion is unlikely is not, as we used to assume five years ago, the incompatibility of Russian communism and American capitalism—indeed, a horse-trading deal between a deeply reactionary American Administration and the Kremlin is a menace of which the British Socialist still has some reason to be afraid, even in 1950. The

---

R. H. S. CROSSMAN is a Labor member of Parliament and assistant editor of the New Statesman and Nation *(London). He is the author of "Palestine Mission."*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Courtesy *Franc-Tireur*

"The only thing we lacked was a cold war"

only man who ever successfully negotiated an all-round deal with the Russians was Hitler, and he was able to do so because he shared their taste for dividing the world into spheres of influence. Theoretically, at least, there is no reason why American capitalism should not come to the same sort of arrangement with Moscow —and hold to it, as Hitler foolishly refused to do.

What obstructs such horse-trading is the existence of the Fair Deal ideology in the United States and the British Socialist experiment. The British Socialist and the Fair Dealer are opposed to communism and opposed by Communists on principle. A Pentagon planner might have written off Korea. President Truman decided to resist aggression there, not for reasons of expediency but on principle, and that is why he obtained Britain's immediate support in the Korean campaign, while meeting stubborn resistance from London when he tried to appease the "realists" in Washington on Formosa.

This brings me to my second point. We are coming to realize in Britain that the cold war is not merely an unfortunate mishap caused by mistakes of diplomacy on both sides or a struggle between rival imperialisms. Essentially it is a struggle of ideas, in which free enterprise is not the protagonist on the Western side but the chief obstacle to our victory. Every American action which has been successful in resisting communism has been carried out in defiance of the principles which actuate American business. Marshall aid became a magnificent if involuntary precedent for international cooperation because the Americans who ran it applied to European recovery methods of social planning which are anathema to most business men; and if our military defenses are to be adequately strengthened, this will only be done by once again violating every principle of competitive free enterprise and capitalist economics. The cold war, in fact, is not only a menace but a creative force. If the Fair Dealer and the Socialist understand their job, the cold war will enable us to reconstruct the non-Communist world in a way that would have been totally impossible had the Russians been willing to work with us peacefully in 1945. Russian collaboration at that time would certainly have precipitated a world slump and removed any possibility of the American aid which has provided so many of the physical resources for the British Socialist experiment.

To an American liberal, perturbed by the growing anti-Communist hysteria and seeing at first hand how gigantic military expenditures are taking precedence over economic and social aid, such a picture of the cold war may seem fantastically optimistic. Certainly I do not mean to suggest that it is bound to stimulate the developments I have just sketched. There are immensely powerful forces in Britain, as well as in America, which accept the ex-Communist view that war is inevitable and which see military strength as the only form of defense against the Russian menace. During the next twelve months it will be a matter of touch and go whether the Labor government in London will avoid surrendering to these pressures and accepting a degree of rearmament sufficient to destroy the basis of its socialism. MacArthur, Churchill, and the ex-Communists may get their way and by assuming war to be inevitable make it inevitable. But it is also possible that the British Labor Party's idea of world-wide mutual aid, of which we seem to hear an echo in Walter Reuther's peace plan, may become the basis of Anglo-American policy. If it does, it will be possible to defeat communism, not by military force but by the peaceful reconstruction of the non-Communist world.

IF THIS is the concept of cold war which American liberals and British Socialists should accept, what part do we assign in our strategy to negotiation with the Russians? In the first place, we, as much as our reactionary opponents, must regard such negotiations as tactical maneuvers designed to strengthen our position while we concentrate on the main job of reconstructing our Western world. Once we recognize that the Russians hate and fear us a great deal more than they hate and fear the reactionaries, we must forgo the hope that liberals and Socialists could achieve a general settlement with the Kremlin more easily than reactionaries could.

The agreement to disagree can never be initialed by statesmen. It can only be achieved after a protracted period of stalemate, in which we try to avoid actions, such as the rearming of West Germany or the support of Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa, which can only be interpreted by the Communists as preparations for aggression. In the case of Germany we should not attempt to negotiate a general settlement; that is out of the question. What we should concentrate on is an agreement upon the armed police forces to be permitted to the Germans in the west and the east. Here the Russians have a common interest with us. Their Slav allies are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reluctant to see an East German army; our European allies are reluctant to see a West German army. By making it clear that we shall permit the West Germans to be armed precisely to the extent that the Russians arm the East Germans, and no further, we could create the basis for a hard-headed agreement. If the Russians disarm the *Bereitschaften* and are also ready to sign the Austrian treaty, we should be prepared to keep West Germany permanently demilitarized. This handling of the German problem is merely one example of a general principle—that the best hope of a *détente*, leading to an agreement to disagree, lies in a series of limited negotiations designed to achieve limited settlements of limited issues.

Nothing succeeds like success, and it is vital to avoid conferences on subjects where failure is certain. To attempt to discuss atomic control, for instance, or indeed any form of disarmament, in the present phase, is to court failure. Far better to concentrate on such minor objectives as a Korean peace settlement or the exchange of coarse grain for machine tools, in which the ideological conflict and the mutual suspicions are counterbalanced by strong material interests.

The philosophy implicit in the policy I have suggested requires the discarding of a good many delusions. One is that the world must be either at peace or at war. From this delusion spring two equal and opposite fallacies. There are those who say that since we are obviously not at peace, we may as well accept a state of war. That is the logic of the ex-Communists. But there is also the fallacious argument that we *must* somehow make peace with the Russians in the near future if we are to avoid war. It is this second delusion which most of us have to overcome. We have got to realize that the cold war will outlast our lifetime, and may become even more intense as the forces of liberalism grow stronger in the West. To prevent the hot war, we must accept the cold war as the challenge of our generation and realize that we must be well on the way to winning it, and must have negotiated a whole series of limited agreements, before the Kremlin will settle down to any general agreement to disagree.

Western Europe's Middle Way

BY CLAUDE BOURDET

THE trend toward "neutralism" or "independence" is definitely gaining ground in France. Concerned primarily with the maintenance of peace, the neutralists hope to construct a bloc of nations which will cooperate with India in trying to bridge the gap between East and West. They are strengthened in their convictions by the following military considerations:

The defense potential of a nation or a group of nations is not a matter of armaments alone. Armaments can be of use only if the unity of the people is complete and their will to sacrifice themselves for the common purpose unflinching. The defense potential can easily dwindle away if the nation or group of nations is torn by internal strife.

But even with impressive armaments and moral unity, a nation or group of nations will not escape attack at the first favorable opportunity by other powerful nations if its military system of defense constitutes in any way a permanent offensive threat. To use a simple mathematical formula, one may say that the military security of a nation or an area is equal to its armaments, multiplied by its moral unity, and divided by something which one may call the "factor of provocation," that is, the danger it represents for others.

Armaments, moral unity, and the factor of provocation are often discussed by journalists and politicians as if they were entirely independent of one another. In reality they are closely linked. For instance, let us consider the situation of a country like France, whose *material* capacity for defense has been to a certain extent increased by the Atlantic Pact and Marshall Plan aid, and will be further increased in future. One factor in its defense potential has been strengthened, but a very different effect has been produced on the other two. Many American journalists have stressed the fact that the "scared men in the Kremlin" have been prompted in their policies, since 1917, by the fear of "encirclement." With strategic air forces playing a predominant part in modern war, the establishment in France and French North Africa of air bases for American strategic bombers may heighten this fear almost unbearably. It is conceivable that if a settlement does not emerge in the next few years, the Kremlin will consider France and some other countries "pistols aimed at the heart of Soviet Russia," just as Antwerp, in hostile hands, would have been viewed by nineteenth-century Britain. It is therefore possible that Soviet Russia may be led to start a preventive war long before Western Europe has attained its maximum power. And since France and other coun-

---

CLAUDE BOURDET, an independent left journalist, is the editor of the Paris Observateur. *He was a leader of the French Resistance during the war and edited the Resistance organ* Combat *for several years afterward.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tries of Western Europe will have become American bridgeheads, the Soviet general staff will have every reason to use its 200 to 300 divisions to prevent their use as such. Even if the Russians, for strategic or political reasons, might prefer to fight on battlefields other than those of Western Europe, the Atlantic Pact would prevent it. We must conclude that, whatever its other effects, the policy of building up France and the other Pact countries—I am speaking in military and not in moral terms—increases the odds against Russia and thus enlarges the factor of provocation and correspondingly reduces the security of the West.



Courtesy *News-Chronicle*

"But will they be turned against the East?"

This would not matter so much if the numerator of the formula—armaments multiplied by moral unity—could be brought to a maximum through the working of the Atlantic policy. The arms provided by America undoubtedly greatly exceed those which could be manufactured in France or bought on ordinary commercial terms, but the Atlantic policy, by defining its purpose as the defense of the "Western world and Western civilization," has not furnished the people of France and Western Europe with a very inspiring rallying cry. The fighting spirit of a country can be mobilized for some great crusade which is supported by the overwhelming majority of its inhabitants or for the defense of its frontiers. A small part of the people of Western Europe might be aroused to a crusade in behalf of the Atlantic policy, but in France at least the majority are indifferent toward any so-called Russian "menace" which does not take the form of a definite threat against French territory and institutions. Moreover, some 25 per cent of the population is now influenced by the French Communists and could be easily persuaded to sabotage, actively or passively, Atlantic strategic plans as long as they did not feel the direct weight of a Soviet invasion.

But this is not all. The Marshall Plan, the Atlantic policy, and the American alliance have had the effect, probably not intended by the American government, of helping to restore to power the political and economic power of the old ruling class. The political situation in France is now such that the cost of rearming will be borne chiefly by the workers and other poor elements of the population. Prices of commodities are rising, and the government is making useless efforts to conceal the inflation, which it has tacitly accepted as the "easy" method of rearmament. Easy, indeed, for the wealthy: profits follow prices.

Only the rich and conservative really approve of France's present foreign policy. The Americans should not be misled by M. Mauriac's paeans of praise about arms and the Atlantic Pact. An army is composed of common men and not of well-to-do Academicians; and the French collapse in 1940 shows clearly what happens when a people has not been given moral purposes to fight for. The present situation is even worse. At that time the French were morally united against Hitler—with the exception of a part of the upper bourgeoisie and the higher ranks of the Communist Party—and it was only the reluctance of the government to make the war an anti-fascist war that left the masses without any fighting stamina. Today the French are completely divided on the purpose of the war and in their feelings toward the enemy.

If my analysis is sound, the French this time lack both moral unity and the fighting spirit. Of the three factors which determine the "military security" of a nation—arms strength, moral unity, and harmlessness for other states—two have been undermined by the Atlantic policy. It is thus conceivable, as many experts whisper over here, that under such conditions any amount of armament the French may produce or receive from America will be wasted.

IF THIS is the effect of the Atlantic policy on the defense of Western nations taken individually, let us see what happens when we try to combine, under the same Atlantic emblem, French and German forces. It is useless to view French and German power simply as separate items which can be added together. The only Germans ready to indorse West German rearmament are the right-wing anti-bolshevists and the old officer corps reunited in the *Bruderschaft* under the spiritual guidance of Manteuffel and Guderian. And that group has put a very precise condition on its cooperation: *Gleichberechtigung,* or equality of rights, for Germany, the first aspect of which is the rehabilitation of the German army, Nazi as well as non-Nazi. Even if this condition had not been stressed, it is clear that the German army could not easily be built up, as an autonomous force or as a part of a European army, without the cooperation of the old German staff and officers, who are revolted by the very notion of one of their members being called a war criminal. The German army we shall get, therefore—nobody in Germany or Western Europe disputes the fact—will be an exact replica of Hitler's army.

It is simply ludicrous to think that French soldiers, many of whom have suffered directly or indirectly at the hands of Hitler's army and police, will cooperate en-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bluebeard's Castle Hotel

SAINT THOMAS • VIRGIN ISLANDS OF THE U. S. A.

• The treasured landmark of St. Thomas, stands above the town of Charlotte Amalie. From its famous terrace the sweeping panorama of the Caribbean, the town and its harbor and the surrounding hills make a breath-taking picture in all colors imaginable.

• Enjoy this sublime view in the comfort of the cooling breezes of the ever-cooling trade winds.

• Explore the historic town, its churches, markets, and shops. Enjoy the countryside and meet the people who are noted for their welcome to visitors.

Relax and Enjoy . . .

Ocean Bathing, Golf, Tennis, Deep Sea Fishing, Sailing, Riding, Beach Parties, Cruises to Neighborhood Islands, Trips on Glass Bottom Boats and Harbor Cruises. Sightseeing and Camera Trips. . . . The Most Beautiful White Sand Beaches. . . . A Most Equable Climate. Excellent Food. American and French Cuisine. Our Free Port-Goods Enter Continental U. S. A. Duty Free.

KARL H. BOCK, GENERAL MANAGER
NEW YORK OFFICE: 84 WILLIAM STREET, BO 9-1475

Greetings

from

A FRIEND

COD LIVER OIL

Arista Oil Products Company

135 FRONT STREET

New York 5, N. Y.

Greetings from

BENJAMIN GILMORE

11 WOODYBROOK

CROTON ON HUDSON, NEW YORK

COMPLIMENTS OF

NORMAN GOURSE

Men's Clothier Since 1921

317 BROADWAY, NEW YORK, N.Y.

'PHONE: WORTH 2-0024

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thusiastically with such a German army against the Russians. However strong the repulsion of the French non-Communist masses for the Communist system, those men and women bear no grudge against the Russian people. They have not forgotten the part played by the Russians in the battles which led to the liberation of France. There is many an Avenue de Stalingrad in France, and no Avenue Guderian. It is quite probable that Soviet propaganda would exploit this feeling by broadcasting what the officers of the new German divisions were doing during the last war. Americans should understand that although the French bear no grudge against the German common man, they would rather, when it comes to shooting, shoot Nazi officers and men in gray-green uniforms than Russians. Thus the moral unity of a Franco-German coalition against Soviet Russia would be even weaker than that of the Atlantic Pact countries alone.

FOR all these reasons many Frenchmen are resolved to fight against the Atlantic Pact policy and to establish instead a policy of independence as between America and Soviet Russia. It is already quite clear to most Frenchmen that only nations that do not take sides in the Russian-American controversy, like India, can in any way contribute to a lessening of the world tension. It is becoming more and more clear to them that their military security is in no way increased by the Atlantic policy. A "neutralist," or rather "independent," attitude was apparent in many speeches made during the recent debate in Parliament about Germany and armament.

What remains to be proved is that an independent policy would enable France to build up a stronger defense. The following points can be cited in support of this proposition:

1. If France and other Western European countries remained independent in international affairs and refused to serve as military bases for the United States, they would offer no threat to the U. S. S. R. The U. S. S. R. would therefore have less reason to start a preventive war or to occupy those countries if war broke out.

2. The defense of French independence and French territory against *all* possible invaders would be a purpose to call forth the fighting spirit of the nation. No Frenchman would refuse to fight for his country in such circumstances—not even a French Communist. This is so apparent that the French Communist Party has had to soft-pedal its contention that "the French people would never fight against the Soviet Union"—a slogan which was understood by everyone to mean: the French will fight *with* the Soviet Union. The French would certainly fight any nation which attacked and tried to invade France. That is why the French Communists, after first opposing the neutralists, are now trying to establish a common front with them for the defense of peace. This attempt is of course hampered by the non-Communists' strong suspicion that the party leaders would not be neutral if the Russian army approached the French border.

The present realistic attitude of the Communist leadership is one proof, among others, that if a French non-Communist government came out with a strong "independent" program, it would be enthusiastically followed by the majority of the French people, including many of the Communist rank and file and their sympathizers. Thus the moral unity of the nation would be made as complete as possible in the existing circumstances.

3. An independent France—and an independent Western Europe—might have to do without American arms. But some military experts believe that an armed force to defend French frontiers could be totally different from a French force formed on classical lines and incorporated in an American-European army. They believe that it would not so much aim to beat an invading army in open battle as to make the occupation of France a frightfully expensive and useless affair for any foreign power; thousands of strongholds would be created all over French territory, and the French frontier force would be used only to give time for the internal mobilization. Thus France—and the same applies to other countries—would become one immense and powerfully organized *maquis*. It is doubtful whether the Russians would engage in such an endless battle if they could help it. Experts also believe that the cost of the armament needed for this form of defense would be much lower than that of a classical force.

At the same time an independent France could ask for a formal guaranty by the United States and Russia. If the U. S. S. R. invaded France, it would be *ipso facto* at war with the United States, and France would become immediately the ally of the United States and allow it to use French bases in Africa.

Applying the same idea to other European countries, the defense of West German neutrality could perhaps be combined with a plan for the neutralization of all Germany, as was originally proposed by the Quakers; this might prove acceptable to the Russians in their present mood. Cooperation between French and German armies would become possible if each army were supposed to defend its own territory.

Western Europe could conceivably become a federation of states preserving an armed neutrality and pursuing in world affairs a third-force policy in cooperation with India, Yugoslavia, and a few other independent states. Such a development might have, of course, some disadvantages—no policy is without drawbacks—but it is the only one which, in the opinion of a large and growing number of Frenchmen, can bring any real chance of world peace.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ONE HALF OF THE WORLD

The Scars of Imperialism

BY ANDREW ROTH

RECENTLY a sensational Sunday paper in London enticed readers with the headlined question: "Is Another World Watching Us?" It then proceeded to spin the theory that some other inhabited world is the source of the often reported "flying saucers." Perhaps the leaders of the Anglo-American and the Communist blocs ask themselves the same question when they view the assorted crockery cast at them by the newly independent states, particularly India.

Of more immediate importance is the question whether India is straying only temporarily from the Anglo-American orbit or as the leader of the new Asian nations will permanently follow an independent middle course between the two great power groups. The interest of the British Foreign Office in this question was seen in its reaction to the Chinese-Indian crisis caused by the Communist thrust into Tibet. British diplomacy could not but view with alarm the extension of Communist military influence to Tibet, so long in the outer circle of British satellites. But this alarm was considerably offset by the near-panic which seemed to overtake New Delhi and by the consequent intrusion of Sardar Patel into the field of foreign affairs. Sardar Patel's speeches have revealed, as many insiders have long known, that he is a strong opponent of Pandit Nehru's attempt to follow the middle course. It is his thesis that India can best avoid being drawn into the Communist orbit by moving closer to the British and Americans. British diplomacy has been deeply concerned over the possibility of India's leading a neutral Asian bloc because Britain's ability to influence South Asian Commonwealth members is one of its major assets in the Anglo-American alliance.

Even in its present nebulous form this India-centered power constellation has exerted considerable influence. Every Western group eager to avoid the drift to war has invoked the name of Nehru. And when Russia, frightened by the reaction to the North Korean attack, attempted to reach some sort of peaceful settlement in July, it too sought to use India's middle position as a bridge. At the same time both the Russians and the Anglo-Americans have tried to win over the India-led nations; recognizing that if this oscillating group gravitated closely to one side, the other would be very much isolated. "Never in the history of the United Nations has there been a delegation so courted and so beseeched and besieged as India's delegation in these days," wrote the New York *Times* correspondent at Lake Success early in October.

This wooing of the Indian delegation is in part a tribute to the brightness with which India shines in the political firmament. The largest of the newly independent countries and after China the most populous country in the world, it is one of the three Asian states with any degree of industrialization, and if its industrial potential were realized, it would become one of the world's great industrial powers. Among its political, economic, philosophical, and scientific leaders are men of acknowledged stature. But it is chiefly as "the voice of free Asia," to quote the London *Economist*, that "India's views have lately come to be regarded with something approaching awe both in Washington and London."

PANDIT NEHRU disclaims any intention of forming a neutral bloc between Russia and America. Yet he made a tentative effort in that direction even before India was freed, at the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in April, 1947. He tried again to unite the non-Communist Asian states—including those of the Middle East—in support of Indonesian independence, in a conference held at New Delhi in January, 1949. Both efforts proved premature because the new states, with few exceptions, were too occupied with domestic problems to want to mix in international affairs. India and Pakistan, Israel and the Arab states have had to cope with millions of refugees. Burma has had to deal with as many as seven separate revolts. Even the less troubled new states, such as Ceylon, have had to master the apparatus of self-government. Countries like Indo-China which have not yet achieved their freedom have made that their chief goal. Pakistan has been too much concerned with defeating India diplomatically in the Kashmir dispute to join it in an Asian bloc. The Arab states have been more interested in scoring off Israel than in any joint action.

The past year has seen some groping among the new states for a common long-range policy in international

---

ANDREW ROTH is now in London after four years in China and Southeast Asia. He is a staff contributor to The Nation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

affairs. Indonesia's entry into the U. N. has added another state consciously searching for a middle road. Most of them have learned from experience that neither the Anglo-Americans nor the Russians adequately support their demands. Not even such a trusted friend of the British as Sir Zafrullah Khan can claim that Britain has been able to give Pakistan much help in obtaining its principal objective, Kashmir. Ceylon, which has long waited for admission to the U. N., feels its case is being used as a diplomatic football rather than judged on its merits. And one wonders whether the Chinese Communists do not sometimes suspect that the Soviet Union is more anxious to use the admission of Peking to the U. N. as a bludgeon against the West than to put it through.

The pressure of events this fall has pushed these new states to vital decisions of adherence or non-adherence to the great-power blocs. The emergence of Communist China, American offers of military-economic aid, and the crisis caused by the Korean conflict have presented them with sharp alternatives. It has become clear, however, that they will form an independent constellation only if the centripetal influences overcome the centrifugal. The principal centrifugal influence has been the pulling power of the bigger and stronger blocs. Many formerly colonial countries are still under the economic and military domination of their old masters. India, Pakistan, and Ceylon have remained part of the sterling area, over which Britain presides as banker. As weak, vulnerable economies, they must bow to the fact that Britain retains control of their sterling balances. When the market for their export commodities contracted in 1948-49, they had to ask Great Britain to increase the rate of release of the money owed them. The power of the banker was further indicated by the alacrity with which all but Pakistan devalued the pound in September, 1949, when Britain, under American prompting, decided that devaluation was required.

America of course exerts even stronger influence, since it can afford to make large loans or gifts if it feels that its political or military interests require it. A striking example of how subservient economic aid can make some nominally independent new states was noted recently in the Philippines, when President Elpidio Quirino publicly acclaimed the Bell report—the work of a United States mission sent there to investigate economic conditions—even though it was a scathing indictment of the corrupt and reactionary character of his own regime.

Another lever used by the great powers is the inability of Asian countries to produce modern arms. India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, and even Burma and Iraq, have armies patterned on the British model and use British equipment. As a result, their military strength is largely determined by the rate at which Britain releases arms to them, particularly such super-weapons as jet planes. And this rate is determined by whether or not the purpose for which the arms are required coincides with British policy. Both Indian and Pakistan officers have complained lately that their arms supplies were being held back because Britain did not want to see the two countries at war. Israel has complained about the large sales of jet planes to Egypt with which Britain has hoped to induce the Egyptian government to sign a favorable treaty.

This form of pressure is certainly not limited to the non-Communist states, as the case of Vietnam has demonstrated. In spite of it Ho Chi Minh has made a number of efforts to maintain an independent left-revolutionary position. As late as July, 1949—when Mao Tse-tung and other orthodox Communist leaders had proclaimed neutrality impossible—President Ho declared in an interview with the writer that it was possible and desirable for Vietnam to be neutral in the conflict between East and West. But he has been pushed toward the Communist bloc by Western, and particularly American, military-economic support for the French-sponsored Bao Dai regime. And he has been pulled toward it by the willingness of Communist China to supply him with the artillery and equipment which has proved decisive in the Vietnamese conflict. Today Ho Chi Minh gives undeviating loyalty to the Kremlin.

PERHAPS the strongest force impelling the newly independent states toward a middle position is their tradition of struggle against outside control. As the Lucknow conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations demonstrated, educated Asians view any Western effort today in the light of their experience with Western imperialism over the past two hundred years. They still bear the scars of British, Dutch, and French despotism. Since the leaders of these new nations are mostly recruited from the propertied classes they are also antagonistic to communism.

Many of the new nations feel that their political independence is still to be recognized as a working reality by the great powers. Despite the post-war revolutionary upsurge and the freeing of former colonies, they find their part of the world still largely controlled by the white man. The Atlantic powers, particularly Britain, do make an effort to get important Asian states like India to *go along* on decisions, but even India does not seem to have a real voice in crucial matters.

The new states also blame the West for their crushing poverty. They feel this is a product of imperialism, which has developed them as producers of raw materials and as markets for Western manufactured products and left them under-industrialized. They have continued too long in this role, they believe, largely because the West is not interested in helping them effect a change unless the direct threat of communism makes it neces-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

All Good Wishes to

THE NATION

COURAGEOUS LEADER IN THE FIGHT FOR A FREE WORLD

FROM

THE PILOT

Weekly Newspaper of
Southern Pines, North Carolina

"The belief that leads to democracy is this: that every man has something sacred about him. This sacredness is held to be inherent and perpetual: no ruler, no religion, no group of men, no government is justified in violating it. It is the first principle of man's life and nothing takes precedence over it."

JAMES BOYD

Compliments of

RUDOLF GOWNS

491 SEVENTH AVENUE

NEW YORK CITY

THE

COTTON

SHOPS

231 S. JEFFERSON STREET

Chicago, Illinois

FROM A FRIEND

of THE NATION

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sary. At the recent Conference of the International Monetary Fund at Paris, for example, Ceylon's Finance Minister demonstrated in detail that the bulk of international funds have gone to Western European countries, although the needs of the Asian underdeveloped countries are so much greater.

Sir George Sansom, a retired British diplomat and distinguished historian who attended the Lucknow conference, summed up the general Asian attitude in an article in the London Sunday *Times*. He said:

> There is undoubtedly in most Asian countries strong unformulated mistrust of the intentions of the Western powers and a leaning toward "neutrality." . . . Thus the Asian peoples are upset by the presence of Western troops on Asian soil, and fear that they may be drawn into a war between the Atlantic powers and Russia. They think . . . that America has given immense sums to rehabilitate Western Europe but has little to spare for Asia, and that only on condition of supporting American policies. However mistaken such sentiments may be, their existence is a fact of great political importance. The new states are extremely jealous of an independence so recently acquired. At the same time independence has brought with it problems, largely economic, which absorb the energies of the new governments and dispose them to take a somewhat narrow, even irritable, view of foreign affairs.

If the new states sometimes seem "irritable" to British diplomats—and certainly Egypt frequently merits that description—it is because they do not have the political, economic, or military strength to carry out their aspirations. Few of them have yet recovered from the last war to the same extent as the European nations. Even the localized wars in which India, Pakistan, Burma, Israel, and the Arab states have been involved have taken half or more of their budgets, and a general war would crush their economies. Most of these new states will attempt to stay out of any conflict which they consider a struggle for power between the rival Anglo-American and Soviet blocs. If they have the strength to resist the pulls of these two giants—and can minimize their own internecine quarrels—they will prefer to form their own power group to try to solve their common problems. The task will require a prolonged period of peace. Therefore the firm fixing of this middle constellation, which is now so nebulous, would almost certainly have a pacifying effect on our international firmament.

Colonialism's Last Stronghold

BY RAYFORD W. LOGAN

ASIAN countries containing more than 500,000,000 brown-skinned people have gained independence since the end of World War II. Not one black colony has been freed. Millions of Indo-Chinese and Malayans are fighting to throw off French and British rule. Black Africa lies dormant except for sporadic strikes and riots.

And yet some 150,000,000 black Africans live under conditions which make them, we are repeatedly reminded, ripe for communism. They are politically oppressed and economically exploited, segregated and kept largely illiterate. Their leaders are becoming increasingly impatient with the gradualist policies of the colonial nations. This impatience manifests itself especially in British West Africa, although Nigeria and the Gold Coast have granted fuller native participation in government than other parts of Africa. While the British Labor government has been dragging its feet in advancing native self-government in Africa, small white minorities in the two Rhodesias and Kenya are insistently demanding dominion status or "home rule." If they achieve their aims and are freed from the restraining influence of the British Colonial Office, they will be able to carry through racist policies similar to those in the Union of South Africa. The white minorities in these territories are also demanding the establishment of an East African Federation that would include Uganda and, despite the protests of the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations, Tanganyika. Jan Smuts's dream of a "white dominion" from the Cape of Good Hope to the borders of Ethiopia may yet be realized. If it is, these new states will probably follow the lead of South Africa and refuse to approve or observe the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The policies of Smuts and Malan in the Union of South Africa must have been of incalculable value to the Soviet Politburo. For more than thirty years Smuts referred to Africans as "children" and at New York's Town Hall in 1930 complimented them for being the "most patient of all animals, next to the ass." In a lecture

---

RAYFORD W. LOGAN, professor of history at Howard University, represents the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People at the U. N. He is the author of "The Operation of the Mandate System in Africa" and "The Negro in the Post-War World."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

at Cape Town, in 1942, he proclaimed that the basis of trusteeship in African native policy was segregation, disfranchisement, and white supremacy. Later, in defiance of the United Nations, he maintained his intention of incorporating the mandated area of South West Africa as a fifth province in the Union and enacted legislation "Jim-Crowing" Indians. Malan rode into power by beating Smuts at his own game—he pitched the appeal to the fears and hatred of the British and Dutch in an even more vicious key than Smuts had done. The United Nations Special Political Committee voted on November 15, 1950, to look over South Africa's "Group Areas Act" to see whether it discriminated against the country's 300,000 Indian minority. But the colored and black majority, who are discriminated against and oppressed by both Indians and Europeans, must fend for themselves.

France is trying a novel experiment in the administration of its overseas black territories. On paper, at least, the natives of these territories have become full-fledged citizens of the Republic and are directly represented in the National Assembly. So far this has resulted in very small gains for the black "Frenchmen" of Africa, in terms either of local self-government or of social and economic advancement. None the less, the principle involved may prove valuable in the future. Belgium, on the other hand, has no truck with either self-government or first-class citizenship for its black African subjects. Its colonial administration is avowedly centralized and paternalistic. A recent observer has called the Portuguese colonies the most backward in Africa. Franco has given even less evidence of an enlightened colonial policy than Salazar.

THE annual publication of the United Nations, "Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories," based on reports submitted by the administering powers, provides an almost unbelievable picture of the plight of black Africans. In 1948 the minimum wage for unskilled workers in French Equatorial Africa was calculated on the basis of their "essential needs." Minimum wages for unskilled workers in French West Africa ranged from 40 cents a day in the hinterland to less than $1 a day in Dakar. Unskilled laborers in British colonies received less than 50 cents a day. Agricultural workers in Kenya and Uganda were paid *monthly* wages beginning at $1.40, plus housing and a farm holding, and domestic workers about $3.60. In Northern Rhodesia natives received less than $4 a month as surface workers in the mines and about $4 a month as underground workers, with free rations and housing valued at about $4 a month more. Europeans received an average of about $200 a month as surface workers and $350 a month as underground workers, plus a cost-of-living allowance, bonuses, and housing at a low rental. (In converting the national currency into dollars and cents, the writer has weighted the exchange in favor of the national currency. Minimum wages, of course, usually tend to become the maximum.)

ESTIMATED POPULATIONS IN TRUST AND NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES OF AFRICA

Trust Territories	
British Cameroons	1,033,000
British Togoland	383,000
French Cameroons	3,060,000
French Togoland	982,000
Italian Somaliland	971,000
Ruanda and Urundi (Belgian)	3,886,000
South West Africa (Union of South Africa, disputed)	341,000
Tanganyika (British)	7,403,000
Total	18,059,000
Non-Self-Governing Territories	
Belgian Congo	10,914,000
French Eq. Africa	3,995,000
West Africa	15,943,000
Madagascar	4,227,000
Morocco	8,293,000
Tunis	2,892,000
British	
Aden	82,000
Gambia	250,000
Gold Coast	3,571,000
Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Swasiland	1,023,000
Kenya	5,180,000
Mauritius	450,000
Nigeria	20,907,000
Northern Rhodesia	1,679,000
Nyasaland	2,200,000
Seychelles	35,000
Sierra Leone	2,000,000
Somaliland	700,000
Uganda	5,000,000
Zanzibar	150,000
Spanish Morocco	1,082,000
Total	90,573,000

The Deputy Legal Adviser to the British Colonial Office in an address last spring to students of Howard University declared that Nigeria was not ready for self-government because not more than 5 per cent of the natives were able to read and write. A Nigerian student inquired whether this small percentage was not an indictment of almost seventy-five years of British company and colonial administration. A comparable rate of illiteracy prevails in many other parts of Africa. It averages 80 per cent in the Gold Coast. In French West Africa 11.6 per cent of the total native school-age population was in school; in French West Africa, a little more than 5 per cent. Northern Rhodesia reported that the net annual cost of education per European child was £24 and per African child, £3, 8*s*. In Kenya the per capita expenditure for European children for 1947 was £50, for Asian children, £8, 15*s*., and for African children, less than £1. Belgium reported that 50 per cent of the African population of school age was in school.

Here as elsewhere in Africa, however, few of the native children went beyond the primary grades, the schools were woefully inadequate, the ratio of students to teachers was inordinately high, and most of the teachers were ill-prepared. The most encouraging aspect of the educational picture is found in the considerable number of students from British Africa at British and American universities. A responsible State Department official credits the British with an awareness of the fact

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that self-government cannot long be postponed and with a desire to provide a large number of well-trained Africans to take over when that day arrives.

Conditions in the Trust Territories are only slightly better than those in the Non-Self-Governing Territories. The latter have been subjected to detailed analysis because, although they are not so well known to the general public as are the Trust Territories, they occupy a much larger area and contain a much larger number of inhabitants.

TWO of the principal themes of Communist propaganda have been "white imperialism" and the injustices inflicted upon Negroes in the United States. As the status of the American Negro has improved, the Communists have stepped up their denunciation of "white imperialism." The extent and effectiveness of Communist propaganda in black Africa cannot, of course, be accurately determined. African students in this country insist that their nationalist leaders are not Communists. However, even when allowance is made for the usual smear tactics, sober opinion and convincing evidence point to a real threat of Communist infiltration in Africa. John Foster Dulles recently warned: "In Africa the influence of Soviet communism has grown over the past five years, and there is danger that repressive policies in the Union of South Africa may touch off an explosion that will spread throughout the continent." In October, 1948, Arthur Creech Jones, then British Colonial Secretary, also uttered a warning against the spread of Communist propaganda in Africa. An American Baptist missionary with more than twenty years' experience in West Africa asserted in August, 1950, that many of the young people of Nigeria were being swept off their feet by communism and that Russia was offering hundreds of scholarships to send young Nigerians to Russia for indoctrination.

But the most specific evidence of Communist influence in Africa was revealed at the trial of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, head of the Gold Coast Nationalist Convention People's Party. In February, 1950, Nkrumah declared in open court that it was his aim to set up a West African Soviet Republic. When Nnamdi Azikiwe, leader of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, visited the United States early in 1950, he was asked what his policy toward the Communists was. He replied, in effect, that he would cross that bridge when he came to it. It is safe to say that while native independence movements are not to any serious extent Communist-dominated, they offer tempting possibilities to Communist agitators. For African natives, having experienced only Western imperialism, naturally regard communism without fear and Russia without hostility.

The Point Four program which President Truman candidly announced as part of an over-all policy to contain communism is woefully inadequate either to prevent the spread of communism or to accomplish any positive improvements. Native African spokesmen bitterly expressed their disappointment when Congress appropriated $35,000,000 for aid to underdeveloped areas and at the same time adopted a military budget of some $40,000,000,000. They also point out that while the European powers have authorized large sums for development projects in their African territories, these projects are still largely in the planning stage. Above all, it is clear that the Point Four program at the present time is based upon military considerations rather than upon concern for the plight of native peoples, especially in Africa. There is little wonder, then, that many Africans regard Point Four as merely the old imperialism in a new guise.

The writer would like, therefore, to submit his own four-point program for Point Four. First, in the training and selection of personnel for development projects there should be no discrimination on account of race, sex, language, or religion. Second, personnel should be selected as much for their skill in human relations as for their technical knowledge. Third, labor should be given as much protection as capital. Fourth, competent natives should participate in the formulation and execution of all projects. To date evidence is lacking that the State Department has drawn up regulations which might achieve these ends. It is to be hoped that Nelson Rockefeller, chairman of the Advisory Committee on Point Four, will show as much awareness of the implications of race and color as he did when he was Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.

PROMPT action is imperative, for time is rapidly running out in the Dark Continent. The colonial powers seem to be determined to hold on to their African territories as long as they can. These territories, as indicated above, are sources of cheap labor. Britain's weakened position in the eastern Mediterranean has compelled it to establish a new defense line in Africa—a military super-highway is to run from Nigeria on the west coast to Mombasa in Kenya on the east coast. Mombasa is rapidly being built up as the new British bastion for the protection of the oil fields of the Middle East and for other military operations. African manpower, which proved its mettle in both world wars, is being recruited in large numbers and trained in modern warfare. In the search for new markets Africa has been accorded such a high priority that Latin American business men have protested against the "favoritism" shown to Africa. Above all, Africa supplies many important materials and commodities. The Belgian Congo is one of the principal sources of uranium ore and copper. South West Africa is one of the principal sources of vanadium. Cobalt, cocoa, palm oil and palm kernels, diamonds, and iron ore, already produced in considerable quantities, can be exploited on an even larger scale.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

STEINBERG PRESS · Inc.
PRINTERS

Solve Your Printing Problems 1, 2, 3

Are your readers obtaining SPEEDY DELIVERY of Your Magazine?

The rapid political and economic changes from day to day make this imperative.

Our fast web press equipment, experience and know-how make this service possible.

STEINBERG PRESS, Inc., Johnson and Morgan Aves., Brooklyn 6, N. Y.

Compliments of

William Whitman Company, Inc.

Compliments of

M. F. B. COMPANY
INCORPORATED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

African exports to the United States increased from $54,671,000 in 1938 to $326,997,000 in 1947. When John D. Rockefeller, 3d, returned from an extensive trip to Africa late in 1948, he called Africa "the reserve continent of the world." He presented his findings to President Truman on December 11, six weeks before the President announced his Point Four plans. In the early part of this year Assistant Secretary of State George C. McGhee met with representatives of Britain, France, Belgium, and Portugal in Portuguese West Africa to coordinate their development programs.

Evidence that the major colonial powers are more concerned with the material development of African territories than with the advancement of self-government there was clearly revealed by a communiqué issued during the recent London conference of Secretaries Acheson, Bevin, and Schuman. This highly significant policy statement of May 13, 1950, declared: "The three governments are basically in agreement as to the importance of the political development of the peoples of Africa and the achievement of improved economic and social conditions. The three ministers recognize the need for development of the existing cooperation amongst the French, British, and other African powers and of the establishment of close cooperation between those countries and the United States to achieve this end." In other words, the three ministers recognized the importance of political development—they carefully refrained from using the word independence or self-government—but they *pledged* themselves to achieve only *one* end, namely, the improvement of economic and social conditions.

The three ministers probably believed that nationalist movements and Communist propaganda do not yet constitute such a dire threat that they must be met by a clear, unequivocal promise of self-government. That the piddling projects for the improvement of the economic and social conditions of 150,000,000 black Africans will be sufficient to contain both nationalism and communism seems unlikely. Meanwhile, it is worthy of note that the most powerful black African, Azikiwe of Nigeria, wants independence *now*. During the visit of a delegation from his National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons to London in 1947, Azikiwe favored "fifteen years of tutelage in self-government," after which Nigeria would become "an independent, self-governing dominion." But when Azikiwe visited the United States in the winter of 1949-50, he declared in the presence of British diplomatic representatives and State Department officials that he had lost faith in British gradualism. He demanded immediate self-government.

There is probably still time for intelligent statesmanship in Africa. But not much.

Middle East Muddle

BY J. C. HUREWITZ

ONE prevalent illusion must be dispelled at the very outset. There are no short cuts to straightening out the muddle that is the Middle East today. The confusion is compounded of intra-regional tensions and big-power conflicts; and the confusion is the worse confounded because conditions in this region are affected, to a greater degree than in most others, by developments elsewhere on this globe.

The Middle East is a conglomerate of hypersensitive, incompatible, and, for the most part, splinter states. The extreme introversion and self-consciousness of all the Middle East "nations" derives in part from political immaturity and in part from a morbid fear and hatred of domination from the outside. Eight of the ten "sovereign" states have come into being since 1918, half of them in the past five years. All are faced with staggering problems. Almost all are not only fragmented by the presence of unassimilated ethnic, linguistic, and religious minorities, but further atomized by the persistence of tribal traditions, most pronounced in those countries with large semi-nomadic populations which resist all governmental efforts to control them. In the main, the Middle East economies are agrarian, the methods of agriculture primitive. Economic and political power is concentrated in few hands. The large mass of the people live in grinding poverty, disease-ridden and illiterate.

Such problems would give pause to well-established governments with unlimited resources. But the Middle East is one of those areas which are now euphemistically labeled underdeveloped. None of the governments, except the Israeli and possibly the Turkish, is representative; therefore none is concerned with public welfare.

The unabating Arab-Israel hostility has seriously unsettled the whole Middle East. The armistice agreements of 1949 stopped the fighting, but the subsequent failure to reach a final peace settlement has left this sore to fester. The Arab lands are themselves rent by dynastic and inter-state rivalries. The Arab League, instead of dissolving the inter-Arab jealousies, has be-

---

J. C. HUREWITZ studied at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem from 1937 to 1940 and later served as an adviser on Palestine to the Cabinet and an intelligence officer in the State Department. He is the author of "The Struggle for Palestine."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

come the principal victim. Moreover, the very existence of the League with its unwholesome self-engrossment has driven a wedge between the Arab and the non-Arab Moslem countries to the north. But even Turkey and Iran have not drawn closer to each other. Most of the Middle East states are not politically and economically viable. Yet they have not learned to live together, much less to pool their resources.

IN THIS highly unstable area great-power rivalry has assumed an ominous form. The interest of the Soviet Union is direct and can be defined simply. The Middle East is proximate to the most vulnerable district of Russia, where are concentrated key industries and basic petroleum resources. Russia has therefore sought to eliminate existing, and to prevent the procurement of new, rights to military bases in any part of the Middle East by the United States or its European allies. The U. S. S. R.'s record in Eastern Europe and Eastern Asia in the past five years leaves little doubt that this defensive strategy is premised on "defense in depth," the attainment of direct or indirect controls over adjacent territories. An added incentive in the Middle East is the presence of huge oil deposits. Whether the Soviet interest in the possession of the oil resources lying closest to the Russian border is preemptive or acquisitive makes little difference. In 1944-47 Moscow showed it wanted an oil concession in northern Iran.

The stake of the United States in the Middle East has been obscured, because it is built on a complicated system of direct and indirect commitments. In addition to seeking alliances with Middle East states, Washington is also attempting to prop up the British defense position, with which it is hoped that, in the event of a new general conflict, the American military effort could be interlocked as it was in World War II. Viewed in this light, the area is vital to the United States because of oil, communications, and bases. Virtually all the concessions in present production in the Middle East—where are located the largest known petroleum reserves in the world—are owned by British or American companies. And the machinery of American-sponsored European recovery is lubricated with this oil. The Middle East, lying athwart essential inter-continental routes by air, sea, and land, has become our lifeline of global power. Without free access to these communications our effective military strength—and therefore, in the current nightmare of *Realpolitik,* our moral and political authority among nations—would be seriously undermined. But free access implies either the actual possession or potential use of the region as a base and arsenal for our armed forces. This, in turn, means either imperial domination or relations of intimate friendship.

The focus of Soviet-American rivalry is thus the effort of each contestant to prevent the area from falling into the other's orbit. This competition, as such, is a product of the post-war period. Five years ago Britain was the preeminent power in the Middle East, even in Syria and Lebanon, where French troops were still stationed. Except for Saudi Arabia, American war-time influence in the region was subsidiary to the British. Similarly, Soviet troops were present only in northern Iran, and the Anglo-Soviet occupation of the country was formally acknowledged as a provisional expedient for the duration of the war plus six months. The first serious post-war crisis occurred early in 1946, when the U. S. S. R. delayed the withdrawal of its garrisons from Iran for some two months after the agreed deadline, and even then withdrew them only in the wake of persistent prodding by the U. N. Security Council. By the end of that year British and French troops were evacuated from Syria and Lebanon, also after Security Council review. The United States sold its war-time air base in Cairo to Egypt, and though it acquired a three-year lease to another in Saudi Arabia, turned down repeated British invitations to share military responsibilities in Palestine. But Soviet pressures in these uneasy months led to a temporary extension of English military and economic commitments to Turkey until the economic crisis in Britain early in 1947, when we, with the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, took over that burden. We also sent a military mission to Iran and issued credit to it for the purchase of war-surplus equipment.

Meanwhile, Britain was eased out of Palestine in 1948 and failed to renew its preferential treaties with Egypt and Iraq, due to expire in 1956 and 1957 respectively. The loss of the bases in Palestine and the surrender of those in Cairo and Alexandria brought a shift in emphasis from a well-balanced defense system with ground, naval, and air arms to over-dependence on a network of air bases, with headquarters in the Suez Canal zone and essential fields in Iraq. Yet the use of these principal facilities was assured for less than a decade. Nor were the weaknesses appreciably offset by Britain's twenty-year preferential treaty with Transjordan in 1948 or by the indefinite rights to air and naval bases on the islands of Cyprus and Bahrein and in the colony of Aden. The weakening of the British Middle East defense system at the center was underlined by the short-lived Central African scheme, first announced late in 1946 and abandoned four years later, and by the growing importance which London attached to the Sudan and Cyrenaica. As for the United States, it negotiated brief extensions of its rights to the use of the Dhahran airfield in Saudi Arabia after the original lease expired. The air force also reopened early in 1948 a war-time American air base in Tripolitania under a special agreement with the British military administration.

By 1950, it was clear, the immediate gains of the United States (and Britain) outweighed those of the Soviet Union. The Western powers did succeed, for the time being at least, in keeping the U. S. S. R. physically

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

out of the Middle East by frustrating Soviet designs on Turkey and Iran. And while pro-Soviet feeling is strong among some segments of important minority groups, notably the Kurds, the Communist movement is still unusually weak in an area that is so close to the U. S. S. R. and that would normally be expected, owing to the depressed conditions and general instability, to be receptive to Communist propaganda. Yet it seems equally clear that in the event of another world war the United States and its allies would probably be unable to prevent the Soviet Union from overrunning the region.

This pessimistic conclusion must be coupled with another. There is no prospect of an agreed settlement between the United States and Russia in the Middle East except as part of an over-all settlement. Valuable as are its oil reserves, the Middle East is important to the two super-powers not for itself alone but for the purposes it serves in the power-political contest. Unless mutual suspicions are removed the world over, any Middle East accord would be honored only in the breach.

A third conclusion, no less important than the preceding two, is that in the matter of long-range objectives the balance of post-war developments in the Middle East has favored the Soviet Union. The emasculation of the British position, especially in the Arab states and Palestine, without a corresponding growth of American influence has, in the existing circumstances, inevitably benefited the U. S. S. R. and enabled it to progress toward its ultimate goal of relieving the Western powers altogether of their stronghold in the Middle East. Moreover, Washington has placed too much stress on its policy of containing the Soviet Union and, as a result, on military and strategic matters in their narrowest sense.

Turkey is the only Middle East country where such a policy could have worked effectively, since the government and the people were unanimous in their determination to resist Soviet aggression. But the case of Turkey is exceptional. There is no such common purpose with our policy of containment in Iran, even though this country is, like Turkey, a vulnerable neighbor of Russia. The Iranian ruling class, as distinct from the Shah, does not enjoy wide popular support. A growing segment of the population is anxiously seeking social, economic, and political reform, and many were organized in the past by the Russian-influenced Tudeh Party. Even persons not pro-Soviet have tended to identify the United States with Britain, and anti-British feeling is almost as virulent in Iran as in most Arab countries. As regards Israel and the Arab states, the United States policy has been even less adequate. In view of Israel's dependence on American financial backing, it might be presumed that the new state would follow our lead without hesitation. But Washington's frequent changes in attitude toward Tel Aviv have kept alive the feeling among Israelis that the State Department is working closely with the British Foreign Office to the detriment of Israel's interests. On the other hand, the mere fact that we gave any help to Israel has been interpreted by all Arab governments to mean that we are fundamentally anti-Arab.

SINCE a big-power settlement has been ruled out for the present, only one practicable choice seems to be left. We must concentrate on reducing the local tensions and attempting to remove the local causes of instability. The United States must exploit its short-term gains by pursuing long-range objectives which will aid in creating an enduring peace in the event that the over-all Soviet-American impasse is resolved; or which will give us an outside chance of converting the Middle East into a friendly zone in the event of war.

The only prospect of realizing this goal is through a creative technical- and economic-assistance program for the Middle East under the auspices of the U. N. Such a program should be ambitious in its range and bold in its approach. It must strive to coordinate fiscal, tax, land, and agricultural reforms with industrial developments, soil reclamation, and irrigation projects, and an all-out attack on disease, illiteracy, and other social evils.

The problems of executing such a technical- and economic-assistance program are certainly enough to discourage the most optimistic and stout-hearted. The Middle East splinter states are all extremely jealous of their sovereignty. Any suggestion of inter-state cooperation, as would be required in the harnessing of rivers for power and irrigation purposes, would meet the stiffest resistance. The governments themselves, on the basis of present revenues, do not have sufficient funds to devote to large-scale undertakings. Their revenue could be increased by imposing higher tax obligations on the wealthy, but this runs counter to all the time-honored principles of oligarchic government in the Middle East. Outside financial aid will have to be funneled through existing government channels. If the expenditure of such funds is not closely supervised, much of it will end up in the pockets of the vested interests. Yet any outside administration will be mistrusted and will be accused of seeking imperialist domination or encouraging discontent among the oppressed peasantry. For this reason it is imperative that the program be implemented by the U. N. Any effort to diversify the Middle East economies by promoting industrial development must face somber realities. Available local capital will not be attracted to projects which cannot promise early returns. But local instability combines with restrictive legislation to repel foreign capital. There remain finally the problems of lack of raw materials and inadequate markets in most countries to sustain native industries.

In the face of these obstacles, a technical- and economic-assistance program for the Middle East is a gamble. But it is a gamble which we must take if the United States and its allies are to create a "situation of strength" in the Middle East.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"In appreciation of your great contribution and untiring effort in behalf of all people."

SHANE & SHANE
By J. P. Shane

In Israel, 330,000 working men and women—members of Histadrut, the General Federation of Jewish Workers—are blazing new trails in social pioneering.

HISTADRUT

—transforms thousands of Jewish immigrants into productive citizens of the democratic State of Israel

—creates cooperative enterprises that constitute the foundation of a sound economy

—establishes mutual aid institutions that care for the health of 600,000 Israelis

—promotes the integration of immigrants from sixty lands into the dynamic Hebraic culture of the reborn state

—fosters amicable relations between Jewish and Arab citizens in Israel and seeks permanent peace throughout the Middle East through the general social-economic advancement of the masses of the population.

The program and activities of Histadrut are supported by the ISRAEL HISTADRUT CAMPAIGN for $10,000,000 now conducting the 27th annual drive.

Send contributions to:

NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR LABOR ISRAEL
45 East 17th Street • New York 3, N. Y.

Good Health to Children...

For the sake of your children, and their children, make sure you buy and use Christmas Seals.

Christmas Seal funds have fought tuberculosis since 1907. And today your children have a far greater chance of escaping TB than you did.

Yet TB still kills more people than all other infectious diseases. So give your children a still better chance.

buy Christmas Seals

Because of the importance of the above message this space has been contributed by
A FRIEND

Compliments of . . .

JULIUS GREEN

330 Seventh Avenue New York City

Congratulations to The Nation

Mr. and Mrs. Morris A. Anesh

Greetings . . .

HORTENSE ERMANN, M.D.

Compliments of . . .

HARRY KOLDIN

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Best Wishes to

THE Nation

on

Its 85th Anniversary

*

L. M. Rabinowitz

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Israel's Road to Peace

BY ABBA EBAN

AS THESE words are written, we appear to be dangerously poised on the brink of catastrophe. At Lake Success there is a desperate search for the formula to halt conflict, save face, preserve the status quo, and—above all—save lives. Much of this investigation is superficial and does not probe for a permanent solution. There is still unwillingness to abandon fixed antagonisms. The doctrine that rival systems may coexist in the world remains unaccepted.

In these months of deepening conflict we have engaged in exhaustive discussions of peace. All delegates have given assurances of their aspirations for a tranquil world. The General Assembly has adopted declaratory resolutions. But these have left no trace on the course of events. The will for peace is so universally shared that it should not need reaffirmation. The historian records that the Walls of Jericho fell at the mere sound of trumpets, but nowhere does the chronicler tell of an edifice erected by vocal exercise alone. The ringing language of formal resolutions and the reiteration of the polished phrases of the Charter merely define objectives without reference to the means of their attainment.

No one may fairly challenge the moral authority and the practical necessity of the United Nations' condemnation of aggression in Korea. Despite military reverses, there can be no recriminations and no retreat. If the United Nations will not act to halt aggression, it will forfeit its right to exist. It cannot evade that first responsibility. But while the moral validity of the United Nations position in Korea is unassailable, its weakness lies in the failure to make that position clear to the people of Asia. The United Nations' stand was undermined from the beginning by the refusal of a majority to recognize the new and strange forces which have arisen in China. Events might have taken a different course if the Assembly on its opening day had adopted the Indian resolution on Chinese representation. Rejection of this proposal was at the very least a procedural failure, impairing the ability of the United Nations to reach China's people. More substantively, United Nations objectives were beclouded in the mind of Asia by suspicion and distrust. Despite our clear and categorical reservation from the form of government practiced in China today, it appeared evident to Israel and to many democratic governments that the association of China with the United Nations by the links of permanent contact, common responsibility, and mutual obligation was the essential foundation of understanding. To reject that association seemed to us a denial of the principle of coexistence, prejudicing the prospect of permanent peace in Asia.

The fear of the unknown launches man upon adventures of ideological conversion or military conquest. In the name of unity he seeks to impose uniformity. The erroneous identification of these concepts is the enemy of the peace. On the domestic landscape it precipitates conflicts over civil rights. The refusal to permit difference, the insistence that the minority abolish itself and conform to the majority—these mean denial of democracy. The same intolerance on the international scene could easily lead to the negation of cooperation and to convulsions of hemispheric proportions.

It must be repeated until it is believed. The first premise of the United Nations Charter was that diverse ideologies could live in one united world. So confident were the founders that they even thought in terms of unanimity. If this premise be denied, then let the United Nations be disbanded. No ideological conversions in either world are in sight, and since neither is prepared to vanish, it follows that if we do not believe in peaceful coexistence, then we believe in the destruction of the planet.

WITHIN the tiny expanse that is Israel and the brief span that is Israel's story there is vivid testimony to the thesis that the integrity of diversity is the real guaranty of unity. Within thirty months more than 500,000 immigrants entered Israel to make their homes in the new state. Scores of different cultural backgrounds, dozens of different linguistic origins are represented in this assembly of people—people from Europe and from the Orient, divided in culture and experience by thousands of miles and hundreds of years. All these differences must be bridged. All this has to be fused into a single distinctive civilization, revealing an underlying unity without sacrificing that divergence which lends color, richness, and vitality to the pattern. The unifying factor in Israel is a strong sense of common historical attachment, revitalized by the attainment of national self-determination. It is a formidable task. Yet none will suggest that the state has been weakened by this extraordinary diversity. On the contrary. And this experience may have meaning in contemporary international thought.

It is axiomatic that men can cooperate and unite in

ABBA EBAN is Israel's ambassador to the United States and permanent representative at the United Nations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the quest for understanding and peace when they stand as equals. This democratic precept gave momentum to the liberation movements following the war. The United Nations played a significant role in the process, giving international benediction to facts of liberation. But national self-determination is an empty concept, arid of meaning, unless it is accompanied by economic and social freedom. Throughout the vast tormented continent of Asia and in the neighboring Near East region, still in the grip of squalor and want, we have witnessed rapid progress toward political independence with no corresponding advance from economic servitudes. This contrast between institutional freedom and social inertia is the root cause of international unrest in our times.

National movements have too often thought of freedom in purely institutional terms. When political independence has been achieved, when the flags, stamps, coins, and emblems, the constitutions and parliaments have lost their exhilarating novelty, men have awakened to learn that no change has taken place in the basic conditions of their lives. The new states were not intended to provide mere façades for the old feudal arrangements. Yet in some of these states, especially in the Arab world, the apparatus of government has served merely to perpetuate privilege. The disparity between the impoverished masses and their rulers has grown sharper. Technological advance and foreign capital have come upon the scene to exploit rich natural resources, but whatever their intentions the royalties they pay are appropriately named. The rich grow fantastically richer. The masses are steadily impoverished. Discovering that national independence has not ended hunger, poverty, illiteracy, and disease, men in many countries have become skeptical of democracy's claims and have sought refuge in non-democratic programs.

IT IS against this environment of mass degradation that Israel has envisaged political independence as the framework for an underlying social and cultural purpose. The state was not an end in itself. It was a means to an end—the rehabilitation and redemption of a people reconstituted in its own land. Here is an adventure which has challenged orthodox economists. Experts have speculated on Israel's capacity to maintain a relatively dense population within a small area. The problem is real. Israel's resources are not plentiful. There is no coal or iron. In contrast with its oil-rich neighbors, Israel cannot command vast income from the sale of a physical resource. The products Israel markets are compounded of the ingredients of human skill and effort, of scientific pioneering. Lacking natural wealth, the people of Israel count human beings as their richest asset. They are confident that their people can become productive, self-sustaining, and self-sacrificing. They reject the pessimistic philosophy which holds that the world cannot maintain its people and which dooms them to famine and war. As the site for this daring experiment in human reclamation, their history chose a land that is derelict and neglected. They convert arid waste to fertile garden, they fashion useful materials from worthless vegetation, they intensify production on the land and in the factory. By their faith they surmount the obstacles which confront them. They reject fatalism. They are the world's first optimists. They preach faith in human personality. The democratic creed finds expression in the land which gave it birth.

Perhaps the exertions and examples of Israel may have something to say of relevance to the issues of democracy's survival. When the bitter, sterile political animosities harbored against Israel by its neighbors are set aside, the constructive and creative in Israel's experience may be communicated across boundaries, taking root in and fructifying the neighboring regions.

The Near East is regarded as a sensitive and strategic area. It is sensitive because its people, for the most part denied political equality and economic opportunity, are restless and insecure. It is strategic because its physical resources are rich and vital. Such areas are inevitably twice-threatened, by subversion from within, by invasion from without. Their defense becomes a matter of concern. Military men, whose duty it is to estimate the strength or weakness of a given area, think in terms of terrain, equipment, supply lines, communications, and —last of all—native man-power. The assessment frequently does not consider the intangible human factor —the spirit of the people, their stake in their security. Men do not defend freedom if they are themselves not free. They will not fight for peace if they themselves are not serene. In such hands, tanks and jet planes are not weapons; they are booty. There is a direct relationship between peace and an equitable social order. A man may be politically free and yet lose the essence of his freedom in the throes of want. A state may be independent and yet forfeit its independence, because, offering no sustenance to its citizens, it receives from them no support.

The minutes are fast running out, but there is still time to secure and preserve the peace. If we fail we shall be driven farther down the road of panic. In this lies the danger that the social ramparts of defense will be neglected and destroyed in the preoccupation with the military weapons of attack. If in a fatalistic abandonment of all hope for peace men devote every effort and resource to armaments, diverting every energy from the channels of social and economic development which offer the only real defense of peace, the world may once again see a war won and a peace lost. There is the fateful prospect that we may perchance live to see history repeated—if we live at all.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reflections of a Latin American

BY JESUS SILVA HERZOG

I WAS very young when the First World War began. I remember it was said then that the Allies were fighting against German militarism and in defense of democracy, freedom, and civilization. Later I was to learn that, behind the struggle, opposing economic interests were at work—on the one hand those of England and France, on the other those of Germany. The United States had not yet reached the peak of power it was later to attain.

The net result of that war was millions of dead and enormous loss of wealth. The years have passed, and democracy is in retreat, freedom hard pressed, and civilization—in the sense of harmony between man and nature and between men of all kinds—but the stubborn aspiration of noble spirits.

Yet why speak of civilization in this sense? I am reminded of the Nazi General Hans Yost, who said: "When I hear the word civilization, I load my pistol." I recall too the Spanish General Millan Astray, who invented those two war cries, "Death to Intelligence!" and "Long Live Death!" The danger is that in the coming months, if the great powers continue on the downward grade which must inevitably lead them to war despite all their declarations in favor of peace, other generals may shout the same slogans as Millan Astray and Hans Yost. This would signify the victory of the evil triumvirate—Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco.

When the Dantesque nightmare of the First World War came to an end in 1918, everyone thought that we had seen the last war and the end of German militarism. At that time we did not realize that human stupidity is limitless, or that "experience is a teacher without pupils," as an illustrious Mexican thinker said many years ago. In the two decades that followed, numberless international conferences were held. The League of Nations was created, but it was deformed from birth; it committed one mistake after another, descending rung by rung into the abyss of failure. Looking from this distance at the statesmen and diplomats who guided or took part in European politics during those twenty years, one is astonished at their stupidity, their ignorance, their narrow view of the problems which should have been solved in such a way as to benefit the peoples of the world. The result of such senseless policies was, as we know, the rise of fascism and another world war.

The Second World War, so much more horrible than the first, would never have been possible had it not been for the aid which Hitler received from England, France, and certain important economic and financial enterprises in the United States. Mussolini received similar aid, although on a lesser scale. The leaders of the democratic countries were well aware of the ideology of the dictators and the objectives which they pursued. Yet by one means or another the democracies helped to strengthen them. The views of Mussolini and Hitler were published in the newspapers; everyone knew that they were preparing for war. The only persons who did not know it, or who pretended not to know it, were a few leading statesmen. Mr. Chamberlain on July 8, 1937, declared, "I do not believe that anyone wants to set off a European conflagration"; and on his return from Munich, from that shameful conference at which Spain and Czechoslovakia were sold down the river, he said to the waiting newspapermen, "For the second time in our history, a British Prime Minister returns from Germany bringing peace with honor."

Then came the invasion of Poland and the declaration of war by the Allies. The Russian bear was not long in presenting himself at the Polish feast, seizing for himself a considerable portion of the martyred country. Once again it was said, and believed, that the Allies were fighting in defense of democracy, freedom, and civilization.

The promises made this time were more far-reaching than in 1914-18. One fine day the international cable offices announced the news of the Atlantic Charter, signed, we were told, by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. All over the world the hope was reborn that after the war a new world would be built in which all human beings would live without fear, in peace, and with decency. Then little by little we stopped speaking of the Atlantic Charter, and the optimism which it had aroused in the hearts of good and simple people was slowly dissipated. Winston Churchill, consistent precisely in his inconsistency, said many times at the beginning of the war that it was necessary to fight until death for the ideal of freedom; on May 24, 1944, he announced: "I have no sympathy with those who think it is smart and even amusing to insult and annoy the Spanish government on every possible occasion. As the war has gone on, it has become less ideological in character." So the promises of the Charter slipped through our hands.

I have often thought that he who said history repeats

JESUS SILVA HERZOG is a distinguished Mexican economist and man of letters. He is the editor of Cuadernos Americanos, *which is probably the most important magazine in Latin America.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

itself was talking nonsense. Nevertheless, I find myself inclined to agree when I observe the anguished labors of the United Nations, for there are no signs that the new world organization has found an effective means of saving international peace and harmony.

BE THAT as it may, I ask the reader to meditate upon and seek an answer to a question or two: From the standpoint of the dearest interests of humanity, was the net result of the First World War good or bad? And the net result of the Second? I myself would answer: no international war has been good for any people. Only the great captains and great merchants have benefited by war, winning glory or wealth. Why, then, if it is realized that a third world war will be more frightful and destructive than any which have preceded it, fatal for both those who win and those who lose, is not a way of reconciling the East and the West being sought in good faith?

Unquestionably man persists stubbornly in his mistakes and is mentally lazy. Unthinkingly he follows the same road that led the past generation to disaster, and only very slowly wakes up to the possibility of finding a path leading to harmony among peoples. When I hear that the only way to maintain peace is to make sure that all the countries of the Western bloc arm to the teeth, I ask myself: can they be unaware that the countries of the Eastern bloc will do the same thing? Armed peace, as we know from experience, creates an impasse from which the only way out is war; if we really and sincerely want peace, if statesmen and diplomats fear to plunge the world into destruction and are conscious of their responsibility, it is obvious that new solutions must be sought.

In the countries of Latin America no one wants war. The last war brought no benefit to the great masses of our people. A few people became millionaires through questionable speculations, selling third-class merchandise to the United States as first-class, or raising the prices of stable articles at the expense of the economically weaker elements of the population. In the Latin American countries there are many who feel that we have nothing to do with the conflict between East and West. What we want is to live in peace, developing our economy and our culture; we want to be ourselves, to act in accordance with our own standards, to follow our own way of life, while striving to be an affirmative factor in the general progress of the world.

But, it will be objected, what about communism? And Communist propaganda? Certainly communism is a reality, and Communist propaganda is a reality too. But this raises the question: what is it that communism offers to the peoples of the world? It offers to better the economic and cultural conditions in which the great masses of the world's people live in return for their renunciation of freedom of worship, thought, and work. That is why communism gains converts in the geographical regions where hunger and nakedness are the lot of the majority. It follows that communism is not going to be destroyed by incendiary bombs, or tanks, or cannon; it will be destroyed only by providing the masses with food, clothes, housing, and the opportunity to acquire a genuine culture; if in addition freedom of worship, thought, and work are guaranteed, communism will be forced into oblivion. In a word, the Communist system will never be established if a better system, better not for a privileged minority but for everybody, is opposed to it.

Another thing which disconcerts the Latin American liberal is the constant discrepancy he observes between the facts and the statements of high officials of both the United States and the United Nations. Every day it is explained that steps are being taken to protect democracy and freedom, that the goal envisaged is the freedom of all peoples under governments of their own choosing. It is declared that the slavery prevailing in the Soviet Union and the satellite countries must be opposed by the freedoms of worship, speech, thought, and work; and that the urgent need of our times is to put an end to dictatorships, which deny the most sacred rights of man. These words are good in themselves and even, at times, make us dream of a happier future for our kind, but do they reflect reality—the reality of the Western world? Unfortunately the answer is depressingly negative.

In Peru the army seized power through a coup and established an iron dictatorship. There is no freedom of thought; those who are not in conformity with the military regime may be assassinated in the streets by the police; the jails are full of political prisoners who are sometimes subjected to torture. In short, the Declaration of Human Rights is a dead letter in Peru.

In Venezuela a military dictatorship wrested power from the legitimately elected President, Rómulo Gallegos; it now exiles Venezuelans who are not in agreement with it or puts them in jail for safe keeping. But the grimmest picture of all is presented by Colombia. There the elements in power not only imprison and kill, as in Peru, but set whole towns on fire if the majority of their inhabitants sympathize with the Liberal Party; freedom of thought or of worship does not exist; the press is subject to daily censorship.

Yet not only have these three governments been recognized by the United States and by other countries; their representatives in the United Nations make eloquent speeches in defense of democracy and freedom.

Nor is this all. General Franco is being cleansed of his sins at Lake Success. Would anyone dare to deny that Franco is an implacable dictator? Or that in Spain enemies of the regime are imprisoned and killed? Would anyone dare to suggest that in Spain there exists even a shadow of freedom? What does all this mean? Is United States and United Nations policy inspired by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lofty aims or by economic interests and considerations of military strategy? The Latin American liberal is full of misgivings; he does not know what to believe.

To my way of thinking the Stockholm Appeal for the abolition of the atomic bomb was stupid. What must be abolished is war, by any means that will be effective. Nothing and no one can justify war. What the peoples of the world want and need is to live in peace with one another, to work for a better life, to strive for the highest well-being that can be attained on the earth.

But the United Nations does not give the impression that it is functioning very effectively, except for some of its specialized agencies. There are many who think and even dare to say that the United Nations has failed and become but a tail on the United States kite. I do not know whether or not this is entirely true. But I do know that after five years of existence the new international organization cannot boast of having achieved great success in settling fundamental questions. It has not settled the question that is the most fundamental of all, namely, the peace of the world.

The solution of the grave problem of assuring peace must be found. Perhaps a small commission made up of individuals from small and medium countries, of superior intelligence and with ample powers, could present to the United Nations or directly to the leaders of the great powers a workable plan for salvation.

The nations in the two hostile blocs can live in peace. It is urgently necessary that they reach an understanding. Above and beyond the interests of certain oligarchic or bureaucratic groups and of single nations stands the supreme interest of the human race.

THE MEANING OF ATOMIC WAR

BY HARRISON S. BROWN

TODAY the United States and Russia are close to war. Neither nation has been able to extricate itself from the "vicious circle" in which it has become caught. Both nations, frightened of each other, have pursued security but have not obtained it.

The loss in military strength, or in material wealth, that either the United States or Russia would suffer as the result of reasonably intelligent, genuine negotiation would be negligible compared to the losses that would be suffered in a full-scale atomic war. The price of such a war would inevitably be millions of casualties and unprecedented destruction of production facilities and economic resources.

The United States is exceedingly vulnerable to atomic attack largely because of the concentration of our industry and population. But the Soviet Union is by no means invulnerable. Technically either the United States or Russia might win the war in the sense that one or the other might be occupied and forced to surrender. But in reality both nations would be losers. Could the "American way of life" survive such a war? I doubt it. In turn, could the Soviet government survive such a war? I doubt that also.

* * * *

When we speak of hydrogen bombs, we mean the detonation of very large quantities of heavy hydrogen, utilizing the ordinary atomic bomb as a component of the detonating mechanism. If it turns out that an unlimited amount of heavy hydrogen can be detonated, we shall be confronted with several possibilities. We may be able to construct bombs some one thousand times as powerful as the Nagasaki bomb and have them carried to their destination by plane or submarine. More important from the military point of view is the possibility of producing much larger tailor-made radioactivities from the neutrons liberated by an explosion. Thus by exploding a sufficient number of bombs in the Pacific, Russia might produce radioactivity in such an amount that, carried by the winds in the stratosphere, it would destroy most of the higher forms of life in the United States. One can of course visualize a similar operation in reverse. But the United States is far more exposed to such attack than is Russia.

If an unlimited explosion in deuterium is possible, a nation may well be able to threaten to annihilate all higher forms of life on earth by the radioactivity that could be produced. No matter how one looks at the situation, life in a world in which the H-bomb exists will be a life of constant fear.

As a colleague of mine recently said: "We must remember that there is no need, in the nature of things, for man to continue to inhabit planet earth."

[*HARRISON S. BROWN is associate professor of chemistry at the University of Chicago. This statement is taken from the chapter he wrote for "The Atomic Era—Can It Bring Peace and Abundance?" published by Medill, McBride and based on the Nation Associates' conference of last spring.*]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TOWARD PEACE BY AGREEMENT

Democracy's Way Out

BY FREDA KIRCHWEY

KOREA is a case history of the illness of our time. There, in the space of a few months, we have seen emerge in acute form all the symptoms of the inner conflict that is convulsing post-war society, and may end in its death. Only if the case is studied with detachment and its meaning put to use, here in America and elsewhere in the world, will society be able to make the adaptations needed for survival.

Korea revealed the basic distrust that existed between Soviet Russia and the West even in 1945. It is untrue to say that only gradually after the war did the Western powers give up their belief in Russia's friendly intentions. Matters have grown worse, but suspicion and latent hostility, dating not from the war but from 1919 and 1920, from 1938 and 1939, caused trouble as soon as the fighting ended. Suspicion and hostility on both sides fixed the line along the Thirty-eighth Parallel that cut Korea into two parts and ruined its chance of normal development. Because of the line and what it symbolized, the Korean people, from the beginning of their so-called liberation, were in bondage to the great rival powers that moved in when the Japanese moved out. This fact conditioned everything which followed.

Americans in the south and Russians in the north set up their contrary versions of "democracy." The Soviet zone reproduced faithfully the pattern established in North China—distribution of land, liquidation of usurers and landlords who resisted the new order, speedy abolition of various old servitudes. A good deal of local self-government was permitted, giving the people who benefited from the revolution a sense of sharing in the running of their own affairs. But on top control was tight and tough, and while the Russians kept in the background far more than the Americans did in the south, policy-making was in the hands of men who took their orders from Moscow.

The United States zone reflected the manifold confusions of American foreign policy. At the start the generals in charge displayed a high disregard for the political wishes of the people. A provisional Korean government representing numerous parties was brushed out of the window. And while political parties were permitted, elections planned, democratic safeguards ordained on paper, the old reactionary nationalist leader Syngman Rhee, established in power against the better judgment of a few sensible American officials, was allowed to use the Japanese-trained police to suppress opposition on the left. Numerous liberal-to-left parties that leapt into existence were smashed or driven underground, active Communists were arrested or killed, along with many moderates who couldn't swallow the Rhee dictatorship. Political assassination became a commonplace. The first election was a stop-gap affair that did not pretend to be representative. The second, under U. N. observation, was worse because it did make such claims. The police terror that preceded it and the absence of left parties and candidates turned it into a bloody farce. The result of the first fairly free election, held in the spring of 1950, was a sweeping repudiation of Syngman Rhee's regime. A limited land reform, forced through by the military government, was still to be put into effect when war struck last summer.

These two political emanations of the Russian and American spirit are symptoms to be studied, for they provide clues to the troubles that soon developed. The Communist blend of reform, social overturn, and popular participation at the "rice roots" under top-level party dictatorship produced, as it has done elsewhere, a tight political texture. It is self-deceiving to pretend that the tyranny inherent in such a set-up promptly breeds disaffection, or that the revolution is just a hoax. The important fact is that, whatever Russia's ultimate purposes may be, *its interests are promoted rather than interfered with by revolutionary change.* With no stake in the survival of free enterprise, it can consolidate its power in the very process of satisfying the most urgent social and economic desires of the majority. Those who get hurt are the few, especially in countries like Korea, with primitive standards of living and of political action.

The American experience offers different clues. Handed a job like the occupation of Korea, Americans, especially military men, have small patience with ideology. Only a few know much about the people they have been sent to rule. Dominated usually by the single desire to get the job done and get out, their tendency is to instal, by rule of thumb, certain prescribed democratic procedures and, beyond that, to rely on those local elements most likely to keep everything under control. No technique could be better designed to give a shrewd, landlord-minded politician like Syngman Rhee a free field in which to carry out a program of planned repression under the camouflage of democratic forms—and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in doing so to make the name of America a stench in the nostrils of Asia.

The meaning of it all boils down to this: In the present stage of American political development we seem almost incapable of doing what needs to be done in countries ripe for revolution. Where drastic reforms groove smoothly into the policy aims of Russia, they cut across the grain of normal American thinking and interests. To force the rapid expropriation of land, to oust a corrupt, oppressive ruling class, to give power to popular leaders: this would seem reckless, immoral, a surrender to the enemy. And behind these inhibitions is the most damaging one of all—the idea that small brown or yellow people are objects of contempt or, at best, of humorous benevolence; in a word, Gooks.

Perhaps this is the deepest reason for the collapse of the American case in Asia

THE creation of two governments—one at Seoul, the other at Pyongyang—deepened the wound in Korea. Not only did each reproduce the forms and policies favored by its sponsor; each also mirrored the conflict between them. The departure of the occupying forces in 1949 made no difference; the pattern was set by that time. Both North and South knew that reunion was Korea's single hope, but in terms of the cold war reunion could only mean conquest of one by the other. Both used accepted cold-war tactics—denunciations, spying, lies, propaganda overtures, border raids. The fact that Syngman Rhee's regime had been left too weak to indulge in dreams of military glory did not discourage him from threatening North Korea with attack. Kim Il-sung's northern government, with more to back its play, made similar threats. Both sides staged forays across the Thirty-eighth Parallel, but in this the Communist regime was by far the worst offender, according to the U. N. Commission on Korea. Almost a year before the invasion of last June, observant correspondents, including Andrew Roth in *The Nation*, reported that war between North and South was only a matter of months. When the blow fell, only the United States military mission at Seoul seems to have been taken by surprise.

That the North's attack was an "aggression" is disputed only by Communists and their backers. It was an aggression because the Thirty-eighth Parallel, agreed upon by the occupying powers, was also recognized de facto by both Korean regimes. It was an accepted boundary, crossed by the northern army in force. But to say this and nothing more is again to blur meanings. For the attack was more than an aggression; it was also an act of civil war and revolution. Its roots lay in the political conflict that dominated Korea's whole existence.

Shortly before the North Korean army started south, Pyongyang sent a "peace" delegation to Seoul with pro-

Hadassah

the Women's Zionist Organization of America, for four decades a healer, teacher and standard-maker in the fields of medicine and social welfare in Israel, greets *The Nation*, for 85 years a courageous, outspoken advocate of peace and freedom for all mankind.

IN ISRAEL, Hadassah supports and helps expand a countrywide medical and public health system, extensive child welfare, feeding, recreation and vocational education projects; provides maintenance and education for youth refugees through Youth Aliyah of which Hadassah is the official American representative; and participates in a program of Jewish National Fund land purchase and afforestation.

IN THE U. S. A. Hadassah works to help interpret Israel to the American people; provides basic Jewish education as a background for intelligent and creative Jewish living; carries on a project for American Jewish youth; and participates in efforts which safeguard the democratic way of life here and assure peace and security throughout the world.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

posals for reuniting the country through joint action by democratic groups and parties on both sides. According to Communist semantics, this offer may have been in effect an ultimatum: either union and peace on our terms, or else. Whatever it meant, it was not answered. Instead, the emissaries were thrown into prison without charge or trial.

The incident was mentioned in a report from the U. N. Commission on Korea, but no great point was made of it. War washed over South Korea, drowning out minor overtures and instigations. I recall it here not to minimize the aggressive nature of the North Korean attack but to point up its internal, revolutionary aspect. By Syngman Rhee the delegates from the north were regarded—and treated—not as foreign envoys but as native subversives.

AND so when the United States and the United Nations moved with unprecedented vigor to check aggression by one state against another, they stepped into the midst of a piece of the Asian revolution. The fact of revolution altered the meaning and effect of the U. N. action from the start. Although military sanctions, proposed by the Americans, won the support of the great majority of members and United States initiative was applauded, especially in Europe, as an indication that Russian-inspired aggression would be challenged no matter where it occurred, the political implications of the decision worried many leaders in non-Communist countries. They realized that a precedent might be in the making which could later be used to justify U. N. sanctions in case of rebellion—described as Russian-inspired—against a colonial power or an oppressive national regime. The nature and behavior of the American-made South Korean government threw doubt on American purposes, and this feeling was augmented by our unilateral "insulation" of Formosa and our refusal to recognize the Peking government. When MacArthur flew to Formosa and issued his unauthorized pronouncement in support of Chiang Kai-shek, suspicion was turned into open criticism, which was not wholly silenced by Mr. Truman's repudiation of the General's remarks. Political worries multiplied as the U. N. forces pushed the Communists back across the Thirty-eighth Parallel, ignoring India's warning that the Chinese had threatened to attack if the war moved into North Korea.

Then MacArthur permitted Syngman Rhee, in defiance of U. N. orders, to take over the administration of liberated areas in the north. For some reason American newspapers, in spite of their impressive bulk, gave little space to this story. But the facts were reported fully in the meager European press; even conservative papers described the hasty, brutal liquidation of supporters of the northern regime by Rhee's police—still the same Japanese-trained force—and by members of his youth organization, a semi-military, wholly fascist body, who were sent north to handle the job of "political reeducation." Farmland was actually restored to the former landlords, and the machinery of revolution set in reverse.

It was a policy hardly calculated to convert North Koreans to Western democratic ideals. Once more, a military action—the drive into North Korea—took on political meanings, only dimly discerned in this country, which touched off sharp reactions among politically conscious Europeans and Asians.

In Washington, even at Lake Success, the belief that China would intervene was generally discounted as the drive toward the northern frontier continued and the North Korean army began to crumble. Even when the first Chinese made an appearance, their presence was minimized, by MacArthur as well as the uninformed public. It was not until the Chinese avalanche began to gather bulk and momentum that questions were raised about the Yalu River power plants, and Mr. Truman and Mr. Lie broadcast hasty reassurances to Peking. By then, assuming time had anything to do with the matter, it was too late.

WHETHER the Chinese would have gone in if MacArthur had stopped at the Thirty-eighth Parallel, whether they would have launched their great counter-offensive if he had not begun his end-the-war drive on Thanksgiving Day—these questions will be debated long after today's bitter tea has been drunk. But most of the debates will leave out considerations that should be weighed, both to place responsibility for what has happened and, more important, to provide guidance in the future.

When Foreign Minister Chou En-lai, on October 1, said China would not tolerate an attack on North Korea, it may have been eyewash. Perhaps China would have invaded Korea anyhow, though it is hard to see why, in that case, Chou bothered to give the warning. But if MacArthur had stopped at the Thirty-eighth Parallel and declared his mission successfully accomplished, calling for a cease-fire and leaving the task of winding up the war to the new U. N. commission, then an invasion by China would have met solid disapproval throughout the free world. Even if MacArthur, having crossed the border on the say-so of the U. N., had sternly prohibited political reprisals and sent Syngman Rhee's "administrators" back to Seoul he would still have kept the record fairly straight. At least it would not have been so dismally compounded of military and political error as to allow China to claim the sympathy of Asia and a fair part of the rest of the non-Communist world.

I asked an Asian leader at the United Nations whether the successful Chinese drive would not frighten the peoples of Asia. He replied: A success for MacArthur would frighten them more. I said: The terrible meaning

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of what you say is that faith in the United Nations has been undermined by American policy in Korea. He answered: It was not only America. The other nations acquiesced at critical moments when they should have said no. Their responsibility is in one way greater, for they understand better than America the power and significance of the revolutionary drive in Asia.

KOREA is a case history in which one can trace the course of democracy's defeat. Today that defeat is being written in the language of military disaster, and one would be foolish to pretend that the political process described in these pages is the whole story. It is merely the part of the story that is generally left out or distorted by illusions and preconceived ideas. How the present crisis can be surmounted—what agreement may be reached or whether any agreement is possible—is a question beyond the scope of this article. It will be answered in terms of the bargaining position of the contending powers. But unless the meaning of Korea for the rest of the world is understood by the West—by America in particular—the end of the United Nations is in sight, and the prospect of an effective coalition of free nations may as well be abandoned.

First, we must accept revolution as the dominant, inescapable fact of our time. Call it a fever, an infection, anything you want. Certainly it is contagious, but it can spring out of unhealthy local conditions too. It appears in different forms, in varying intensities, depending largely on the economic state of the area affected. Where conditions are really bad, as in Korea, the disease cannot be halted by minor remedies—elections, constitutions, a "recovery" program. Nor can it be cured by methods of suppression, though these are universally popular with political witch-doctors such as Syngman Rhee. In a country like Korea, or in other countries covering two-thirds of the globe, revolution must run its course, helped by radical measures to correct the systemic disbalance which caused it in the first place, and by

[*Continued on page 645*]

Prerequisites to Negotiation

BY BISHOP G. BROMLEY OXNAM

NEGOTIATION does not necessarily involve mutual respect or mutual trust. The government of the United States negotiated with the czarist government of Russia. This did not mean that the Czar had become a convert to democracy or that the United States condoned autocracy. It meant that there were issues that had to be settled; and sensible men seek settlement around the table rather than upon the battlefield.

Negotiating with the Soviet government is doubly difficult because the American representatives, as a result of sorry experience, are convinced that Russian negotiators are unprincipled, have little regard for the truth, and are actually engaged in a world-wide conspiracy aimed at the eventual overthrow of any government with which they may temporarily negotiate as a matter of expediency. The Soviet government apparently is unwilling to allow the Communist concept to meet the democratic concept in free debate or competitive effort. It seeks to establish its way of life by invasion or infiltration and the support of a revolutionary group that, puppet-like, dances to Moscow-pulled strings. The so-called dictatorship of the proletariat, once thought of as temporary, has become a continuing dictatorship of a small body of self-perpetuating officials. The assumption that the state will wither away has itself withered away.

There are those who insist that the solution of the Russian problem lies in "anticipatory retaliation." In plain English that means—bomb them first. Destroy Russia, and presto—peace! Is preventive war the answer? Suppose every Russian in the world were to die tonight and the Kremlin walls were to disintegrate and become dust, suppose Russia as a nation were to cease to exist, would security and peace be our lot? No. A world in part overfed and in large part hungry, a world poverty-stricken, ignorant, and diseased, would still be a seething, revolutionary world.

Some would quarantine Russia and try by this means to save the world from infection. Others call for a new organization of the nations in which Russia would be left alone to worship its own idols. But Russia is more than a geographical unit, more than one-sixth the land of the globe. Russia is both expanding imperialism and dynamic ideology. Russian aggression is a sufficient problem in itself, but the infiltrating ideology of the Kremlin is far more baffling. The method that may appear logical as a means of containing Soviet imperialism may actually contribute to the success of its ideology. For instance, to salute Franco in order to stop Stalin may alienate French and British labor—besides forwarding a particularly vicious form of totalitarianism. This is sheer stupidity.

Most men and women who participate in negotiations

G. BROMLEY OXNAM is resident bishop of the Methodist church of the New York area. He is the author of "Labor and Tomorrow's World" and other books.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with Russians return from the conference table disillusioned and baffled. The Russians are unimpressed by attempts to change their minds, and hardly know whether to fight or to laugh when we seek to convert them. Their foreign policy is a part of their over-all policy. Full knowledge of what they want in each situation enables them to reach decisions based on either their maximum desires or their minimum acceptances. They are realistic, cold-blooded bargainers.



The best studies of their intentions indicate that Stalin must have peace for a considerable period of time. George F. Kennan, one of the most fully informed men who have served the State Department, holds that war with Russia is not inevitable, although of course possible. He insists that we must pursue "a vigorous and hopeful foreign policy which firmly rejects all defeatism about a future war and aims at keeping alive and pursuing every possibility for solving international differences where possible—and for burying them where solution is not yet possible—without recourse to war." Such a policy involves negotiation. However, he also holds that we must throw our weight into the balance "wherever there are relatively good chances that it will be effective in preventing the further expansion of the power of international communism."

It was in October, 1946, that the Executive Committee of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America adopted its highly significant statement on Soviet-American relations. This statement declared:

> War with Russia can be avoided and it must be avoided without compromise of basic convictions. Tensions exist which constitute a serious threat to world peace. The fact must be faced realistically and at the same time with courage and vision. It demands a new way of international accommodation which will reckon with fundamental differences in outlook and practice. If the nations find that way in our time, they may set the pattern of a peaceful future. Men should be impelled by a sense of urgency even greater than that which made them determined, resourceful, and cooperative to win the war.

The statement recognized that there are unavoidable tensions, that the beliefs which "we hold as Christians are different in many essential respects from those of the Soviet leaders," but insisted that the existence of conflicting beliefs must be considered normal.

As a necessary first step to peace, the statement declared, "All men must renounce the effort to spread abroad their way of life by methods of intolerance." We must make it clear that we renounce for ourselves the use of methods of intolerance and at the same time make it clear to the Soviet government that its use of the methods of intolerance, such as "purge, coercion, deceitful infiltration, and false propaganda shielded by secrecy," will jeopardize the peace.

The statement moved from "unavoidable tensions" to a consideration of the tensions that can be avoided by a process of adjustment. It called upon this country to recognize that change is not of itself evil, that security is no longer geographic, that the armament race should be ended, and that neither state socialism nor free enterprise provides a perfect economic system but that each can benefit from the experience of the other. It looked forward to a more intimate association between the American and Russian peoples and a greater use of the United Nations.

In the section headed "Security Is No Longer Geographic," the Federal Council declared:

> The sharply increased offensive capabilities of modern warfare are such that it is not possible to reconcile a friendly and a neighborly policy with such strategic defense as from a military standpoint might seem most effective. Therefore no nation should allow its action in these matters to be determined by military factors alone. The United States should set an example by renouncing the acquisition of new military bases so close to the Soviet Union that the offensive threat is both disproportionate to the defensive value to the United States and also incompatible with a policy designed to dissipate distrust and to increase good-will. This principle applies to all nations.

This statement was almost entirely the work of John Foster Dulles and was little changed by intensive committee discussion. The necessity of negotiation is implicit; but Mr. Dulles would be the first to insist that no negotiator could hope successfully to deal with Soviet representatives unless he spoke for a nation or a world organization with strength to back its position.

WHAT are the prerequisites to negotiation with Russia? First, an effective bipartisan foreign policy must be developed, clearly and concretely formulated and based upon democratic principles. It is impossible successfully to confront a consistent and continuous Russian policy with a changing and intermittent American policy. No Secretary of State can deal with the Soviet Union

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Congratulations to

THE *Nation*

on the

Occasion of its

85th Anniversary

*

A Friend

M. D.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in a period of crisis if our foreign policy is subject to change without notice—or even as the result of election changes. If foreign policy is to be discussed recklessly in political campaigns and party good is to be placed before national good, we shall be at such disadvantage in negotiation as to face disaster.

Further steps must be taken to insure that both parties have an opportunity to share in the formulation of the policy that must be jointly supported. This unfortunately is not easy. Delicate negotiations shared in by Republicans can be destroyed by the public utterances of a McCarthy or the vicious columns of a McCormick.

Second, recent decisions by the United Nations make it possible to act with dispatch in meeting the force of aggression with the force of law. It is imperative that the United States keep itself strong enough to be able to make available to the United Nations the proportionate force that may be necessary to restrain aggression. This will be a heavy burden upon the American people, but a light burden when compared to the costs of war. The Russians believe that ideas can be imposed by force. Stalin, who could dismiss the Pope with the question, "How many divisions has he?" must be made aware of the divisions that are available to a world agency determined to subject force to law.

Third, Russia must be confronted not only with a Marshall Plan but with effective implementation of Point Four until at last it faces economic changes in vast areas of the earth that mean better living for the people and the possibility, under freedom, of achieving justice. To date little has been done to carry out any of the various plans advanced to attain those objectives. Senator Brien McMahon's creative proposal has not been acted upon. Only a small, wholly inadequate appropriation has been made to implement Point Four, announced by President Truman in his inaugural address almost two years ago.

Walter Reuther's plan, "A Total Peace Offensive," recently submitted to the President, seems worth serious consideration. Mr. Reuther proposes that the United States pledge thirteen billion dollars annually to the United Nations for the next hundred years. This sum would equal the cost of the last war to the American people. Other nations would be asked to contribute according to their ability. The money would be deposited in a special United Nations Fund for Economic and Social Reconstruction and would be used solely to help nations help themselves by developing and expanding economic resources and for other purposes, like health and housing, that would improve living standards. These funds would be available to all nations, including Russia and its satellites, on an equal basis, provided they participated in a total-disarmament plan which would be worked out at an international conference convened by the U. N. and which would establish universal inspection and other security controls along with the creation of an international police force.

The United Nations would also convene a People's World Assembly for Peace, each country sending two delegates from each of the following groups: dirt farmers, industrial workers, housewives, youth, veterans, educators, scientists, professional persons, business men, and religious leaders. To administer the program of reconstruction, the U. N. would expand existing agencies or create new ones, including one for the development of atomic energy for peace-time use within the limits of security measures made necessary by the refusal of one or more nations to agree to universal disarmament. The U. N. and its member nations would expand and strengthen the means of communication so that all peoples would know that the United States and the other participating nations were backing the peace proposal, and would become familiar with its provisions, possibilities, and concrete social achievements.

Fourth, the President—backed by (1) bipartisan support, (2) a military force sufficient to meet obligations to the United Nations and to resist any attack upon us, and (3) full implementation of Point Four without our by-passing the U. N. or entering into bilateral agreements—might invite Stalin and other national leaders to a conference to consider the many vital issues that are proper subjects of negotiation, such as peace treaties with former enemies, access to the Mediterranean via the Dardanelles, as well as the problems of infiltration and externally stimulated revolution. From a position of such strength the President could bargain confidently and without fear. He might demand the lifting of the iron curtain. Once negotiations were under way, how long could Russia flout world opinion and continue its policy of blindfolding and earmuffling its people? The association of Russian scientists, artists, musicians, educators, and leaders in labor and religion with similar leaders from the West would soon have its effect. A dynamic democracy has nothing to fear from dictatorship once the iron curtain is penetrated.

The iron curtain on our side must also be lifted. We must welcome scholars and other visitors from the Communist world, exercising only enough control to prevent espionage and actual attempts at subversion. Such advances as have been made within Russia would but serve as a competitive spur to improve our own society.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

India and World Peace

BY SIR BENEGAL N. RAU

MANY people whom I have met in recent months have associated India with the cause of world peace. This is natural, because India produced the greatest apostle of peace of modern times—Mahatma Gandhi; and although Gandhi died more than two years ago, he is one of those for whom there is no such thing as death. One incident in his life, which occurred some months before his tragic murder, has a meaning in present circumstances. Toward the end of August, 1947, the Mahatma happened to be in Calcutta. It was a period of general Hindu-Moslem tension, but Calcutta itself was comparatively quiet. I asked the head of the police whether the peace that reigned in the city was due to Gandhi's presence. He replied, "Oh, no, it is due to a multitude of other causes—chiefly the efficiency of the police. One man cannot bring peace to a whole city."

About the first week of September I was again in Calcutta; and again there was peace in the city. But during the interval grave events had taken place. In fact, on August 31 there had been a serious disturbance: the very house in which the Mahatma was living had been attacked, and he himself had narrowly escaped injury. Next day he started a fast—a fast unto death unless the warring communities came to their senses and promised to behave themselves.

The fast lasted seventy-three hours, and during this period leaders of all communities—Hindu, Moslem, Christian—and of all organizations—merchants, shopkeepers, workers—came to his bedside and signed a pledge that there would be no more communal trouble. And from that day, for months, there was no trouble either in Calcutta or anywhere else in Bengal, although there was serious trouble in other parts of India. I asked the head of the police what he thought of the situation this time. He replied, "This time I must confess that peace has been brought by the efforts of one man and one man alone."

Here we see a proof of one of the articles of the Mahatma's philosophy: if the cause is just, one man with faith and determination can win through. What is true of the individual is true of organizations. It is also true of countries; one country, with faith and determination, can win through in time. It is in this hope that we who have the honor to represent India in the United Nations are trying to carry out our duties. I have often quoted what a great admirer wrote of Gladstone: "We believe in no man's infallibility, but it is restful to be sure of one man's integrity." India, like any other country, may make mistakes, but even if it is in a minority of one, we are anxious that there should be no doubt of its integrity.

I sometimes wonder whether "the worth of the human person"—to quote the words of the Charter of the United Nations—is fully realized by us, or whether by constant repetition the words are coming to lose their meaning. To guard against this danger, we might recall an analogy suggested by recent developments of science in the world of matter. The atomic bomb is the greatest explosive force that we know in the physical world today. Yet what starts this tremendous explosion is a single neutron —an infinitesimal, invisible particle which, acting as a kind of gun, first sets off two near it and then others and so on until there is an almost earth-shaking force.

What is true of the physical world is also true of the moral: there also vast chain reactions may radiate from a single individual. One of the lessons we may learn from modern science, therefore, is the importance of the infinitely small and, by analogy, the tremendous potential worth of the individual human being and the immense value of individual freedom. If a single individual, organization, or country can set in motion the right kind of idea, it may ultimately move the whole world.

That is a fortifying thought in moments of frustration; there is another, almost equally effective, and also suggested by the latest developments of science. Let us for a moment consider not man as an individual but man in the sum. The earth he inhabits is a small planet revolving round an insignificant star, so insignificant that if through any cosmic cataclysm it were to disappear, the event would not even be noticed from the remoter parts of our own galaxy, let alone the innumerable other galaxies of the universe.

On this planet, which is many millions of years old, man is a very recent arrival compared with other forms of life. His normal expectation of life is about seventy years. Thus on the purely physical plane he is a mere speck in space and time. Most of his life is a struggle for existence, leaving little time for higher thought. And yet look at his achievements in the few thousand years since civilization began! "Perched precariously on this rotating speck of mud and water" that we call the earth, man has by mere force of thought penetrated into the

---

SIR BENEGAL N. RAU is India's permanent representative at the U. N. In India he has been judge of the Calcutta High Court and constitutional adviser to the Constituent Assembly.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COMPLIMENTS OF

Helena Rubinstein

NEW YORK • PARIS • LONDON

WHAT forces have contributed to the development of the present world crisis?

What role does Germany play in the cold war?

How can we get back to the facts and save the peace?

The Society for the Prevention of World War III has devoted its research facilities and energies to studying these questions of world import.

Readers of *The Nation* are invited to send in their requests for our magazine, PREVENT WORLD WAR III, and other literature.

SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF WORLD WAR III, Inc.
A Non-Profit Educational Organization
515 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK 22, N. Y.
MARK VAN DOREN, *Chairman*

THE
ZIONIST ORGANIZATION
of
AMERICA (ZOA)
41 EAST 42nd STREET
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

with a record of 53 years of service and achievement for the cause of Jewish Statehood, is as ever in the forefront of all major efforts to aid in the economic upbuilding of Israel and the enrichment of Jewish life in the United States.

Benjamin G. Browdy,
President

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

deepest mysteries of the universe. He has discovered the laws of the infinitely vast spaces around us as well as of the infinitely small world within the atom, and is now in the process of creating a miniature sun that we call the hydrogen bomb. When we contemplate man's truly wonderful conquests of external nature, have we no reason for hoping that he will, before very long, discover the laws of his own well-being and learn to conquer rather than destroy himself? Surely, the end of all his labors could not merely be the destruction of the race.

THESE may seem somewhat general reflections, but they serve to give some idea of the hope and spirit in which the representatives of India in the United Nations are trying to guide their activities. There has been a good deal of misunderstanding regarding India's attitude on many questions of importance—for instance, that of admitting the Peking government to the U. N. I shall not discuss here all the aspects of this question but shall confine myself to one which I hope will be entirely non-controversial. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in December, 1948, largely as the result of the noble efforts of Mrs. Roosevelt. That declaration is meant to serve as a common standard of achievement for all peoples. There are 475,000,000 people in the Republic of China. Do we or do we not want these people to have the benefit of this Declaration, with all the rights and freedoms for which it calls? And who can confer rights and freedoms on these millions of people except the government that actually controls their territory and shapes their laws? Whatever may be the complexion of that government, surely it would be an advantage to have it represented in the United Nations and made to accept the obligations of a member; so that if it fails to do so, we can call it to account.

I have frequently been invited at Lake Success to explain India's attitude toward other difficult problems which have come up for solution in the Security Council or in the General Assembly. Whether it is Korea, China, Indo-China, or any other country in the Far East, there is often a tendency to assume that a particular regime represents democracy and that those who oppose it are Communists. This is an extreme over-simplification which may lead to serious errors of policy. It should not be impossible to find reliable, unbiased persons capable of undertaking an objective study of the real situation in each of these countries. The results of such a study would be a great contribution to world peace. To take drastic action in the absence of such information is likely to lead the world in the opposite direction—toward universal conflict.

Recently, in the General Assembly of the United Nations, I mentioned that the total annual expenditure for the United Nations was less than the annual interest on the cost of the equipment needed for the production of a single atomic bomb. If only the fear of war could be reduced to a minimum, we could embark upon a program of general disarmament and spend the money so saved on economic reconstruction. Atomic energy could be diverted entirely to purposes of peace. A great surgeon in this country recently told me how valuable some of the products of atomic fission were proving in the treatment of disease and deplored the fact that a fraction of the vast sums now spent on preparations for war could not be devoted to medical research. All this would be possible if we could dissipate the distrust among nations out of which is born the dread of war, and the competition in armaments.

This general statement on the deeper currents of India's foreign policy will, I trust, make it easier for the people of the United States to appreciate Nehru's moves in regard to problems on or near India's frontiers. The American people must understand that the solutions of these problems concern India even more vitally than countries farther away from the scenes of actual or possible trouble in Asia. They must learn to trust India, even if on some specific questions we hold divergent views. India's adherence to the democratic way of life, its opposition to aggression, and its faith in the fundamental freedoms are so deep and abiding that the differences are of minor and passing significance.

With its long and varied history and wide range of experiences India surely has a mission to fulfil in the present world crisis. That it manifestly cannot do by passively identifying itself with any power or group of

Courtesy *United Nations World*

"Are you sure you mailed that letter with my Peace Plan?"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

powers. To pursue any other course than the one on which Nehru has firmly set his country would be to suppress its individuality, and therefore to reduce its capacity to play an active role in safeguarding peace.

As I began with a reference to Gandhi, so I must conclude. Twenty years ago, at the Round Table Conference in London, Gandhi addressed a prophetic appeal to the then British Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald. He said: "Can we [Britain and India] not march together as equal partners, not for the exploitation of a single race or a single individual, but for the good of humanity—and form a real League of Nations?" Had that appeal borne immediate fruit, the world might have been spared some at least of the agonies of the last twenty years. But the appeal has lost none of its force in the vastly altered circumstances of today.

In any event, India—alone or in the company of other powers which are similarly convinced that the principles of the Charter should be the basis of a new civilization—must continue to strike the same note, in the U. N. and outside. The solution of its many economic and social problems will give it even greater authority than it now possesses in insisting on decent standards of living as the best antidote to revolutionary doctrines. Happiness and prosperity for 350,000,000 people in southern Asia, achieved by democratic processes, will inevitably prove to be the greatest single stabilizing factor in the cause of world peace.

The Essentials of Peace

BY GRENVILLE CLARK

IN THESE tense days anyone having the temerity to advance definite proposals for a new world order, pursuant to a general East-West settlement, must be acutely conscious of the uncertainties of events and the pace at which they move. I base my proposals, therefore, on the assumption that both East and West will have been chastened by the lesson of Korea and that no irrevocable showdown will have occurred to make all discussion impossible.

In my opinion, the essentials of a program which, if systematically followed, would achieve a durable peace can be summed up in the following four points:

1. *Encourage a more searching public discussion of the implications of a third world war, so that all people, realizing its shocking moral as well as physical consequences, will be more resourceful in finding means to establish world order.*

Our government, our leaders of opinion, and our press ought to encourage such a discussion. For one thing, it would serve to clarify such terms as "retaliatory bombing" and the like, now used with various meanings. To illustrate: our authorities do not state whether we would drop A-bombs on Russian centers in "retaliation" to any form of warfare—say, a submarine attack on a merchant ship—or only if an A-bomb attack had first been launched by Russia against ourselves or an ally. Nor do they say whether we would use A-bombs on cities outside Russia that might be occupied by the Red Army.

Questions like these involve such great moral as well as practical issues that we should be impelled to explore them to the bottom. They affect not only our survival but our peace of mind and place in history. A discussion of the continuing and thorough kind I have in mind has not yet been held in this country. It would involve no danger that we would go "soft" in face of the shocking possibilities that would be revealed, since the American people have never been disposed to surrender their essential interests or rights no matter what the consequences. It would simply make more clear the appalling implications of an atomic war and lead to a more insistent demand, not for "appeasement," but for the exercise of the utmost patience, imagination, and resource in seeking a way out.

2. *Recognize that total disarmament by all nations in all arms is the crux; that for effective disarmament a world federation of universal membership, with adequate though carefully limited powers, is essential; and that basic revision of the U. N. Charter is the best means to this end.*

We are only trifling with the problem of world order until we realize that disarmament is the precondition of peace, and further that disarmament must apply not only to all nations but to conventional as well as atomic weapons. We must realize also that disarmament and a general political settlement are interdependent. As long as the great political questions remain unsettled—Germany, Japan, China, and so forth—

GRENVILLE CLARK, vice-president of the United World Federalists and a distinguished lawyer, is one of our most influential citizens. He was a prime mover for the Plattsburg Idea before World War I and contributed largely to the writing of the Selective Service Act in 1940. This article is based on his book "A Plan for Peace," recently published by Harper and Brothers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

neither the United States nor Russia can be expected to disarm. Nor, conversely, can they be expected to make any real settlement of the political questions while remaining armed. It follows that a general political settlement and disarmament are inextricably intertwined and must be handled in a single comprehensive negotiation.

Even such thorny problems as Germany, the Dardanelles, and Russian domination of Eastern Europe might yield to negotiation if effective disarmament were a leading feature of the settlement itself. The question of disarmament must therefore be an *integral part* of the great negotiation.

If the premise is accepted that there can be no stable peace without universal disarmament, it is equally clear that there can be no genuine disarmament without limited world government. Disarmament, therefore, calls for basic revision of the United Nations Charter.

The Charter should, first of all, be amended to provide for membership of all the nations of the world without the right to resign. With this accomplished, every inhabitant of the world would be a citizen of the United Nations as well as of his own country. The Charter and laws enacted thereunder would bind each individual just as the Constitution and laws of the United States bind every inhabitant of our nation. There would be a Bill of Rights safeguarding all persons against violation of certain basic liberties by the United Nations itself, but not attempting to protect the individual against the government of his own nation. Upon these foundations there would then be created, through further Charter revision, binding and enforceable world law in respect of war prevention. And as part of that world constitutional law, there would be written into the Charter itself a detailed plan for general disarmament.

I propose progressive and proportionate disarmament by all nations, carried out simultaneously with the development of an effective world police force. Disarmament would be accomplished over a period of twelve years in three stages of four years each. During the first stage all armed forces and all their weapons of every description would be reduced by one-third, subject to careful verification by United Nations inspectors. A further one-third reduction, with similar inspection and verification, would be made in each of two succeeding four-year periods. At the end of twelve years *all* national military forces and weapons would be eliminated, save only lightly armed police forces for the sole purpose of maintaining internal order. The manufacture of all war weapons would be prohibited to the member nations. Such manufacture would be conducted solely in arsenals owned and operated by the United Nations and limited to those arms required by a world police force.

To avoid uncertainty and suspicion, the revised Charter would provide for a complete and continuing system of United Nations inspection and would also prescribe the precise maximum strength of all local and national police. This should be determined in proportion to population but with a moderate fixed maximum for any nation, however large.

With all nations disarmed, there must exist a world police force capable of insuring against any violation of world law. The strength of such a police force, or Peace Force, should be determined from year to year by the General Assembly, within limits set by the Charter, perhaps 300,000 to 700,000. It should be recruited, on a voluntary basis, mainly from the smaller nations, with a low limit on the permissible quota from any one nation, and would be organized step by step during the twelve-year period of proportional national disarmament.

The General Assembly would be made primarily responsible for the maintenance of peace and would exercise control over the Peace Force through a new executive arm, the Executive Council, superseding the Security Council. There would be no veto in the Executive Council's proceedings, and its authority would be considerable. Yet it would always be an agency of the Assembly, subject to the Assembly's direction and to dismissal by that body, the relationship resembling that of Cabinet and Parliament in Britain.

In order to enable the Assembly to discharge its new responsibilities, both its composition and powers would be revised. A great need exists for a new basis of representation, since, under the present Charter, Haiti has the same voting power as the United States, and Luxembourg an equal voice with the United Kingdom. I believe the most just and practicable basis to be that of population, but with provision for representation of even the smallest nation and a maximum limit, say thirty, for even the largest. Thus reorganized, the Assembly would be given greater authority, although its power to legislate would be strictly limited by the revised Charter to matters directly connected with the prevention of war.

Some provision must be made for amendment of the revised Charter, since future needs can never be wholly foreseen. Because no country could retire from the or-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ganized world community, amendments should not be imposed upon non-assenting states unless they reflect the views of a large majority of the member nations and of the world's people. It is therefore proposed that, for fifteen years—a sufficient period to provide experience—no amendments whatever shall be made without the consent of all nations which have more than one representative in the Assembly.

After the fifteen-year period amendments would be possible if ratified by two-thirds of the member nations; these nations, however, would have to contain at least three-fourths of the world's population. Still further safeguards might be necessary to afford protection against certain kinds of amendments of a fundamental character.

The expenses of a United Nations with these new responsibilities and functions, and assuming a World Peace Force of 500,000 men, would be of the order of $6 billion per annum, requiring a system of direct United Nations taxation. To this end, careful constitutional safeguards would be provided. These would include a limitation of 2 per cent of the world's estimated annual income as the maximum that could be raised in any year and the specification of certain modes of taxation that could alone be used, with a large degree of option to each member nation to elect a particular mode to supply its quota of the annual budget.

Since the burden of national armaments would have been abolished, the revenue required for the United Nations, including its Peace Force, would be only a small fraction of the amount now devoted to military budgets—that is, perhaps $6 billion as compared with the $70 billion or more which the world is now annually expending on armament.

A United Nations so remodeled would be a genuine world government. No other term could fairly describe it. But it would be a government whose sphere of legislative, executive, and judicial authority would be strictly confined to the enforcement of world order so as to prevent the nations, as has been said, "from murdering each other."

As compared with the present world situation, a new world regime of this nature would work a revolution. In a world divided into opposing armed camps, it is inevitable that Russia will maintain its grip on governments which we call "satellites" and it calls "friendly," to serve as a cushion against possible invasion from the West, an occurrence not without precedent in Russian history. Under present conditions we cannot expect Russia to relinquish control of Eastern Europe any more than we would relinquish our air bases that command Russian territory or dissolve the Atlantic alliance. It is only when a scheme of general disarmament has been agreed upon and included in the Charter, and after a lapse of time to allow the plan to prove its worth, that we can expect Russia to loosen its grip on Eastern Europe or correspondingly expect the West to relax its efforts for the protection of its own way of life.

Under general disarmament, however, there would be no need for international alliances or military bases either in the Atlantic area or the Far East. They would all be without purpose when all national armaments had been eliminated and an effective World Peace Force had been established. With tension relieved and with a reduction of over $60 billion per annum in armament expenditure, the world's living standards would improve appreciably and the underlying factors that make for internal and international strife would be mitigated.

It is true that the contest for the minds and hearts of the vast masses of Asia would continue, as would a similar contest in Eastern Europe. But with the threat of bombings and invasions removed, this contest could be conducted on a different plane from that of actual or imminent violence.

For all these reasons, disarmament is revealed as the key factor through which long-standing fears and suspicions can be made to yield.

3. *During the interim period of discussion and negotiation armed strength should be maintained, but a constant effort made to create a better atmosphere.*

This whole plan for disarmament and world law through Charter revision is, of course, dependent upon a settlement with Russia. This is inescapable, since (a) the Charter cannot be amended without the consent of Russia as well as of the United States, and (b) without fundamental changes in the Charter it is impossible to see how universal disarmament can be realized.

Nor can Charter revision and disarmament be accomplished in a brief time. Perhaps several years of preliminary discussion, exploration, and exchange of ideas would lie ahead. In the present mood of mutual distrust and recrimination it will be no easy matter to formulate comprehensive terms acceptable to both sides. Our conduct during this interim period—whether it is truculent and provocative or firm yet moderate—will largely influence the result. We cannot determine Russian attitudes, but we can control our own.

During the process of discussion it will doubtless be necessary to build up the armed forces of the non-Communist world and maintain them at a high level. Until negotiations were well under way and promised success, there would probably be no hope of an arms holiday. Yet while the delicate business of peace-making is under way, the influence of military men must be kept within its proper sphere. This is not to cast aspersions upon the military. Their profession is that of arms,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their duty to win wars if they come. It is, however, essential that, while remaining strong and firm, we use every endeavor not to exacerbate present tensions; and this means that the dominating influences must be kept in the hands of the civilian authorities.

At this point, many will doubtless ask: "But what about the Russians? Can we seriously believe that they will negotiate on reasonable terms?" My answer is that I am well aware of the Russian "dynamic" and of the semi-religious element in communism. Nor do I ignore the deep-seated fears and suspicions that drive the Russian regime toward expansion. Yet I am also aware of the tremendous forces of self-interest which cannot but influence the Russians, as they do all peoples, to try to avoid the colossal losses inevitable in a general war.

It is, of course, possible to assert, as many now do, that the Russian regime is inexorably set on world domination and can by no means whatever be diverted from this fixed objective. If this opinion is accepted, there would indeed be no purpose, from our standpoint, in seeking agreement upon the basis of general disarmament or any other. By the same token, if the Soviet propaganda were accepted at face value, and if the West were in fact inexorably set on world imperialism and the destruction of Russia, there would be, from the Russian standpoint, a corresponding futility in seeking agreement upon any terms. For my part, I consider both views too cocksure—at once over-dogmatic and defeatist. I believe that there is a reasonable chance of success for a great, comprehensive settlement on the basis of disarmament under genuine world law as herein outlined.

In this connection, I think it significant that so consistent a foe of communism as Mr. Churchill, far from discarding the idea of East-West negotiation as fruitless, has persistently advocated that such negotiation should be undertaken, provided it be from strength and not from weakness. If the effort should fail, it is hard to see what harm could be done. But if we do not even attempt it, sincerely and persistently, we should, I believe, be blameworthy before the bar of history.

4. *Recognize that our executive agencies cannot be expected to produce the new ideas necessary to deal with this unprecedented problem; that the new conceptions must come from the people, with the help of Congress.*

There is, I believe, a strong dissatisfaction among our people with the present trend of our foreign policy. Millions of citizens feel instinctively that it tends slowly

...A Prayer...

of

Saint Francis of Assisi!

Make me an instrument of Thy peace.
Where there is hatred, let me sow love.
Where there is injury, pardon.
Where there is doubt, faith.
Where there is despair, hope.
Where there is darkness, light.
Where there is sadness, joy.

Grant that I may not so much seek
To be consoled, as to console;
To be understood as to understand;
To be loved, as to love, for,
It is in giving that we receive;
It is in pardoning that we are pardoned;
It is in dying that we are born to eternal life.

Courtesy of Blanche Ittleson

Friendship Cargo For China

友國誼際

International Friendship

. . . continues today the American people's tradition initiated in 1938 of aid to the International Peace Hospitals and model child care and maternity welfare projects of the China Welfare Institute. Formerly known as the China Defence League and later as the China Welfare Fund, the Institute remains under the active leadership of Madame Sun Yat-sen. . . .

CHINA WELFARE APPEAL, Inc.
439 Fourth Avenue, New York 16, N. Y.
(This space contributed by a friend)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but steadily toward a frightful conflict. They are against "appeasement" in the sense of unworthy concessions made merely for peace. They recognize the necessity of military strength for the present. They support the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic treaty, and the arms-aid program. But they also know that these things are not enough. Most people give the Administration credit for good faith in its repeated protestations that peace is its objective. But they know that "he who wills not the means, wills not the end," and they demand a more imaginative and more basic approach.

It is a mistake, however, to look to the Administration, the State Department, and other executive agencies for a solution to the world problem. Faced with constant emergencies, they lack the time or energy to deal with so vast a subject as the organization of world order. Many are afflicted with what Charles F. Kettering has called "groovology" at a time when getting out of the groove is literally vital. Still another trouble is that many who have struggled with the East-West conflict—good and able men though they are—have become tired, exasperated, and defeatist at a time when resource and fresh ideas are at a premium.

In other troubled times when the nation has been confronted by problems that baffled government officials, private citizens have risen to the occasion and provided the ideas needed to triumph over crisis. Our recent past provides two such examples. In 1915-17 officials were helpless when faced by an alarming shortage of military officers. The solution, the "Plattsburg Idea," was the product of the initiative and vigor of private citizens. Again in 1940, when Norway fell and the threat of Hitler's conquest of Europe became clear, it was a group of private citizens, aided by a few far-sighted Congressmen, who conceived and put forward the Selective Service Act.

For these reasons we cannot, in dealing with so vast a subject as the organization of world order, rely upon executive officials, inhibited and burdened as they are by traditional methods and by day-to-day problems. Rather, we must look to the people at large, aided by their representatives in Congress. And since the solution of the problem involves bold and novel ideas, we must recognize that our main hope lies with the new young leaders now emerging, many of them veterans of World War II.

Courtesy London *Daily Herald*

In the World Federation resolution now pending in House and Senate, a great opportunity is presented, whereby the Congress can do more toward peace than in any other way. The resolution reads:

> Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that it should be a fundamental objective of the foreign policy of the United States to support and strengthen the United Nations and to seek its development into a world federation open to all nations with defined and limited powers adequate to preserve peace and prevent aggression through the enactment, interpretation, and enforcement of world law.

This resolution commits the Congress to no special plan of world federation and is no more than a first step. Yet its adoption would be of enormous importance. For in all its resolves concerning world cooperation the Congress has never yet clearly declared that *enforceable world law* in the limited field of war prevention, but binding on all nations, is the pre-condition of peace. Without this we shall not have come to grips with the problem of world order.

By contrast the Atlantic Union resolution, which calls for a federation of only *some* of the nations, should be rejected as based upon a principle that would confirm the world's division, and, however good the intention, be a disservice to the cause of peace. In substance the Atlantic Union conception does not greatly differ from former President Hoover's recent plan either to expel all Communist nations from the United Nations or, "if that is impractical," to form a new organization without those nations. It has since been generally recognized that Mr. Hoover's proposal would so impair the United Nations as virtually to destroy it and make still more difficult any solution of the issues dividing East and West.

The World Federation resolution, on the other hand, contemplates a federation—a revised United Nations—whose membership shall include *every* country and whose authority, though strictly limited, shall bind *all* the nations. That is the road to peace and the only one.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Congratulations

▼

From

a

Friend

did you ever see a Dream working?

A dream can have the vigor of a butterfly's cry, or the massed strength of a million people.

Israel is the 2,000-year-old dream that got itself a job, went to work with its sleeves rolled up, came down to earth as settlements and cities, schools and ships, people and parliaments.

Two and a half years of dream-turned-reality brought to Israel 500,000 immigrants, fleeing the nightmare of the past, in desperate need of a secure and productive future.

Israel welcomed them, sacrificed to provide care, homes, jobs. Now she pays the price of a grim and heartbreaking austerity.

We, at least, can try to match that austerity with our generosity, so that the dream of a growing, building democracy can go on working for Israel and all of those yet to come.

UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL
41 East 42nd Street, New York 17, N. Y.

***A constituent agency of the* United Jewish Appeal**

Bertha Schaefer

32 EAST 57th, NEW YORK 22

- CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PAINTINGS AND SCULPTURE

"THE PROSPECT OF ANOTHER WAR can only make thinking people wonder if mankind has gone completely mad.

"We want peace, and we see no reason why the Asiatics and the down-trodden everywhere cannot rebel against their poverty and enslavement—even though they may elect to alleviate their plight through socialism rather than capitalism. Let us not fall into the trap of thinking that rebellion and communism are one and the same."

Congratulations to **The Nation** in its efforts Towards Peace.

HEATH CERAMICS, SAUSALITO, CAL.

Farband

LABOR ZIONIST ORDER

45 East 17th Street
Suite 1603
New York 3, N. Y.

— Provides —

- An intelligent program for American Jewish men and women.
- Warm comradeship in a congenial environment.
- Jewish educational, social and fraternal activities.
- An opportunity to do your share for Israel, the Jewish people and progressive forces everywhere.
- A cooperative system of Life Insurance, Hospitalization, Disability, Funeral and Cemetery and other fraternal benefits.

RAYTRIC KNITTING MILL INC.

Warp-Knitters

BRISTOL CONNECTICUT

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Value of Negotiation

QUOTATIONS FROM WINSTON CHURCHILL'S SPEECHES

[*To quote statements by Winston Churchill out of the context in which they were originally made can be a dangerously self-deluding undertaking, for the speeches of this master of English prose are generally elaborate structures housing several major themes in complex juxtaposition. It is none the less significant that even in the addresses that have aroused the greatest opposition among the Communists, he has consistently urged the Western nations to press for realistic negotiations with Russia for the purpose of achieving a settlement of outstanding differences before resorting to the final obscenity of war.*—EDITORS THE NATION.]

March 5, 1946: The "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri

I REPULSE the idea that a new war is inevitable; still more that it is imminent. . . . I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines. But what we have to consider here today, while time remains, is the permanent prevention of war and the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries. Our difficulties and dangers will not be removed by closing our eyes to them. They will not be removed by mere waiting to see what happens; nor will they be removed by a policy of appeasement. What is needed is a settlement, and the longer this is delayed, the more difficult it will be and the greater our dangers will become. . . .

[Peace] can only be achieved by reaching now, in 1946, a good understanding on all points with Russia under the general authority of the United Nations Organization and by the maintenance of that good understanding through many peaceful years, by the world instrument, supported by the whole strength of the English-speaking world and all its connections.

January 23, 1948: Speech in the House of Commons after Russia's threat to blockade Berlin

IT IS not odd that this ugly question should still be put, and force itself upon us: "Will there be war?" I will only venture now to say that there seems to me to be very real danger in going on drifting too long. I believe that the best chance of preventing a war is to bring matters to a head and come to a settlement with the Soviet government before it is too late. This would imply that the Western democracies, who should, of course, seek unity among themselves at the earliest moment, would take the initiative in asking the Soviet for a settlement.

It is idle to reason or argue with the Communists. It is, however, possible to deal with them on a fair, realistic basis, and, in my experience, they will keep their bargains as long as it is in their interest to do so, which might, in this grave matter, be a long time, once things were settled.

November 30, 1950: in the House of Commons during the debate on the Korean reverses

I HOPED myself . . . that a lasting settlement might be reached with Russia before we evacuated our portion of central and eastern Germany, and before the United States' armies were demobilized and dispersed. Later, in 1948, I hoped that we might come to terms with them before they gained the secret of the atomic bomb. Now I hope that we may come to terms with them before they have so large a stockpile of these fearful agencies, in addition to vast superiority in other weapons, as to be able to terrorize the free world, if not, indeed, to destroy it. . . . While it is right to build up our forces as fast as we can, nothing in this process . . . (in the next two years) will deprive Russia of effective superiority in what are now called conventional arms. All that it will do is to give us increasing unity in Europe and magnify the deterrents against aggression, and, perhaps, give us the means of gradually approaching the situation when relations between world powers may express themselves in normal terms and not only be measured in the strange and novel methods of the atomic age.

Dangerous as it may be to make such a prediction . . . I would venture to express the opinion that a major attack by Russia in Europe is unlikely in the near future, and that it will not be provoked or produced by the modest measures of defense now being so slowly . . . developed by the Atlantic and Western powers. Even if our preparations developed more rapidly, a long period must elapse before they could offset the Russian superiority, even if Russian strength itself were not increased meanwhile.

It is upon this that I found my hope that we still have time, that there is still a breathing space for us to pursue the policy of seeking an understanding, and for us to pursue the essential counterpart and foundation of any such hope, namely, the building up of a more reasonable measure of defensive strength. This may be a vain hope. I may live, perhaps, to be mocked at if proved wrong by events. It is, at any rate, the working hypothesis of my thought in these anxious and agonizing times.

Therefore I am in favor of efforts to reach a settlement with Soviet Russia as soon as a suitable opportunity presents itself, and of making those efforts while the immense and measureless superiority of the United States atomic-bomb organization offsets the Soviet predominance in every other military respect and gives us the means to talk together in a friendly and dignified manner and, at least, as equals. I think that we are all agreed . . . about the kind of answer we should make to the Russian proposals for a four-power conference.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE MIND OF WINSTON CHURCHILL

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From a Friend

Compliments

of

Dudley Nichols

Yes,

we wish to walk in

freedom . . .

Congratulations to

THE *Nation*

on its 85th Anniversary for its continued devotion to the democratic way of life.

CIRCULATION ASSOCIATES

1745 BROADWAY • NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

COMPLIMENTS

of

STRYKER & BROWN

FIFTY BROAD STREET

New York 4, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COMPLIMENTS

of

HYMAN GROVER

CHILDREN TO PALESTINE salutes *The Nation* and solicits the assistance of its readers.

OUR PROGRAM:

RESCUE AND REHABILITATION OF JEWISH CHILDREN

SCHOLARSHIPS FOR ARAB AND JEWISH CHILDREN IN ISRAEL

EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY AND BROTHERHOOD IN AMERICA

Help us to accomplish these three aims by sending contributions to:

CHILDREN TO PALESTINE, 3 Joy St., Boston 8, Mass.

BEST WISHES

Dr. and Mrs. I. Peter Glauber

GREETINGS

from

Mr. and Mrs. Charles Goldman

First Mortgages on improved Jacksonville Real Estate for sale.

FIRE INSURANCE TO COVER BUILDINGS, AND TITLE INSURANCE TO SHOW TITLE.

W. C. WARRINGTON, Realtor

703 CONSOLIDATED BUILDING

JACKSONVILLE 2, FLORIDA

Greetings from

LEON SHERMAN

1562 UNION STREET

Brooklyn 13, N. Y.

GREETINGS

More power to *The Nation* and the Nation Associates.

Mr. and Mrs. Leon B. Sager

COMPLIMENTS

OF

A

FRIEND

D. R.

GREETINGS TO THE NATION

from

THE RECONSTRUCTIONIST Magazine

Bi-weekly Journal of Jewish Opinion

15 WEST 86th STREET NEW YORK 24, N. Y.

MANY HAPPY RETURNS

from

A FRIEND

SOLUTION FOR JERUSALEM

An International Curatorship for the Holy Places

A proposal submitted to the President of the United States and the United Nations by 285 distinguished American leaders.

Copies of this document may be obtained by writing to

ROOM 1010 • 20 VESEY STREET

NEW YORK 7, N. Y.

THIS SPACE HAS BEEN PAID FOR BY MRS. SIMON KUHN

CINCINNATI, OHIO

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ON "THE NATION'S" ANNIVERSARY

REINHOLD NIEBUHR
Dean, Union Theological Seminary

My best wishes to you on the Eighty-fifth Anniversary of *The Nation*. You are continuing to develop year by year, relating a living present to a long and honorable past of fearless journalism. *The Nation* is a vital part of the intellectual and political life of our nation. Its influence has always been far greater than its seeming strength.

SENATOR WAYNE MORSE

While *The Nation* needs no encomium from me, the occasion of its Eighty-fifth Anniversary should be one of rededication, by those who call themselves liberals, to the cause of political and economic democracy. In the babble of voices and councils that compete for attention with ever-increasing intensity *The Nation* has stood out as a beacon light of freedom, richly meriting a reputation of leadership in charting a clear and progessive course toward the goal of human decency. Founded at the close of the War between the States, *The Nation* has held fast to the basic tenets of Lincoln's philosophy—the integrity and dignity of the individual. In these perilous times may *The Nation* continue its fearless course of scrutinizing men, ideas, and events to the end that the principles of democracy may be better understood and more faithfully practiced at home and abroad!

VIJAYA LAKSHMI PANDIT
Indian Ambassador to the United States

Please accept my congratulations on *The Nation's* Eighty-fifth Anniversary. It is my hope that your paper will continue its good work in the cause of democracy and peace.

A. PHILIP RANDOLPH
President, Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters

While one may differ with the position of *The Nation* on various issues, one cannot seriously question its independence, courage, integrity, and basic liberalism. I have high affection for the spirits who have given *The Nation* to the American people, especially my close friend and associate, the late Oswald Garrison Villard, and the present editor and publisher, Freda Kirchwey, who carries on with ability and dedication in the great traditions of this fine publication.

KINGSLEY MARTIN
Editor, New Statesman and Nation

Warmest congratulations to *The Nation* on its eighty-fifth birthday. Franklin D. Roosevelt's message to you ten years ago now needs emblazoning in letters of fire on Broadway and every other main street in America. It is now ten times more important that "minorities shall have means of expressing themselves." *The Nation* still splendidly upholds the cause of individual and minority freedom.

MAX LERNER

Congratulations to a sturdy, courageous voyager in the rough waters of our era. I know that *The Nation* will still be doughtily alive long after the narrow, provincial little men who are today trying to strangle it will have shriveled up and died.

ARTHUR GARFIELD HAYS
A Director of the American Civil Liberties Union

For years, whenever Clarence Darrow sent someone to see me, the bearer carried a note of introduction reading as follows: "Dear Art: Here's one of our kind." It would be hard to say just who are our kind. One test, however, is fairly applicable. We can be characterized as people who for years have read *The Nation*. Its point of view is not only liberal and sound to us, but under Freda Kirchwey's guidance, *The Nation* is easy and stimulating reading. Good luck to it on its Eighty-fifth Anniversary!

EMIL RIEVE
President, Textile Workers' Union of America (C. I. O.)

The Nation is a magazine with a deep devotion to lost causes and a literary style aimed at a small audience of intellectuals.

As a trade-union leader I much prefer uninspired victories to gallant defeats, and large audiences to small ones. Moreover, the problems of an industrial union require empirical rather than intellectual handling most of the time.

Yet no matter how dimly I view the "professional intellectuals" as a class, I cannot but confess my respect and affection for *The Nation*. It may be highbrow, but far more often than not it also makes sense.

A good many of *The Nation's* "lost causes" have come close to being won in my lifetime, including the cause of organized labor. How could this have happened if there had been no one to fight for them when they were "lost"?

Surely there is no more vital cause today than that of world peace; and, typically, *The Nation* has embraced it most heartily just when the prospects are worst. *The Nation* can't make peace, but it is eager to tell the world how to go about the job. This is the spirit—the effrontery, if you will—which gives *The Nation* its special flavor.

DAVID E. LILIENTHAL
Former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission

America can thank its lucky stars for *The Nation* and Freda Kirchwey, needed in 1950 perhaps more than at any time since the tragic days of '65 when *The Nation* was founded. For this journal symbolizes American faith in the open competition of ideas.

JOHN K. FAIRBANK
Associate Chairman, Committee on International and Regional Studies at Harvard

One of the many services which *The Nation* has rendered in recent years has been its early and consistent emphasis on the problems created for the United States by the social revolution which is sweeping Asia. Its recognition and analysis of these problems through the statements of a variety of writers have been an invaluable contribution.

JACOB BLAUSTEIN
American Jewish Committee

Long before attaining its present age of eighty-five, *The Nation* had earned the right to be regarded as more than merely a periodical. It is, rather, an institution whose influence in American intellectual and political life is out of all proportion to the size of its circulation. While one may disagree with some

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of its views, one can never question the sincerity of its motivations, or fail to admire the courage and zeal with which it consistently propounds its lofty concepts of Americanism, democracy, and human values.

Please accept the expression of my hope that *The Nation*, its vigor undiminished by age, will continue for many decades to wage its traditional fight for freedom and justice for the individual human being and for all mankind.

FRANCIS BIDDLE
Former United States Attorney General

I congratulate *The Nation* warmly on its eighty-fifth birthday. That is a long while to sustain an ideal which—and I still like the word—is liberal.

If you have often thumbed your nose at the accepted clichés, how healthy for all of us! It has been a courageous record, and, I believe, not without considerable influence on men and on ideas.

Keep going, particularly now, with all the old robustness!

EDOUARD HERRIOT
President of the French National Assembly

On the occasion of the Eighty-fifth Anniversary of *The Nation* I should like to send you my sincere congratulations.

It is reassuring to know that during so many long years certain people have never wearied of the task of defending the ideals of human dignity and human liberty against the onslaughts of open or disguised tyranny.

SPONSORS

[*A list of the distinguished Americans—and of some of the institutions with which they are associated—who have sponsored* The Nation's *special anniversary issue on Peace with Russia: Can It Be Negotiated? appears below.*]

DR. DEWEY ANDERSON, Executive Director, Public Affairs Institute.

DR. GLENN L. ARCHER, Executive Director, Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State.

HON. THURMAN W. ARNOLD, lawyer, author, former Associate Justice, United States Court of Appeals.

DR. HENRY A. ATKINSON, General Secretary, the Church Peace Union.

DR. STRINGFELLOW BARR, President, Foundation for World Government.

DR. L. M. BIRKHEAD, National Director, Friends of Democracy.

SARAH GIBSON BLANDING, President, Vassar College.

MRS. JAMES BOYD, Publisher of the *Pilot*, Southern Pines, North Carolina.

VAN WYCK BROOKS, author.

CHARLES C. BURLINGHAM, attorney, civic leader.

DR. HENRY SEIDEL CANBY, Editor, *Saturday Review of Literature.*

DR. DONALD B. CLOWARD, Executive Secretary, Council on Christian Social Progress, American Baptist Convention.

Over 50 Years of Experience as

...OIL REFINERS

- *White Mineral Oils,*
- *Petrolatums, Petroleum Sulfonates, Petroleum Specialties*
- *AMALIE Pennsylvania Motor Oil and AMALIE Lubricants*

...MANUFACTURING CHEMISTS

- *Building Products for Construction and Maintenance*
- *Textile Chemicals*
- *Detergents and Disinfectants*

L. SONNEBORN SONS, INC.

Main Office: New York, N. Y.
Factory: Nutley, N. J.
Refineries: Petrolia and Franklin, Pa.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Presto Luggage Locks

Dependable Performers on America's Finest Luggage for over 30 years

• "America's Largest Manufacturers of Luggage Hardware"

PRESTO LOCK COMPANY

Main Office & Plant:
100 Outwater Lane • Garfield, New Jersey

DR. JOSEPH M. DAWSON, Executive Director, Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs.

DR. CLARK M. EICHELBERGER, Director, American Association for the United Nations.

DR. WILLIAM EMERSON, President, American Association for the United Nations.

JANE EVANS, President, National Peace Conference.

PROFESSOR JOHN K. FAIRBANK, Associate Chairman, Committee on International and Regional Studies of Harvard University.

RAYMOND FOGELMAN, business leader.

THE RT. REV. CHARLES KENDALL GILBERT, Protestant Episcopal Bishop of New York, Retired.

RABBI ROLAND B. GITTELSOHN, member of President Truman's Advisory Committee on Civil Rights.

HON. FRANK P. GRAHAM, Senator from North Carolina.

WILLIAM GREEN, President, American Federation of Labor.

MRS. J. BORDEN HARRIMAN, former Minister to Norway.

EARL G. HARRISON, lawyer, former Vice-President, University of Pennsylvania.

ARTHUR GARFIELD HAYS, lawyer, a director of the American Civil Liberties Union.

ERNEST HEMINGWAY, author.

DR. W. A. HIGINBOTHAM, President, Federation of American Scientists.

LEWIS M. HOSKINS, Executive Secretary, American Friends Service Committee.

HON. HAROLD L. ICKES, Former Secretary of the Interior.

DR. SAMUEL GUY INMAN, lecturer, specialist in Latin American affairs.

DR. CORNELIUS KRUSE, Chairman, American Council of Learned Societies.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LOULA D. LASKER, social welfare leader, Associate Editor, the *Survey*.

ARCHIBALD MACLEISH, poet, former Assistant Secretary of State, Boylston Professor of Rhetoric and Oratory, Harvard University.

DR. ARTHUR CUSHMAN McGIFFERT, President, Chicago Theological Seminary.

DUDLEY NICHOLS, director and producer.

MICHAEL M. NISSELSON, President, Amalgamated Bank of New York.

THE VERY REV. G. BROMLEY OXNAM, Methodist Bishop of New York.

SAUL K. PADOVER, Dean, New York School for Social Research.

GIFFORD PHILLIPS, Publisher of the *Frontier*.

DR. CLARENCE PICKETT, Honorary Secretary, American Friends Service Committee.

DR. PAUL NEWTON POLING, Secretary, Board of Christian Education of the Presbyterian Church in the United States.

MRS. DAVID DE SOLA POOL, former President of Hadassah.

DR. EDWARD H. PRUDEN, Pastor, First Baptist Church, Washington; President, American Baptist Convention.

T. EDWIN QUISENBERRY, attorney.

WILLIAM ROSENBLATT, Vice-Chairman, The Nation Associates.

PROFESSOR JAMES T. SHOTWELL, President Emeritus, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

DR. ABBA HILLEL SILVER, Rabbi, The Temple, Cleveland, Ohio.

ROBERT ST. JOHN, author and foreign correspondent.

DR. HAROLD TAYLOR, President, Sarah Lawrence College.

CLORE WARNE, attorney.

MEYER W. WEISGAL, Vice-President, Chaim Weizmann Institute of Science.

RICHARD WOOD, Editor, *The Friend*.

WALTER WHITE, Director, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

Democracy's Way Out

[*Continued from page 625*]

ameliorative measures to prevent convulsive symptoms likely to cause death.

Images get boring. In plain non-medical language, Korea proves that when the United States uses its power to prevent revolution where revolution is inevitable, it sets its feet on a road that leads directly toward war. Korea proves that the United Nations will reduce its capacity to stop aggression in the degree to which it permits itself to be used as an instrument of counter-revolution.

Korea proves that the only way this country can help organize a free world possessing enough power to deal on equal terms with Russia—and with Moscow-ruled communism—is to put our own strength behind the forces of change. We must become, and quickly, the new sponsor of revolution, helping the peoples of the world to win all that communism promises or provides—plus liberty.

If we can learn this lesson fast enough we still have a chance to snatch peace out of war and victory out of defeat. For despite Korea, it is most unlikely that Russia and China are set to conquer the rest of Europe and Asia by force of arms. The assumption that they are, now so generally accepted, is a natural product of panic and dismay—but it has little solid evidence behind it. The attack on Korea certainly was *not* designed in advance as a trap for American manpower. On the contrary, there is every indication that no serious resistance was expected, inside or out; South Korea, as the record shows, was expected to fall of its own weakness with no more than an armed "assist" from above the border. Korea, in fact, offers better evidence that Russia and China intend to expand their areas of control, where possible, by exploiting situations ready-made for revolution. The Communist powers would be foolish indeed to invite the vast destruction of atomic war; far better to bide their time and let events, and American policy, prepare the ground for a revolution they can shape and direct.

This prospect is not limited to the underdeveloped areas of Asia. It embraces Europe as well, and eventually will include Latin America. The challenge it presents to this country is a sharp one, for it calls for a drastic overhauling of our foreign policy in the direction of more courageous, aggressive democracy, at a time when the unthinking reactions of people and politicians clamor for the opposite.

We must, if we are to seize a chance which may indeed be the last, rediscover our own democratic beliefs, lost somewhere in the compromises of these years of shifting expediencies. Talk about defending freedom has a hollow ring when we plan to include among its defenders a shoddy leftover like Chiang Kai-shek or the German generals; such cynicism denies us the backing of those who might put some zeal into the job of fighting even for survival. We ditch our professed principles, and along with them goes our security.

The criticisms and positive proposals contained in this issue offer a concrete basis for a policy which might reintegrate our democratic strength. The chance of negotiating a settlement with Russia depends as much upon such political "situations of strength" as upon the frantic effort at mechanical unification and rearmament that has so far borne so little fruit. Let our government turn now to the task of carrying out a Point Four program that is related not only to the magnitude of the need but to the even more necessary attack upon feudal and colonial power; let it risk greatly to build up and stabilize democratic institutions in the newly free areas of Asia; let it reverse its despairing decision to restore German fighting power—at the cost of popular confidence in Western Europe and legitimate panic in the East. By drastic means such as these we can repair the damage our nation has suffered in its own eyes and those of the world and, with renewed hope, begin to apply those positive plans for the peaceful reorganization of the world so ably outlined in this final section.



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To

THE *Nation*

on

Its Eighty-fifth Anniversary

*

The Salute and Greetings

of

A Friend

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS and the ARTS

THE REASONABLE ROAD TO PEACE

BY ALBERT GUERARD

I DID not choose the quartet of books under review*; but I am well satisfied with the selection. All four books are good—lucid, cogent, earnest. Werner Levi writes with the exacting care of a scholar. Grenville Clark is a man of affairs with a fine record of enlightened civic spirit. Edgar Ansel Mowrer is among the few journalists who are able to rise above the sensational and the ephemeral, and who are in truth experts on contemporary history. James P Warburg is *sui generis*: a banker who has remained a poet, a shrewd capable realist with the ardor and the vision of an ancient prophet. There is a wide area of agreement in these four books. There are also sharp differences in emphasis which bring the problem into bolder relief.

All four are pleas for a World Federation, instead of the loose, perpetual diplomatic conference called—ironically—the United Nations. All intone the same chant, which might be taught our children in the grades:

No peace without justice.
No justice without law.
No valid law without consent.
No effective law without enforcement.

All agree that the one great obstacle to sanity and peace is nationalism, which is not synonymous with patriotism or good citizenship but implies an unreasoning, a fanatical belief in absolute national sovereignty. On this crucial point the American mind has been divided from the very first. We are offered the choice between George Washington's ideal: "the Great Republic of Humanity at Large," and Stephen Decatur's: "My country, right or wrong!" The D. A. R., as might be expected, are against George Washington; but many unimpeachable Americans repudiate Decatur.

Grenville Clark performs a unique service: he attempts to make us realize what a third world war would entail. Not an H. G. Wells or Orson Welles nightmarish Utopia: a sober, closely reasoned, convincing anticipation. By and large, America has no inkling of what war actually means. No doubt we have suffered losses; and our men have seen with their own eyes the abysmal sufferings inflicted by war. But these losses were insignificant compared with those suffered, say, by France in the First World War, or by Russia in both. We emerged from the two contests not merely unravaged but enormously richer and more powerful than when we entered them. Apparently, war paid us generously. This does not turn us into a nation of warmongers; but our horror of war is theoretical, not a tragic experience. Herbert Hoover is, I believe, perfectly right when he asserts that Germany and France are not eager to join us in an anti-Russian crusade. Actually we might very well write them off. Most strategists seem to take it for granted that in the next war Germany at any rate, and probably France as well, will be easily overrun. We shall "liberate" them in due course by dropping hydrogen bombs on Paris and the rubble heaps of Berlin. We could allay their misgivings and prove our earnestness by keeping a million men on the Elbe, as well as half a million in Korea and Vietnam: I hardly believe such a policy would win many votes in this country. There is still a comfortable feeling here that foreigners are expendable; and that because our war is fought on their soil, they should pay the price in blood as well as in destruction.

Grenville Clark is true to the pure American tradition: for him, disarmament is the crux. No doubt it is; but it is the fruit of peace, not the road to peace. It is not wicked guns that force themselves into the hands of blameless men: it is angry, selfish, and stupid men who manufacture the guns; it is anger, selfishness, and stupidity that have to be curbed. We could impose disarmament through victory, as we did in the case of Germany, and then disarm ourselves. But at any moment a rearmament race might start again, in which the secretive and the unscrupulous would have a tremendous advantage. Then Grenville Clark wants a Federal World Government strictly limiting its activities to the prevention of war. Such a government would have no appeal and no power. A World Federation must have something constructive to do. The causes of war are not military; military precautions are intended to protect racial, religious, cultural, and, most obviously, economic interests. Grenville Clark considers it dangerously utopian that the World Federation should ever legislate on the free circulation of men and goods—in other terms, on immigration and tariffs. But until this be done there will be a latent warfare between the haves and the have-nots, and in this warfare our sole defense will be our strong arm. It is passing strange that the traditional policy which made America great—"Let them all come!"—and the policy that made England wealthy and powerful, free trade, should now seem fantastic, alien, and subversive. Grenville Clark wants to preserve ethnic and economic frontiers, and yet to destroy exclusive nationalism. But it is those very frontiers that are the essence of nationalism. The realistic approach is to prepare for the peaceful and gradual realization of "One World." Point Four is a step. A resolute liberalization of our own laws is another.

Werner Levi goes to the root of the matter—the totalitarian conception of *culture* imposed upon us by certain an-

**FUNDAMENTALS OF WORLD ORGANIZATION.* By Werner Levi. The University of Minnesota Press. $3.
A PLAN FOR PEACE. By Grenville Clark. Harper and Brothers. $1.
CHALLENGE AND DECISION. By Edgar Ansel Mowrer. McGraw-Hill Book Company. $3.75.
FAITH, PURPOSE, AND POWER. By James P. Warburg. Farrar, Straus and Company. $2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thropologists who translate into scientific terms the romantic German idea of *Volk*. There is an "American way of life," and it is infinitely precious because it is different from any other. Levi quotes Gunnar Myrdal: "There are no homogeneous 'attitudes' behind human behavior, but a mesh of struggling inclinations, interests, ideals, some held consciously and some suppressed for long intervals." Even one individual personality is a compromise. "America" means liberty, that is, the right to dissent. Imposed Americanism is a contradiction in terms, and "un-American" a perfect fallacy. The first step toward sanity, national and international, would be the suppression of the Un-American Activities Committee. Our task is to make America and the world "safe for differences."

The totalitarian cultural fallacy might be softened through cosmopolitan tolerance: let a Frenchman be 100 per cent French, an Italian 100 per cent Italian; all cultures are radically different, all are legitimate, all may be enjoyed, in their special domain, for their very contrasts. Thus Bali or Tepotzlan might command our curiosity and sympathy. But "cultures" turned into the team or party spirit are expansive, jealous, and exclusive. "The gods of the (other) nations are idols." We soon reach the Manichean heresy: between our culture and other cultures—except harmless picturesque survivals—there is the same difference as between light and darkness, Ormuzd and Ahriman, Jehovah and Dagon. The Beast—we have Stalin's number, and it is 666—the Antichrist, must be suppressed. Seven hundred million devils must be chained in the pit. Then, as Edgar Ansel Mowrer promises us, under American leadership we shall enter upon the American millennium.

This Manichean heresy is being imposed upon us, and by methods of terrorism; for to take away a man's chance of earning his living is to threaten him with torture and death. Anybody who tries to keep a judicial mind is branded a fellow-traveler or a crypto-Communist. Nineteen eighty-four is already here: War Is Peace; Freedom Is Slavery; Ignorance Is Strength. War against the Fiend means striving for God's peace; freedom consists in accepting slavishly the opinions imposed by Representative Dies or Thomas; ignorance of what the Russians are attempting to do, distortion of everything they may propose, is the secret of strength. It is hard to imagine a more complete intellectual and moral snafu.

The Manichean heresy leads inevitably to the idea of a league to crush Russia: the secret thought back of Clarence Streit's proposal, the open thought of that pugnacious Quaker, Herbert Hoover, of that suave Southern gentleman, Will Clayton. Let us not blind ourselves to the inevitable consequence: this is the direct, unrelenting preparation for war; therefore it is war. But what enemy are we combating? John Foster Dulles once told us in plain terms: it is not communism *per se*. Communism is the ideal and practice of the early Christians and of the religious orders. The million employees of giant concerns live under a kind of collectivism. General Marshall has lived under communism all his life. It is not totalitarian anti-democracy; for we are eager to support Chiang Kai-shek and Franco. If Hitler could return, we should hail him as an ally, for was he not the earliest and most consistent advocate of the Truman Doctrine? The present conflict is a test of power. "Realistically," we have made power our sole ideal: when there are only two contenders left, they are bound to fight for the crown. Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco gave us the façade of a world organization; the reality was the confirmation of national sovereignty, with the dictatorship of sheer power superimposed. This was the great betrayal of the world's hope. Until we realize exactly where we went wrong, we shall not find the road to peace.

We must therefore abandon any thought of hegemony, supremacy, the American century. We must, for instance, cease to treat the France of Pleven as though it were but an annoying satellite, with constant threats of "cracking down" upon it. We must be ready to discuss on equal terms with friends and foes. Toughness is not firmness: it is only wilful stupidity. When we force Russia and China into "unconditional surrender," we shall not be able to keep them on their knees forever. We shall have to convince them: "eventually, why not now?" The whole policy of sheer "containment," negativism, is wrong: even Mowrer, who gives it his qualified blessing, recognizes its insufficiency. We must be seekers of the path, not retained advocates of an ideology. Especially if that ideology has nothing more inspiring to offer than the profit motive and the party system.

A world constitution, like an international language, would be at the same time an admirable symbol and a most effective instrument of unity and peace, and I have worked hard on behalf of both. But the first step is to be intelligent, liberal, humane, realistic, in the full sense of those terms, instead of stubbornly closing our ears, our minds, our hearts, to every possibility of understanding. As a student of history I firmly believe that from 1917 to 1945 Russia was more sinned against than sinning. We are apt to forget Kolchak, Denikin, Wrangel, Pilsudski, Munich, the interminable delays in opening a second front. Russia has suffered long from a justified frenzy of fear; its present frenzy of power has not allayed but exacerbated that fear. It has to be nursed back from that psychopathic state. The remedy is not to become totalitarian, brutal, unreasoning ourselves; still less to capitulate to Russia in its madness, as Chamberlain capitulated to Hitler. We must have faith in reason, not in ideologies; in reasonableness, not in anger; and above all in generosity, or, in Pauline terms, in charity. But how can this one road to salvation be attempted when our materialistic leaders, supported by not a few ministers of the Gospel, consider "do-gooders" and "starry-eyed" to be terms of unfathomable contempt?

Two Prophets: Wells and Shaw

H. G. WELLS: PROPHET OF OUR DAY. By Antonina Vallentin. Translated by Daphne Woodward. The John Day Company. $4.

MOST young intellectuals of the early twentieth century got their literary educations from either Shaw or Wells. The two doctrines were much more similar than the temperaments or the talents, and the young were very likely to be attracted principally to the one or the other. Yet they were, in either case, led or misled in the same general direction, and a whole surviving generation might appropriately sing, in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from the editorial rooms of the BEACON PRESS, Boston

For the first time...1900-year record of the crime for which every Christian must answer

THE FOOT OF PRIDE: The Pressure of Christendom on the People of Israel for 1900 Years

By MALCOLM HAY • Introduction by Thomas Sugrue.

Boston: Beacon Press At all bookstores, $3.75



"This is a needed volume..."—Library Journal.

You won't want to believe the documented facts in this book. It will hurt you to note the cold-faced implacable inhumanity recorded here with unhurried, calm, objective scholarship. The whole "Christian" world—nations upon whom we traditionally look as honorable and fine—even your own country—will be revealed in a light you may not be able to face. ☙ Says the author, in Chapter 1: "Even in countries where pogroms are unknown, it was the coldness, the indifference of the average man which made the Jewish drama in Europe possible...The way was prepared by a hatred which has a long history. The inoculation of the poison began long ago in the nurseries of Christendom." ☙ Says Thomas Sugrue, author of "Stranger in the Earth" and "Watch for the Morning": "I have just read this book for the third time; and I like it more than ever. It is a splendid book, a great and courageous work....It is not, after all, the degree to which anti-Semitism is expressed which is important; where it exists at all it is engaged in murder—the murder not of Jews, but of Christians. An anti-Semite is a dead Christian; his prejudice has strangled his faith." ☙ Says Pierre Van Paassen: "This book's mild and somewhat mysterious title hides the shocking story of 'the pressure of Christendom on the people of Israel for 1900 years.' It is the abysmal record of Christian anti-Semitism, documented with scholarly precision and frightening objectivity. ☙ It is well that 'The Foot of Pride' has been written by a non-Jew. Its reading ought to dispose us Christians to humility and repentance."

New warm insights into FDR...

THE WIT AND WISDOM OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Edited by Maxwell Meyersohn

Boston: Beacon Press At all bookstores, $2

This newest volume in the popular "Wit and Wisdom" series contains the most expressive words of the man who has left his mark permanently on history. These excerpts from the public papers and addresses of Franklin Delano Roosevelt provide warm insights into the complex nature of the man himself, as well as the country he knew and loved so well. Listen: "Eternal truths will be neither true nor eternal unless they have fresh meaning for every new social situation." ☙ "A national defense program intended to protect our democracy [should] not...make the rich richer and the poor poorer." ☙ "Our Bunker Hill of tomorrow may be a thousand miles from Boston."

Blanshard study averaging 1,000 copies per week

AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER

By PAUL BLANSHARD • Boston: Beacon Press At all bookstores, $3.50

Honored as one of the "50 outstanding books of the year" by the Division of Public Libraries of the American Library Association. "Should be read by both Catholics, Protestants and all other Americans, for it concerns all of us," says the Hartford Courant. "Scholarly and well-documented criticism," says John P. Marquand, Pulitzer Prize author. "Fearless and painstaking handling of this delicate and controversial theme, which most of his fellow-citizens dare not mention above a whisper...Mr. Blanshard's volume should be in the hands of every thoughtful American," says Henry Sloane Coffin, President Emeritus of Union Theological Seminary. "This book is most carefully and completely 'documented.' Therein lies its serious importance," says International Affairs (Royal Institute, London).

Erasmus...shown in true perspective ...as the herald of a united world.

ERASMUS AND OUR STRUGGLE FOR PEACE

With fresh translation of Erasmus' 'Peace Protests.'

By JOSE CHAPIRO

Boston: Beacon Press At all bookstores, $2.50

Never was there a more eloquent voice raised in the cause of world peace than the voice of Erasmus of Rotterdam. Never was an age more desperately in need of such a voice than the present. This book presents the first complete English translation from the original (Peace Protests, 1517) since 1559—and in modern idiom which makes the classic statement utterly contemporary. It has the exact tang of a public pronouncement of this very week. The first half of the book is a lively study of Erasmus himself, and undertakes to correct the impression of this 16th century pacifist as presented to us by traditional biographers. Erasmus was first and foremost a pacifist, not a theologian, Chapiro shows. ☙ Here was a genius who lived centuries in advance of his age. It was more than four hundred years later that men began to talk in the same terms—began trying to put into practice the same ideas and means of achievement which this outstanding thinker articulated in 1517. Peoples and democratic governments are now using the identical arguments Erasmus used. But today, the bold dreams of Erasmus have become the solid ground of our own political thinking. In this book José Chapiro—a scholar of universal erudition who is at home in a dozen languages—presents Erasmus in his true perspective as the herald of a united world—a herald not honored in his own era. ☙ The present study is dedicated to the United Nations—the legitimate heirs and trustees of the dream of world peace propounded by the famous monk, Erasmus of Rotterdam, born nearly 500 years ago.

Schweitzer at his most appealing

THE ANIMAL WORLD OF ALBERT SCHWEITZER

Translated and edited by CHARLES R. JOY

With 22 Full Page Illustrations.

Boston: Beacon Press
At all bookstores, $3

Here is Schweitzer at his most appealing...at his most popular and easiest reading level. If you have a taste for strange adventure, for exciting action and for information about the African forest, here is your feast. ☙ A major section of the book is devoted to "Animals and Ethics." Here Schweitzer traces the development of ethics in India and China and criticizes the lack of a sufficient ethic for the West. Ethics he feels should relate to all of nature, not just to man himself. Finally he discusses his own ethical position, defines what he means by a "boundless ethic" and explains the origin of his phrase "reverence for life." Here is the key to Schweitzer's whole philosophy.

Beacon Press
25 Beacon St. Boston 8, Mass.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RUSSIAN "FRIENDSHIP"? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?

AMERICA FACES RUSSIA

Russian-American Relations from Early Times to Our Day

By THOMAS A. BAILEY
Professor of History,
Stanford University

How has America reacted through history to the land of the Czars and the Communists? You'll find the straightforward answer in this new account of our response to the Slavic character and *modus operandi.*

"Provides excellent background for the study of Soviet-American relations today. There was a need for so lucid and well-documented a survey of Russian-American relations.... Dr. Bailey fills in for Americans some big gaps in the story of the recent past."—Henry C. Wolfe, Saturday Review

•

"Professor Bailey has ample evidence to prove that we have always detested the rulers of Russia, whether they were czars or commissars."—*The New Yorker*

•

"In a popular new study, *America Faces Russia,* Professor Thomas A. Bailey of Stanford University analyzes the strange dualism of Yankee reaction to the Russian enigma from the time of Francis Dana to the present-day fencing of Acheson and Vishinsky in the United Nations."
—*The Boston Herald*

•

"....an interesting and carefully documented history."
—*St. Louis Star-Times*

$4.00

At your bookseller, or

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS
124 Roberts Place, Ithaca, New York

words of the popular ballad of their youth, "You made me what I am today." If Shaw is certain to outlast his rival, it is less because he was more right or more wrong so far as specific moral or social doctrines are concerned than because of the daemonic element so conspicuous in him, so painfully absent in Wells. The one was a great deal more than a teacher; the other, for all the popularity of his fantasies and his satiric novels, less anything else.

Adequately to assess either the one or the other would come pretty close to assessing the aims, the ideals, the thinking, and, one might almost say, the wisdom or folly, of a half-century. The present biography, excellent in its own way, unfortunately makes no effort to do anything of the kind. It tells clearly and interestingly the story of Wells's career from draper's assistant to wealthy and fabulously successful publicist. It sketches the main outlines of his shifting convictions, conveys some idea of his personality and his foibles, indicates at least the more obvious influences of both his struggle with poverty and his contact at an early age with Huxley, the scientist, and Plato, the social planner. But in more ways than one it is almost completely uncritical. Wells's greatness as a man and greatness as a writer, as well as his wisdom—constantly growing if not quite ultimate—is taken adoringly for granted. There is almost no concern with the question of his literary quality as such and almost no attempt to see his intellectual world from any point outside it or in the perspective either of a time or of premises different from his.

There are few men who have laid themselves more open to the gibe that they conducted their education in public. One might almost say that if Shaw believed all modern doctrines simultaneously, Wells believed them all seriatim, moving easily from atheism to a kind of Christianity and then, apparently, out of it again. But of course both men did have a center, and the centers did not quite coincide. Wells never yielded wholly to the vulgar assumption that technological progress necessarily meant greater happiness and well-being, for he had some visions of brave new worlds not too unlike Aldous Huxley's, but he was, nevertheless, much more of a scientist than Shaw, and he stressed more the role that science would play in making for the good life. On the other hand, he was even less a Marxian, for he called Marxism an expression of the "resentful phase" of social evolution. Wells's Utopia was likely to be full of youth manipulating gadgets; Shaw's kingdom of the ancients seems, on the other hand, to be reduced to an almost pastoral simplicity. And of course Wells, who in one phase appeared to come pretty close to identifying the good society with free love, would never have consented to surrender sex to the exclusive use of adolescents—there would certainly have been a Voronov somewhere in the background ministering to the needs of any happy ancients he could have imagined.

But for all of that, the first principles of the two were the same: belief in perfectibility, belief in a thoroughly planned society, and the conviction that democratic methods were at best temporary expedients to be discarded ultimately in favor of some sort of dictatorship of the élite. For that reason both remained to the end at least qualified defenders of the Soviet government, and neither ever explained very clearly how he reconciled personal intransigence with a belief in the necessity of discipline. Indeed, one sometimes wonders if the explanation is as simple as it often is in the case of ardent royalists; wonders, that is to say, whether both Wells and Shaw did not simply take it quietly for granted that he would be among the planners, not among the planned for.

Wells's most famous phrase was certainly "the race between education and catastrophe." Presumably he never repudiated it, but as he grew older he obviously came, like most of his intellectual contemporaries, to fear more and more that the race had been lost. One of the very last of his published writings was a prophecy that the world was coming soon to its end—which prophecy, by the way and as a wit pointed out, was printed with the warning, "copyright reserved in all countries." In his case as in Shaw's, Utopia, which had seemed in youth just around the corner, receded farther and farther into the distance. Both began with the conviction that man needed merely a little readjustment and ended with the conviction that he would have to be remade. Miss Vallen-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tin quotes Wells as having written at the age of seventy-nine: "The human story has already come to an end . . . and Homo Sapiens in his present form is played out. . . . The stars in their courses have turned against him and he has to give place to some other animal better adapted to face the fate that closes in more swiftly upon mankind." That sounds, of course, almost as though it had been plagiarized from "Back to Methuselah." The two great prophets of hope had become prophets of doom.

If there is a fatal flaw in the liberal thought of the twentieth century, the thinking of these two men ought to reveal it. Both had a vision of the future, and both concluded finally that human beings were not capable of living up to it. Yet in the simpler world of the past men got along, if not well, at least well enough not only to survive but to have a history which has its honorable chapters. Is it possible that science and technology are responsible for the universe in which man can no longer survive? Should the tools which give him more power than he can safely use have remained uninvented? Or is it possible, even, that scientific progress was a part of a more inclusive mistake—the mistake of asking too much and expecting too much? Do we get along better when we accept the limitations of ourselves and the universe, when we are satisfied with a tolerable society without asking for a perfect one? Can Samuel Johnson have been right in saying, "The remedy for the ills of life is palliative rather than radical"?

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

America in Chinese Eyes

TWO KINDS OF TIME. By Graham Peck. Houghton Mifflin Company. $4.

PEKING DIARY: A YEAR OF REVOLUTION. By Derk Bodde. Henry Schuman. $3.75.

IN THE light of the election results and the entry of Chinese troops into the Korean war, it is difficult to think of any books of more urgent and compelling interest than these. Both books, but especially Peck's, are burningly sincere and utterly honest. Both point to America's abysmal ignorance of the mind of Asia, to the forces of the Chinese revolution that were gathering

SUBSCRIBE TO

CONGRESS WEEKLY

A REVIEW OF JEWISH INTERESTS

America's foremost journal of Jewish opinion and affairs

REGULAR FEATURES INCLUDE

- Penetrating editorials on current issues
- Informative and authoritative articles on Israel, world affairs, Jewish life in other lands, civil rights, and civil liberties, Jewish culture, etc.
- Reviews of Books, Theatre, Films, Art, Music
- Overseas Reports—from the capitals of the world
- Chronicle of Events—major events of the week in capsule form

STILL AVAILABLE

Copies are still available of the special November 27th issue of Congress Weekly on

Civil Rights in the United States, 1945-1950

A Five-Year Review

a survey of the fight for full equality and against racial and religious discrimination in America with articles by Walter White, Milton R. Konvitz, Robert Weaver, Dan Dodson, Shad Polier, Will Maslow, Saul Carson, Charles Abrams, Jack Wasserman

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION $3 SINGLE COPIES 10¢

CONGRESS WEEKLY
THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS
15 East 84th Street, New York 28, N. Y.

Please enter my subscription to Congress Weekly (one year $3.00)
☐ Remittance enclosed ☐ Bill me

I want to become a member of the American Jewish Congress and to receive Congress Weekly regularly.

Membership dues—$5.00 per year—includes subscription to Congress Weekly)

☐ Remittance enclosed ☐ Bill me

Name_____

Address_____

(This space has been contributed by friends and well-wishers of TheNation in the American Jewish Congress)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Recent Releases . . .
. . . for doctors
. . . and patients

HENRY R. VIETS, M.D. and others
NEUROLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY IN GENERAL PRACTICE $3.50

D. EWEN CAMERON, M.D.
GENERAL PSYCHOTHERAPY
Dynamics and Procedures $5.00

KARL A. MENNINGER, M.D., and GEORGE DEVEREUX, Ph.D.
A GUIDE TO PSYCHIATRIC BOOKS
With a Suggested Basic Reading List $3.50

PAUL H. HOCH, M.D., and J. ZUBIN, Ph.D. (Editors)
ANXIETY $4.50

WERNER WOLFF, Ph.D.
VALUES AND PERSONALITY
An Existential Psychology of Crisis. $4.75

WENDELL JOHNSON, Ph.D. (Editor)
SPEECH PROBLEMS OF CHILDREN
A Guide to Care and Correction. $3.75

MARGARET NAUMBURG
SCHIZOPHRENIC ART: Its Meaning in Psychotherapy $10.00

NOAH D. FABRICANT, M.D.
AMUSING QUOTATIONS FOR DOCTORS AND PATIENTS $3.00

E. VEILLON, M.D.
MEDICAL DICTIONARY
English-French-German
French-German-English
German-English-French $18.75

GRUNE & STRATTON, INC.
381 FOURTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 16, N. Y.

long before Moscow was in a position to manipulate them, and to the slow but now explosive accumulation of anti-American feeling in China.

Peck went to China for two years in 1935, and was there again continuously from 1940 to 1946, first on his own and then as an employee of the OWI. Bodde went to Peking on a Fulbright fellowship in August, 1948, and stayed on when the city fell to the Communists in January, 1949. Scholarly, reflective, versed in Chinese philosophy and fluent in the language, Bodde has adhered strictly to the diary form. Peck apparently is less fluent in Chinese, but he moved about a great deal among the peasants—the true Chinese—and made use of his gift of easy friendship. His book is more often descriptive and expository than narrative; it would have been even better than it is if he had let his experiences speak for themselves. He is an artist—his interesting if excessively literal line drawings are scattered profusely through the book—who is concerned with the appearance of things; his quick human sympathy, which enables him often to think like a Chinese, gives his book depth. He supplies the evidence without which Bodde's book would be merely a polemic; but it is Bodde who is able to make the broadest generalizations.

Writing before the election, Peck predicts that the kind of Republican victories we have seen will result in the complete communizing of China within a few years. The way the electorate has been hoodwinked by the Republicans is one of the great jests of history. For the policy they advocate is the policy we have followed for all but a brief period from 1944 to 1946—the policy of supporting "the corrupt, anti-modern, and unpopular" Kuomintang. Peck's whole book goes to prove, in the concrete terms of his personal experiences, that this policy hastened the destruction of non-Communist China. This is not the fault of the Chennaults, Kohlbergs, and Knowlands alone, for our entire national character "makes it difficult for us to adjust to a revolutionary situation in another country." Our State Department has been handicapped by public ignorance concerning the decay of the feudal order in China over the last fifty years and the disintegration of the rural economy to the point that it is "visiting unspeakable hardships on increasing numbers of peasants." The Kuomintang, as Peck reveals in the most scarifying detail, is the party of tradition, the party of the landlords and bureaucrats. The peasants are anti-Kuomintang out of sheer animal necessity. Our support of the Kuomintang merely drives them into the arms of the Communists. Our pro-Kuomintang policy has failed, utterly and irrevocably.

As for anti-Americanism, which shocked so many when it took the form of intervention in Korea, Peck traces its growth step by step, from its beginnings, when "a few long-dead Americans placed our country among the Western powers destroying the balance of China's traditional society." He points an accusing finger at hypocritical missionaries, at arrogant business men, at G. I.'s strutting on Chungking street corners, at generals who found it pleasant to be friendly with Kuomintang officials or "well-heeled types who spoke English and were socially attractive by American standards." To the Chinese people the evidences of our offenses were overwhelming even before they saw American planes flown by American-trained pilots dropping American-made bombs on their cities. And here is the significance of Peck's title: our time flows toward the future. We argue that the future containment of communism is the paramount issue. To the Chinese, time is a river bearing gifts from the past; they remember that the American gifts have been hateful.

The Kremlin's grand strategy is surely the proximate cause of China's intervention in Korea, but Chinese anti-American feeling is one of the ultimate reasons why the Kremlin is now able to dictate Mao's policy.

I follow Peck to this point, but I cannot believe that the remedy he would have liked to administer in 1945 would have worked. He believes we should have taken the Chinese problem to the U. N., not in the hope that the results would have been altered but only because China would not then have had a special grudge against America. He underestimates the Chinese. Such a course would only have produced another, bloodier Korea. And here Peck forgets the principle he maintains elsewhere of Chinese solutions for Chinese

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

problems. That is the one course that might have prevented Chinese from firing upon our troops in Korea today.

Peck's greatest weakness is that he does not understand Oriental philosophy, despite his respect for Oriental values. His fine pictorial sense does not penetrate to that inner yearning for harmony and decorum which is central to the Chinese spirit. I don't believe he understands the Confucian ideal of a static society which even today is orthodox in China. For such insights we must turn to "Peking Diary." It is a less eventful book than Peck's, for Bodde led the rather sequestered life of a student in a walled-off villa. His chief contacts with Chinese came through shopping trips in a time of booming inflation, and through conversations with Chinese professors who were more concerned with the disastrous drop in the real value of their salaries than with anything else. Bodde's massive evidence on inflation shows that although the Communists did not halt it, they slowed it to about half its rate under the Kuomintang. Bodde denounces some of the more superficial stupidities of the Communists, such as the isolation of foreign newspapermen, and reports some ugly rumors about the secret police. But the initial acts of the Communists were so mild, and the people were so generally glad to be rid of the Kuomintang, that neither he nor Peck saw much of the harsher side of the police state. The Chinese Communists are certainly not merely agrarian reformers now, and Bodde clearly designates them as doctrinaire Marxists, but if we had allied ourselves with the tide of change in China before the Russians did, who is to say they would not have been? To the contrary, we have, "by our concrete policy in China, done as much as anyone else to discredit . . . those abstract democratic principles which we would like to see function there."

The ultimate lesson of these two books is that our China policy must consider the Chinese rather than our own short-term advantage. "The thing that really counts in China is what happens to the Chinese," as Bodde says. Our foreign policies are often stated in terms of American democratic principles, which only obscures for most of us the manner in which they offend against

Give these books this Christmas

Boswell's LONDON JOURNAL 1762-1763

EDITED, WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES, BY

FREDERICK A. POTTLE

Sterling Professor of English, Yale University

***Preface by* Christopher Morley**



"All the vigor, the crudity, the selfishness, the romance are here, caught forever by the genius of the young Scot, who ran up and down the town 'just like a wild colt.' Modern readers may well be forgiven if they cannot lay down his vivid account until the last page, for this is a journal destined to be one of the classics of its kind."
—JAMES L. CLIFFORD,
N. Y. Times Book Review

"Here by any reckoning is THE book of the year." —VAN ALLEN BRADLEY,
Chicago Daily News

END PAPER MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS
$5.00

Challenge and Decision

By Edgar Ansel MOWRER

A Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter and author of *Nightmare of American Foreign Policy* indicates simply and clearly how the free nations can, under U. S. leadership and U. N. control, achieve world peace and security. "No American interested in survival should fail to read this book." —STERLING NORTH
$3.75

World in Crisis

By J. Salwyn Schapiro

This vivid, informative history of the social, political, and economic aspects of the world today, traced from the world of the 19th century shows the trends leading to the present international situation and offers us a clearer understanding of the problems we face and the goals we seek. By the author of *Liberalism and the Challenge of Fascism.* $5.00

At all bookstores

McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, Inc. N. Y. 18

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The only workable alternative to war

AMERICA must stop playing Santa Claus! You can't *buy* peace with dollars, you have to *work* for it.

In the most hopeful—and helpful—statement so far written on the underlying causes of the world's developing catastrophe, Stringfellow Barr, president of the Foundation for World Government, shows precisely why America's well-meaning "Point Four" program has been naive and ineffective.

Let's Join the Human Race is a hard-hitting and courageous pamphlet, which presents the only workable alternative to war in the modern world.

LET'S JOIN THE HUMAN RACE

By STRINGFELLOW BARR

Twenty-five cents a copy

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, 5750 Ellis Avenue, Chicago 37, Illinois

THE VOICE OF THE NEW WEST

frontier

a monthly magazine of progressive principles in The Nation tradition

read it for the *background* story of the news and important developments in the *dynamic* western states.

AMONG OUR CONTRIBUTORS: CAREY McWILLIAMS
MORRIS GARNSEY • RICHARD NEUBERGER
LOUIS BEAN • BENTON STONG • MAURICE TOBIN
GIFFORD PHILLIPS, PUBLISHER

Subscribe *now* at special rate of
$1 FOR SIX ISSUES
or send for free sample copy.

Name_____

Address_____

☐ Enter my subscription for 6 months. Enclosed $1.00 ☐ Send me free sample copy.

Send to frontier, 211 S. Beverly Drive, Beverly Hills, Calif.

democracy by imposing American judgments on other people. In China our policy has been without principle in Chinese eyes. We have given first consideration to our own convenience in the global wars, hot and cold; we have given a poor but kindly second consideration to what *we* thought would be good for the Chinese. What the Chinese think to be good for themselves is never mentioned. A truly democratic foreign policy ought to have two principles inviolable even in emergencies: the right of people to go to hell their own way; and resistance to aggression at any time, in any place. The second principle we are learning the hard way; but as for the first, it is an unhappy characteristic of Americans, regardless of party or politics, that they believe they know better than foreigners. This is a special kind of naivete stemming from the assumption that material productivity is the sole criterion of civilization. Even our most decent liberals appear arrogant when they attempt to impose American judgments on alien cultures. Arrogance, in Chinese eyes, is the hallmark of foreign devils, and because of this identification, the Communist charges of imperialism, so fantastic to us, ring true to most Chinese. I don't mean that arrogance is an American monopoly. If the Chinese undertook missions in America, they, because of their long history of disdain for alien values, would appear even more arrogant than we. But they don't undertake missions, and we do.

Bad as our situation is in China, we could electrify the entire Orient by boldly, even at this late date, espousing in our China policy Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles—Independence, Democracy, and Improvement of the People's Livelihood. This espousal would have to be by deed rather than by word, for the Chinese mistrust us as much as we mistrust the Russians. It would entail enormous short-term sacrifices, such as the denunciation of all colonialism in Asia, regardless of the consequences in Europe. And we would have to stand firmly for Chinese solutions to Chinese problems, under whatever party label. This is one bid to the Chinese the Russians dare not match. The risks would be great, but the rewards would be incalculably greater.

HAROLD STRAUSS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Churchill: Volume IV

THE HINGE OF FATE. By Winston S. Churchill. Houghton Mifflin Company. $6.

THIS fourth volume of "The Second World War" proves to be more communicative than the third, partly because of the inherent dramatic contrast between such defeats as Singapore, Tobruk, or the Arctic convoys and such victories as Midway, Alamein, or Stalingrad, but principally because during 1942 the war ceased to be "Mr. Churchill's war" and the British Commonwealth found its efforts becoming interlocked with energies greater than its own. While it cannot be said that the wars in Russia and in the Pacific receive the same proportion of attention as the wars in North Africa and in the North Atlantic, the records of Churchill's two visits to Washington, of his courageous confronting of the Russians in Moscow ("a somewhat raw job"), and of the continuous Anglo-American cooperation and understanding give the events of the year a coherence that was missing from the account of 1941.

The complete volume exposes the misleading effects of the abridged versions in periodicals. For instance, the terrifying success of the U-boats along the American coasts and in the North Atlantic and Arctic during 1942 constituted so vital a problem of such long duration and rapidly changing character that its handling demands ample space. Similarly, the management of the efforts of a multiple alliance, even when boiled down to the agreements among two or three leaders, is a process that cannot either be explained briefly or be taken for granted if we are to benefit by its trial and error in the future. It may seem dull, petty, even personal stuff to many when Churchill gives considerable space to the problem of the executive within Britain, as well as to the passage (probably in July, 1942) of executive predominance from London to Washington, but it is a safe bet that his record is going to be studied seriously for some time to come as we are faced by similar problems. An excellent instance on a small scale is his discussion (pp. 554-560) of the relationship between advisory and executive functions. His lengthy account of the Darlan affair is a larger instance. He has a sense of obligation to the future that transcends mere concern with his own and his country's reputations.

Even a catalogue of his revelations is too long for reproduction here. They range from the failures of Ritchie, Klopper, and Auchinleck in North Africa to Katyn, Unconditional Surrender, "H_2S" (ultra-short-wave radar), Belgian prowess in espionage, and Russian tank production (2,000 a month in August, 1942). Strategy and tactics are illuminated, and both the central importance of artillery and the change in tank tactics from breaking through for the infantry to having the gunners and the infantry make the opening for the tanks emerge clearly, as does the essential role of air power in naval and land-sea warfare. Mr. Churchill puts his finger on, but cannot solve, the greatest mystery of the American effort, namely, where its many leaders and vast staffs came from. He seasons his discourse by impish comments and by such odd boyish delights as his discovery—and adoption at home—of the water-taps in the extravagant state residence at Moscow which blended hot and cold streams in one. He and Stalin, however, behaved like young gang leaders in making Molotov the butt of their swagger.

It becomes more apparent than ever that Churchill operated in a vision or dream of empire and of Anglo-Saxondom under British guidance. He was disconcerted by the movement of Australia and New Zealand toward the United States and by the creation of the Pacific War Councils in February, but after the rending strains of late winter and spring, Australasia won back his comradeship by its subsequent prowess in North Africa. Smuts was a great compensation for any disappointment over South Africa. Eire, of course, earned his complete disregard, and India provoked a kind of incredulous appeal to his readers' sense of justice and equity. Thanks largely to his great trust in Roosevelt, Hopkins, Eisenhower, and (belatedly) Marshall, and to the seniority in war that the Commonwealth

● PACIFIC AFFAIRS

an international review of the far east and pacific area

INVALUABLE for libraries, teachers and all students of Far Eastern affairs.

$4.00 annual subscription

SUBSCRIBERS are offered special reduced prices on a great variety of IPR books and pamphlets. Please write for details and a specimen copy of PACIFIC AFFAIRS.

Published quarterly by the

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

1 EAST 54th STREET NEW YORK CITY

HOW TO BE WELL-INFORMED ON BRITISH AFFAIRS

You can't understand the world today without knowing what Britain is doing, thinking and planning. To know what's really happening in England, read the world-famous *Manchester Guardian*. Mail the coupon for a 4-week trial subscription, at our risk.

If you like frank speaking and honest thinking on British and world affairs—even when it's the unpopular view—you will like the *Guardian*, "English liberalism's bravest voice." (*Time Mag.*) This free-examination offer brings you the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, airmail edition, which summarizes the news and carries the week's outstanding editorials and articles. Features include foreign correspondence by Alistair Cooke in the United States, and others, financial news, book reviews, literary articles, etc.

MONEY-BACK GUARANTEE! To accept our Free Examination Offer, mail the coupon with your payment today. If not delighted after reading four issues, write us and we'll return your money in full.

SPECIAL XMAS OFFER: TWO 1-YEAR SUBSCRIPTIONS, $12

FREE Examination OFFER!

THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, 53 East 51 St., New York 22

Send me the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, as checked below. My payment is enclosed. If not satisfied after seeing four issues, I may get a full refund on request, and the trial will have cost me nothing.

☐ 1 year $6.50 ☐ 20-week trial, $2

Name_____

Address_____

City_____ Zone____ State____ N 3

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Study of Power

WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY by Harold D. Lasswell

POLITICAL POWER by Charles E. Merriam

POWER AND CONSCIENCE by T. V. Smith

Three classics of American social science complete and unabridged in one volume for the convenience of the reader interested in obtaining a systematic account of power and politics. 1048 pages.

$6.00

Reflections on Violence

by Georges Sorel

Including material never before translated from the revised French edition as well as an illuminating study on Sorel by Professor Edward A. Shils of The University of Chicago. **$3.50**

at better bookstores or from

The Free Press/Glencoe, Illinois

MUST PAMPHLETS FOR
Nation Readers

Freedom and the Welfare State.
By Oscar Ewing, George Meany, Herbert H. Lehman, Walter P. Reuther & others, 25¢

British Labor in Government and Opposition. By Harry L. Laidler. 25¢

Forward March of American Labor.
By Theresa Wolfson and Joseph Glazer. 15¢

Education and the Social Order.
By John Dewey. 15¢

LEAGUE FOR INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
112 East 19th Street New York 3, N. Y.

BOOKS and PERIODICALS From the USSR

Contemporary literature and classics in Russian, English, Lithuanian, Latvian, Esthonian and Ukrainian. Works in all branches of science, industry and art, in Russian.

LATEST SOVIET RECORDS, SHEET MUSIC AND ARTISTIC HANDICRAFTS

1951 SUBSCRIPTIONS OPEN FOR SOVIET NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES

Ask for Complete Catalogue P-50

Just Received!

MAXIM GORKY

Contains: IN AMERICA
MY INTERVIEWS • PUBLIC WRITINGS
In English — 408 pp. — $1.25

FOUR CONTINENT BOOK CORP.
55 West 56 St., New York 19. MU 8-2560

Looking for a Publisher?

Our basic policy is to encourage new authors. If you are looking for a publisher of your book, learn how we can help you. Send us your manuscript or write today for Free Booklet 101.

VANTAGE PRESS, Inc., 230 W. 41 St., N. Y. 18

still enjoyed, he showed few signs of distress over the gradual passage of the power of decision to the United States. In many ways Canada was the main disquieter of his dream, having checked his designs as far back as 1912-13 over contributions to the British navy and in 1921 by shelving the Anglo-Japanese alliance. In response, he ignored Canada in the destroyers-bases deal, although Canada was actively defending Newfoundland and had just set up a Permanent Joint Defense Board with the United States for "the north half of the Western Hemisphere." Perhaps more significantly, his narrative has managed to avoid proper attention to crucial Canadian production, to the Canadian naval enterprises that were so valuable from the Caribbean to Iceland, and to the large Canadian proportion of the Royal Air Force, by submerging them in "we," "us," and "our." Since the contrasts between the dream and the reality grew after 1942, it will be interesting to see how he accommodates them.

J. B. BREBNER

The Individual and the State

NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM. By Harold D. Lasswell. A Research Study of the Committee for Economic Development. McGraw-Hill Book Company. $3.50.

PROFESSOR LASSWELL'S title poses the most challenging issue of our time. It is a fact, made increasingly apparent since his book was written—by passage of the McCarran act, for example, and by the triumphs of McCarthyism at the polls—that individual freedom is being jettisoned in the name of national security as though it were burdensome cargo on a foundering ship of state. For all the apostrophes and declamations in its behalf, there is now a widespread tendency to view liberty as a luxury—and a dangerous luxury at that. We are acting out a tragic paradox: in order to make the government of the United States more secure, we are sacrificing the inalienable individual rights to secure which, as the founders of the Republic saw it, governments are instituted among men. The paradox is made more absurd, though no less tragic, by the fact that these rights have been, until now, the real source of American strength.

Professor Lasswell recognizes that national security and individual freedom need to be kept in equilibrium, that changing circumstances may change the nature of the balance between them. Restraints of many kinds—conscription, man-power and materials allocation, limitations on private initiative, counter-espionage and counter-sabotage precautions—may have to be accepted in order to protect the country from external threats. But "overzealousness in the cause of national defense," he observes, "weakens rather than strengthens total security." This is particularly true when overzealousness brings about encroachments upon the freedoms of inquiry, expression, and association guaranteed by the First Amendment. For these freedoms are indispensable to operation of the democratic process. Out of them grow the challenges to orthodoxy, the remedies for official error, the clash of opinion and the resolution of conflict necessary to genuine national unity, which have always been America's most formidable armament.

> Plainly [says Professor Lasswell] the national security of America demands all the sacrifices necessary to preserve American independence. This calls for the development of an American garrison to be defended against aggression. If the crisis continues for years, as seems probable, and rises to even higher levels of intensity, as seems likely, effective freedom of choice will be restricted by the necessities of defense. One urgent problem, which is the problem with which this book is particularly concerned, is how to keep these sacrifices of freedom at the lowest point consistent with national security, since an unnecessary loss of freedom is an unnecessary blow to security. Our aim is to prevent successful aggression by a totalitarian dictatorship without becoming transformed in the process into a garrison prison.

Those who may be led by the title of his book, or by an occasional exhilarating passage of the sort just quoted, to expect from it a critical appraisal of the extent to which security has already been impaired by unnecessary loss of freedom will be keenly disappointed. There is a mildly hair-raising chapter on what might happen in a "garrison-police state"—if the soldiers and the police, "the specialists on violence," become the dominant group. But there are no more

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than oblique and parenthetical references to the wholesale loyalty investigations, the prevalence of vigilantism, the spread of police surveillance, the wiretapping, the proliferation of test oaths, and the whole array of extra-legal punishments for heterodoxy which have already become familiar. Since continuing crisis has, as Dr. Lasswell points out, an insidious tendency to induce new conceptions of normality, such invasions of traditional rights can easily become commonplaces.

The bulk of Dr. Lasswell's book is concerned much more with procedures than with the substance of the problem. He has a great deal to say about how to preserve essential liberties but very little to say about what liberties ought to be preserved. Among the interesting suggestions he presents are these: that the President add a civilian member to the National Security Council, with special responsibility for weighing limitations on freedom in respect of their utility for security; that Congress establish a special joint committee on freedom and security to integrate varied aspects of the problem and see them whole; that Congressional committees safeguard individual freedom by providing a model of fair play in their hearings; that a civilian Commission on National Security and Individual Freedom be set up jointly by the President and the Congress; that the press be alert to warn of authoritarian trends; that voluntary associations create special committees to study the relation of security to freedom; that prophylactic measures be taken by community leaders to prevent the spread of hate-filled rumors and hysteria.

This is a meticulously objective book. But its objectivity, its detachment, its studied avoidance of the specific illustrations to be found so abundantly in the present and the recent past rob it of vitality. It makes no attempt to sound a tocsin. It conveys to its readers no sense that they are already suffering profoundly from the malady it seeks to cure. The very procedures recommended by Dr. Lasswell depend upon the preservation of free institutions now gravely imperiled. Before therapy can begin, the country needs to be awakened to the unreasoning fear in which it is now gripped. That fear may end by destroying national security and individual freedom alike.

ALAN BARTH

The Uses and Costs of Atomic Power

THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF ATOMIC POWER. By Sam H. Schurr and Jacob Marschak. Published for the Cowles Commission for Research in Economics by the Princeton University Press. $6.

THE imperative need for studying the manifold problems which might beset mankind in an Atomic Age was keenly appreciated by social scientists soon after the Hiroshima bomb. The Social Science Research Council established a Committee on the Social and Economic Aspects of Atomic Energy which initiated, among other projects, this comprehensive exploratory study designed to evaluate the possible impact of atomic power upon industries and nations.

One of the major question early confronted was: Will atomic power revolutionize our economy? With respect to existing production processes, the answer coming out of the analysis and profuse data of this book is an emphatic no. Whatever the industry examined—aluminum, iron and steel, flat glass, cement, brick, or railroad—at most only modest reductions in production costs and moderate shifts in location are envisaged, supposing atomic power cost to fall to a minimum level. It is in fostering the emergence of new industries, an area of inquiry beyond the scope of this study, and to a lesser degree in encouraging the adoption of new production processes by existing industries that atomic power may most radically impinge upon industrial structures.

The Cowles Commission researchers have dug into possible new techniques, such as producing sponge iron by reducing iron ore with hydrogen from the electrolysis of water, manufacturing cement using direct heat from a nuclear reactor, using nuclear reactors for central residential heating systems. Of these, only the first seems to imply any major change. As a result of sponge iron production, "integrated operations on a considerably smaller scale than we have today may be the dominant characteristic of future steel industry operations." But this conclusion must be heavily discounted since it rests on a set of highly unlikely postulates: one, that atomic power costs for this operation

PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY PUBLICATIONS

RUSSIAN IMPACT ON ART
By Mikhail Alpatov. Ed. and with a Preface by Martin L. Wolf. Trans. by Ivy Litvinov.
Covering the development of Russian painting, sculpture, architecture, literature and music, and its relation to that of the world from ancient to modern times, this volume is the result of long research by an acknowledged authority in the field. Its lively and graphic style makes it accessible to the general reader as well as to the specialist.
Illustrated. $7.50

SOVIET EDUCATION
By Maurice Shore, Ph.D.
"The interdependence of Soviet education and its economic base, and thus politics, should be studied and its process understood. Therein lies, significantly, the key to the solution of many intricacies; and, therefrom, a stronger hope for an increased understanding between the West and the Soviet."—*The Bulletin, National Association of Secondary-School Principals.* *$4.75*

EUROPEAN IDEOLOGIES
Edited by Feliks Gross
"A useful text for the comparative study of European social movements. Meets very satisfactorily the need for prime source materials."—*American Journal of Economics and Sociology.* *$12.00*

HUMANISM AS A PHILOSOPHY *By Corliss Lamont*
The Humanist idea, in philosophy, religion and literature from ancient times up to the present. *Prof. Herbert W. Schneider in The Survey, says:* "Corliss Lamont has achieved a difficult and useful task; he has outlined a philosophy of life in simple and honest terms." *$3.75*

PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY, *Publishers*
15 East 40th St., Dept. N New York 16, N. Y.
Expedite shipment by prepayment

TO BREAK THE MONOTONY OF AGE AND BOREDOM IN A GLOOMY HOUR READ A COPY OF THE YOUTHFUL **LITERARY AMATEUR**, the critical magazine of unknown writers.

Among other thrilling stories, poems and articles coming in January read "Breadline Baby of Amateurs' Row," written by a man who has kept a small magazine going for a dozen years on bread and water. Here you will step in on the American Small Press, see how it lives, know its joys and sorrows, learn the drama of its struggle in a piece so feelingly wrought of sharp wit and lingering beauty that you will not soon forget.

A twenty-five-cent coin will do

LITERARY AMATEUR
MORRISTOWN, INDIANA

U. S. AND RUSSIA IN FAMOUS "PAPER COVERS"

Rice: RUSSIAN ART (with 32 plates)	.65
Commager: AMERICA IN PERSPECTIVE	.35
Ashby: SCIENTIST IN RUSSIA	.35
Leckhart: MEMOIRS OF A BRITISH AGENT	.35
Dostoyevsky: THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV	.65
Pares: RUSSIA	.35
Eleanor Roosevelt: THIS IS MY STORY	.25
Rice: RUSSIAN ICONS (illus. in color)	.75
Tolstoy: ANNA KARENINA	.65
Sherwood: ROOSEVELT AND HOPKINS (Complete in two volumes)	.70
Shub: LENIN (Abridged)	.35
Turgenev: ON THE EVE	.35

We pay postage. Minimum order $1.00
Ask for our FREE list of hundreds of worthwhile titles
BOOK MAIL SERVICE, Dept. 20
West Hempstead, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A vital tool for libraries scholars • editors • analysts writers • educators

THE CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS

published weekly by

The Joint Committee on Slavic Studies appointed by the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council

IN 70,000 words a week, the Current Digest brings you an English translation of Soviet newspapers and periodicals. It covers the entire contents of Pravda and Izvestia—major articles in full translation, lesser ones condensed, the remainder summarized or noted by headline and bibliographical reference.

In addition, it prints material from 40 other publications, ranging from Voprosy filosofii to the children's papers. Its value as a reference work is enhanced by comprehensive quarterly indexes, listing not only Current Digest translations but also those of other periodicals containing Soviet materials in English.

HOW YOU SUBSCRIBE

Institutions such as libraries, publications, government agencies and universities pay $50 for their subscriptions and contribute $100 to the operating fund, i.e., a total of $150 a year. Once an initial subscription has been entered, additional concurrent subscriptions may be entered by the same institution, or by anyone directly associated with this institution, at $25 a year. Single copies are $3 each.

THE CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS
413 West 117th Street, New York 27, N. Y.

Gentlemen:

Please send your brochure free of charge ☐.
Please send a sample copy of the Current Digest, for which I enclose $3 ☐.

Name_____

Address_____

_____

_____N

will fall to less than a third of a cent per kilowatt hour; two, that the hydrogen process will actually work on a commercial basis; and three, that success will crown efforts to realize continuous casting of larger steel items, a dream of ironmasters ever since the days of Bessemer.

Another basic question facing social scientists has been what will be the impact of atomic power upon the different regions and nations of the world. An answer is especially needed if an effective program for international atomic control is to be established. Here, however, the Cowles Commission study, even though it is exploratory, leaves much to be desired because of the use of certain questionable procedures.

One is the setting up of specific cost estimates for atomic power. As far as the reviewer is aware, there is no substance to any of the cost estimates made in the heyday of speculation during late 1945 and 1946 when it was fashionable for engineers to display dope sheets. Among others, the problem of controlling the deterioration of materials in the reactors was seriously underestimated. None the less, Messrs. Schurr and Marschak do attribute some significance to these early estimates and set up a range of costs for a 75,000-kilowatt nuclear power plant operating at 50 per cent capacity, the minimum or lowest conceivable cost being around 0.4 cents per kilowatt hour, the maximum around 1 cent. Frequently, by conducting their analysis in terms of the extremely optimistic figure of 0.4 cents, occasionally referred to as "realizable," the authors mislead the unwary reader. The analysis could have been simplified and the reading made less cumbersome had they answered directly really relevant questions: to what level must atomic power cost fall for the sponge iron process to be adopted? or, for the production cost of chlorine and caustic soda to decline by 5 per cent? and so forth. No results would have been sacrificed, and unnecessary confusion and assumptions could have been avoided.

One may question, too, the postulate that nuclear power costs for stations of 75,000-kilowatt capacity or more will be fairly uniform throughout the world and will thus tend to erase the important differences among nations in the cost of generating power. The rationale for this lies in these facts: (a) transport cost on coal has been in large part responsible for these differences; (b) since one ton of nuclear fuel is potentially equivalent to 2,500,000 tons of coal, transport cost on nuclear fuel to produce a unit of power will be negligible. The bogy of high transport costs on fuel will have been driven out.

Unfortunately for most underdeveloped countries, perhaps a still more haunting bogy enters through the back door. Considerably larger quantities of capital will be required for nuclear power than for conventional steam stations. Underdeveloped countries typically are short on capital and must pay substantially higher interest rates for investment capital than already industrialized countries which at the same time are favored with excellent endowments of conventional fuels. The higher cost of capital to underdeveloped areas may very well nullify their gains from decimated transport cost on fuel. The Cowles researchers give only passing attention to this critical factor.

If one sympathizes with Norbert Wiener's views expressed last spring at the Nation Associates conference on the "Atomic Era"—namely, that atomic power is "big business," that it must be produced in huge blocs to be economical, then the hopes of many underdeveloped countries must be dimmed. For this means that nuclear power development would be feasible only in regions where enormous demand for power will come to exist and where large quantities of capital will be available for investment not only in the nuclear station itself but also in the host of ancillary industries required for large-scale nuclear development. These factors may conceivably mean that the direct gains from nuclear power will accrue to just the major industrialized nations of the world. Underdeveloped countries may benefit only indirectly, by obtaining through trade more goods in exchange for those they export.

The Cowles Commission study is a very welcome one, indeed. But in substantially neglecting the above arguments, in tending to minimize the problems which plague underdeveloped areas, thus presenting just the optimistic viewpoint, in short in failing to achieve a well-balanced approach, it does not fill the void as an exploratory study

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

should. To guide those struggling toward international control of atomic energy, a well-rounded treatment of the economics of atomic energy is required; or now at least one that would neutralize the effect of the Cowles Commission study by elaborating the other side of the story. WALTER ISARD

Tory History

BRITISH POLITICS SINCE 1900. By D. C. Somervell. Oxford University Press. $3.75.

THE subject of this book is a lively one, for there has been no lack of drama in British political life during the past half-century, and the author has treated it in a suitably lively fashion. Retired schoolmaster, historian, and digester of Toynbee, Mr. Somervell commands an easy if rather donnish narrative style and shows a considerable gift for candid portraiture.

But although I enjoyed reading this book, it seems to me to be vitiated as serious history by two major defects. In the first place, the author has deliberately limited himself to party politics, to "the rising and falling of governments and the ups and downs of party political opinion . . . using only such parts of general history as were necessary for the elucidation of my theme." The isolation of party politics in this fashion tends to exaggerate their sporting aspects and so gives quotable ammunition to the totalitarian critics who sneer at "the Parliamentary game."

Sticking to his self-imposed restrictions, Mr. Somervell, it seems to me, pays far too little attention to the economic forces that have been shaping British politics these last fifty years. Dealing with the pre-1914 era, he writes of the rise of the Labor Party, the Lloyd George "people's budget," and the syndicalist movement but tells us little or nothing about the vagaries of the trade cycle, the inflation of prices, the decline in real wages, and the combination of economic pressures that forced an unexampled export of capital and man-power during that period.

Again, in writing of the twenties, while he cannot avoid altogether the subject of deflation, Mr. Somervell does little to explain the connection between the restoration of the gold standard in 1925 and the general strike of 1926.

NO FRIEND OF LABOR

EXPOSE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF CATHOLIC TRADE UNIONISTS

In church-ridden Catholic countries (Spain, Portugual, Italy, etc.) poverty is and always has been most widespread, standards of living lowest, illiteracy and illegitimacy highest.

In countries where its control has been undisputed, the Catholic Church has made no move towards improving the lot of the underprivileged. These realities stand in glaring contrast to the Catholic Church's lip-service, to the cause of the poor.



For the real uncensored background of labor's tragedy, read

"NO FRIEND OF LABOR"

by JAMES MORTON FREEMAN

32 pages of startling and fully documented facts.

Only 35¢ per copy

3 copies for $1 • 10 copies for $3

Other Pamphlets Still Available

VATICAN POLICY IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR
The classic work by L. H. Lehmann ..... 25¢
HOW THE POPES TREATED THE JEWS ..... 15¢
CLERICAL FASCISM IN ITALY ..... 15¢
BISHOP STROSSMAYER'S SPEECH IN THE VATICAN COUNCIL OF 1870 (against Papal Infallibility) ..... 10¢

Order from DEPT. N 12

THE FULFILLMENT PRESS • 350 WEST 26th STREET • NEW YORK 1, N. Y.

Many Happy Returns to a

COURAGEOUS CRUSADER

from

The Survey

THE MAGAZINE OF SOCIAL EXPLORATION

Coming in January Issue: **A first-hand report of the Mid-century White House Conference on Children and Youth—A Special Section.**

See . . . December Issue: **Everybody's Business—The Young of the Nation, by Kathryn Close.**

Introductory Rate to New Subscribers Three Dollars a Year

Survey Associates, Inc.

112 EAST 19 STREET NEW YORK 3, N. Y.

THE ROAD AHEAD

A PRIMER OF CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM
By Dr. Harry W. Laidler

has been included in the **DEBATE HANDBOOKS** as one of the reference books to be used in the high school debates this year on the subject of the **WELFARE STATE.**

If this book were made required reading for every boy and girl in the U. S., it would make the building of the GOOD SOCIETY of the future infinitely easier.

Cloth Bound $1.00 Paper Covered 50¢

published by
THREE ARROWS PRESS
Room 516a 303 Fourth Avenue New York, N. Y.

No More Balderdash!

Let's face reality. Is there inherent in world Catholicism and in world Communism the terrifying possibility of an immediate ideological and military alliance between the Vatican and the Kremlin? If so, what must the Democratic Fraternity do NOW?

Read MANUAL OF CIVILIZATION ($2.50) and the companion HANDBOOK OF DEMOCRACY ($1.25), available from

WILLIAM-FREDERICK PRESS
313 WEST 35th ST., NEW YORK 1

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE HUMANIST

a bi-monthly $2.00 per year

- ARTICLES—By leading philosophers, social scientists, and religious liberals.
- COLUMNS—Including "The Sectarian Battlefront" by Edwin H. Wilson on Church-State controversy.
- WRITE—For sample copy and free booklet on Humanism "The Philosophic Needs of Today."

THE AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSOCIATION
137 S. Walnut Street Yellow Springs, Ohio

THE OLDEST LIBERAL AND LABOR BOOKSTORE OFFERS NATION READERS DEEP DISCOUNTS on current books on economics, politics, sociology, socialism, communism, trade unions, cooperatives, Great Britain, Russia, History, Philosophy, Psychiatry, etc. Pamphlet center, liberal and labor magazines. Rare and out-of-print books on social-economic problems.
VISIT OUR BOOKSTORE
SEND FOR CATALOG
RAND BOOK STORE
7 E. 15 ST. • N. Y. 3 • AL 5-6250

EDMUND STEVENS
lived on Red Square for 10 Years
and won 1950's Pulitzer Prize for
THIS IS RUSSIA—UNCENSORED $2.75
DIDIER, Publishers
660 MADISON AVE. • NEW YORK 21

New *Shortcut* method—no faster way to speak
FRENCH
ITALIAN GERMAN

Learn to speak a language the quick way developed by U. S. Govt. during war. Direct approach makes grammatical drill and study of theory unnecessary. Learn the carefully selected 1000 basic phrases and sentences in 128-page booklet and you will understand and speak the language for all your practical everyday, social and travel needs. Master correct pronunciation of every sound in language with two-sided 7-inch unbreakable 78RPM record accompanying each booklet. Prepared and endorsed by faculty members at Barnard, Columbia and other leading colleges.

ONLY $1.00 --IF YOU ACT NOW!

13,500 courses now in use. Writes W. Wolf of N. Y., "Fully as successful for me as a course costing $25." Money unconditionally refunded if you too do not learn quickly, easily through Record-O-Guide method. ORDER TODAY. Only limited supply of present edition available.

Dover Pub., Dept. N3,
1780 Broadway, N.Y. 19.
Send me postpaid under unconditional guarantee.
_French book & record $1
_Italian book & record $1
_German book & record $1
BOOK AND RECORD ONLY $1.00

NAME.....
ADDRESS.....
.....
I am enclosing $_____in full payment.

And he provides but a brief and far too simplified account of the great slump that led to the downfall of the second MacDonald government in 1931.

My second criticism of this book is not that it is biased—most histories are—but that it pretends to be a good deal more impartial than it actually is. Anticipating readers' questions, Mr. Somervell states in his preface that "in the course of the past forty years [I] have on different occasions voted for each of the three parties." That made me wonder under what peculiar circumstances he could possibly have supported Labor, for his whole trend of thought seems to be Tory.

That is not to say that the book is blatantly partisan. In a schoolmasterish way Mr. Somervell makes an effort to be even-handed in his distribution of good and bad marks. All the same his castigations of labor have a sting that seems absent from the discipline he applies to Tory backs. Thus in his account of the National Government of the thirties he leans over backward to be fair to Chamberlain but is sharply critical of the ambiguities of Labor's foreign policy. True, that criticism is not entirely undeserved, but in his anxiety to convict the left of stupidity and inconsistency he makes some careless generalizations.

Thus he leaves the reader with the impression, an erroneous one, that the Parliamentary Labor Party continuously opposed defense appropriations up to the outbreak of war in 1939. He seriously undermines confidence in his judicial qualities by dismissing the Spanish civil war as "a struggle between two rival gangs of terrorists." And the brief pages he devotes to the post-war Labor government are tinged with that mixture of malice and condescension that visitors to Britain encounter when the port is circulating around the "best" dinner tables. KEITH HUTCHISON

Those German Cartels

ALL HONORABLE MEN. By James Stewart Martin. Little, Brown and Company. $3.50.

THIS is no usual book, not just another repeat story on cartels. It is a dramatic account of how nice honorable men—Americans, Germans, English, and French—form international industrial combines that operate as super-governments to which they owe their final allegiance. It tells how, in the name of the cartel, they commit what we ordinary citizens would regard as treason.

This is no history of past events. Its significance lies in the fact that the international cartel arrangements in force prior to World War II played a major part in making that war possible; and that the reestablishment of these cartel arrangements after the war, even with the old figures back on their powerful industrial thrones in Germany, may provide much of the economic strength to wage the next war.

The opportunity to avoid this dismal development was ours, once our army and civilian apparatus for control of Germany moved into that country. James Martin and his decartelization staff sought to prevent the return of the old Nazi intriguers and to break their ties with foreign industrial and banking leaders. But the power of several "honorable men" was too strong. Their private world was so important that key figures in our military-government setup found it expedient to let decartelization policies lapse. Or the same result was achieved through the skilful exercise of bureaucratic sabotage behind the scenes.

This is no "gripe" book produced by a disgruntled former government official who wasn't allowed to have his way. However much he must have suffered personally, Mr. Martin studiously avoids recriminations. He is ever about the business of laying out the facts, all the facts, and trying to make them convey their larger meaning.

Howard K. Smith, CBS European ace, called the book "a kind of standard text on our post-war policy in Germany." It has that value, but it is no dull reference textbook. The writing style, the vivid pictures, the sense of struggle, and the importance of events to the reader make it one of those books which are read as a continuous piece because they hold one's interest throughout.

We see General Clay under fire in a variety of situations, and the shortcomings of a strictly military training and experience when confronted with complex economic policies and practices in a civilian operation stand out plainly. Here is decidedly an "honorable man," one who would not knowingly make

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

those decisions that would set the stage for the reentrance of Nazism. But missteps and misjudgments are fatal, however well intentioned the individual. And many such occurred. The lesson? Well, we are now engaged in global diplomacy and military defense. Hadn't we better reappraise our leadership and our policies to guard against similar failures in the future?

There is another lesson one learns from "All Honorable Men." Those who advocated and apparently are succeeding in furthering the revival of cartelism in Germany subscribe to a different philosophy of government and a different system of economics than democracy and free competitive enterprise. They are not without a substantial support in this country. So much so, in fact, that some of these very individuals whom James Martin singles out as responsible for the failure to denazify and decartelize in Germany are coming back into Washington in policy-level and high administrative posts where they will inevitably carry on according to their own understanding and belief.

The struggle in Germany was only an episode, not so isolated, in the march of the cartelists and monopolists toward world power. But it is such an important one, taking place on such a big field and for such crucial stakes, that no one can afford to miss Martin's profoundly authoritative description and analysis.

Can democracy and peace win out? Martin is not too hopeful. Assuredly their final victory is not aided by the disappointing experience in post-war Germany unless, as the author urges, we take that lesson to heart and act upon it now. He is right in saying that "as the post-war pattern unfolds, this chain of events in Germany becomes more and more of a piece with a larger pattern." His book should do much to break across that pattern with another and more wholesome one.

DEWEY ANDERSON

Coming Soon in *The Nation*

Edna St. Vincent Millay: 1892-1950
An Essay by Rolfe Humphries

"Classics and Commercials"
By Edmund Wilson
Reviewed by Perry Miller

"The Federal Bureau of Investigation"
Reviewed by M. R. Werner

BOOKS IN BRIEF

INVASION, 1944. By Hans Speidel. Regnery. $2.75. Rommel's Chief of Staff tells the story of the Normandy invasion from the German point of view. Interesting as military history, the book is even more valuable as a picture of the relations between Rommel and Hitler. The megalomaniacal determination of Hitler to direct the war in every detail led him to hamper and thwart his generals to such an extent that one closes the book with the impression that the German armies were defeated by Hitler with the assistance of the Allies. In fact, Speidel believes that the Allies could have won the war in the autumn of 1944 if they had more boldly exploited the German blunders. Convinced at last that victory was impossible, Rommel threw in his lot with the generals who were plotting to kill Hitler and end the war—a plot that, in Speidel's opinion, might have succeeded if at the crucial moment Rommel had not been almost fatally wounded by an Allied airman. Eventually Hitler discovered that Rommel had been implicated, forced him to commit suicide, and then announced that he had died as a result of his wounds and gave him a state funeral.

ALL THINGS COMMON. By Claire Huchet Bishop. Harper. $3. An enthusiastic report on the "communities of work" that have sprung up since the war in France and adjacent countries—more than sixty are now in operation. Reminiscent of the communities and phalansteries that briefly flourished in America a century ago, these present centers of the "communitarian" movement differ in methods but have certain basic principles in common. Means of production are owned by the community, and members are paid for all activities that benefit the community; a woman, for example, is paid for housework, a child for going to school, and an invalid for recovering his health. The amount of payment to each member is based on his or her total value to the community both as a worker and as a social unit: that is, an efficient but surly member may receive smaller wages than a less efficient but more cooperative member. Management is in the hands of

POSTWAR careers of 585 Southern soldiers in a world of Reconstruction: CONFEDERATE LEADERS IN THE NEW SOUTH by William B. Hesseltine. $2.50

PROPAGANDA in the hands of the first great modern ruler to use it to his own advantage: NAPOLEONIC PROPAGANDA by Robert B. Holtman. $4.00

IDEALISM, experimental socialism, and disappointment in early America: THE UTOPIAN COMMUNIST by Carl Wittke. $4.50

Louisiana State University Press
Baton Rouge, La.

THE ENGLISH NOVELISTS SERIES
Fifteen fine titles now in print at **$2.00 each.** Send for full list.
ALAN SWALLOW, *Publisher*
2679 So. York, Denver 10, Colorado

PUBLISHING
We publish, print and distribute your manuscript in pamphlet & book form. Send for free folder.
WILLIAM-FREDERICK PRESS
Pamphlet Distributing Company
313 West 35th Street, New York City 1

Will you RETIRE YOUNG ENOUGH to enjoy it?

Do you really want to work all your life?

You can take life easy a lot sooner than you think. If you know where it costs less to live, and where you can earn a small income from a part-time business or job, you can afford to retire sooner, even now perhaps.

One of the best features of "Where to Retire on a Small Income" is that every town, city, or region described was selected because it offers opportunities to get part-time or seasonal jobs or to open a part-time business.

This book tells you where are the best places in the U. S. to retire. It covers Florida, California, New England, the South, the Pacific Northwest, etc. It also includes Hawaii, the American Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.

With this book, you learn:
—where living costs, rents, and real estate are less (even where you can buy a farm for only $2500);
—where you can live inexpensively on an island far from the world, yet close to neighbors;
—where you can go fishing all year round; where you can go hunting, boating, swimming, and always have a good time;
—where your hobby will bring you an income;
—where you stand the best chance of living longer.

You'd spend months, plus hundreds of dollars if you searched for the hundreds of facts in this book by traveling around the country. But all these facts on *little known beauty spots, America's favorite retirement* areas, and many undiscovered towns, cities, and regions, are yours for just $1.

Sooner or later—now or in years to come—you will want to be independent. Order today, while you think of it. Money back, of course, if you're not satisfied.

Don't bother writing a letter. Simply tear out ad, print name and address, and mail with $1 bill to Harlan Publications, 67 First Ave., Greenlawn, New York.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DATELINES FOR FREEDOM

1951 CALENDAR

For desk or wall—useful at home or in the office.

Each month pictures a candid, attractive scene of people playing, working, studying, worshipping together—setting the **DATELINES FOR FREEDOM.**

Short, significant quotations from historical documents, interpreters of American life and the Bible underscore the monthly illustrations.

Easy to read, the calendar at the same time takes up a minimum of space.

Size: 6" x 9".

Price: 50 cents each.

Quantity rates for orders of 100 or more calendars.

Add meaning to your Christmas gifts this year—give **DATELINES FOR FREEDOM.**

RACE RELATIONS DEPARTMENT
American Missionary Association
Fisk University, Nashville 8, Tennessee

JUST RELEASED

The FIRST Factual Survey

Yugoslavia

. . . NEW LAND IN THE MAKING

An up-to-the-minute 64-page volume (with over 100 photographs and illustrations) of basic facts and background material on the history, culture, geography, industry, agricultural and political life of Yugoslavia.

Much of this material has not been published before—and is essential to an understanding of current developments in Yugoslavia. Price: 50¢

THE YUGOSLAV INFORMATION CENTER
Dept. N, 36 Central Park South, New York 19

Convenient Subscription Order Form

THE NATION
20 VESEY STREET
NEW YORK 7, N. Y.

I want to become a regular "Nation" subscriber.

Please enter my subscription for the period indicated below. I enclose $_____ or bill me ☐.

☐ **One Year $7** ☐ **Two Years $12** ☐ **Three Years $17**

NAME_____

ADDRESS_____

CITY_____ ZONE_____ STATE_____

Canadian and foreign postage—$1 per year extra 12/16/50

an elected chief of community and/or councils. Decisions must be unanimous, and no coercion of minorities is permitted. All communities seem to have a firm ethical base and a sense of the perfectibility of man through the reformation of his institutions. Those who have studied the rise and decline of Brook Farm, Oneida, Fruitlands, and similar communities will read this eulogy of their present-day descendants with nostalgic and somewhat skeptical interest.

EAST OF HOME. By Santha Rama Rau. Harper. $3. This is more than a record of travel in Japan, China, Indo-China, Siam, and Indonesia; it is an attempt to give the color and flavor and currents of thought in the parts of these countries which the author visited. There is no philosophizing and very little factual information. For the most part the author sets down her impressions and her conversations and leaves the reader free to draw his own conclusions. The result is a kind of superior journalism of especial relevance today because the author is an Indian, educated in England and America, and hence able to give a sort of bifocal view of the people and problems of Asia.

HUGO BLACK. By Charlotte Williams. Johns Hopkins. $3.50. A sympathetic study of Roosevelt's first appointee to the Supreme Court; a man who has stirred up more criticism and controversy than any other member of the court. Although the greater part of the book deals with Justice Black's court opinions, the treatment is non-technical and of interest to the layman.

THE THEATER BOOK OF THE YEAR. 1949-50. By George Jean Nathan. Knopf. $4. The eighth of the annual volumes in which Mr. Nathan adorns a record of the season with critical dissertations, obiter dicta, epigrams, gibes, and in general whatever occurs to him in, and sometimes out of, connection with the new productions he never fails to attend. Neither his manner nor his inexhaustible knowledge of plays good and bad needs to be commented on again. According to the jacket he moved Bernard Shaw to the exclamation "Attaboy!" and that is a considerable achievement.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Records

B. H. HAGGIN

THE following are outstanding among the recordings of the past year—LP except as otherwise noted (RCA Victor: V; Columbia: C; London: L; Mercury: M; Capitol: CA; Allegro: A; Haydn Society: HS; Cetra: CE).

Bach: Suites Nos. 4 and 5 for unaccompanied cello; Casals (V; 78 rpm). Concerto in D minor; Szigeti and New Friends Orchestra under Stiedry (C). Brandenburg Concertos; Stuttgart Chamber Orchestra under Münchinger (L). Prelude and Fugue in E flat, Chorale Preludes, from Clavierübung Part 3 for organ; Noehren (A). Cantatas Nos. 21, *Ich hatte viel Bekümmernis;* 34, *O ewiges Feuer;* 46, *Schauet doch und sehet;* 56, *Ich will den Kreuzstab gerne tragen;* 104, *Du Hirte Israel;* Viennese chorus, orchestra, soloists under Sternberg (Bach Guild). Motet No. 3, *Jesu, meine Freude;* Shaw Chorale (V).

Bartok: String Quartets; Juilliard Quartet (C).

Beethoven: Sonata Opus 102 No. 1 for cello and piano; Fournier and Schnabel (V; 78 rpm). Sonata Opus 96 for violin and piano; Totenberg and Baller (A). Symphony No 3 ("Eroica"); Toscanini and N. B. C. Symphony (V; imperfectly recorded). Piano Concerto No. 1; Gieseking and Philharmonia Orchestra (C).

Copland: Suite from "Billy the Kid"; orchestra under Bernstein (V).

Chopin: Ballades; Casadesus (C).

Handel: Concerti Grossi Opus 6 Nos. 3 and 4; Boyd Neel Orchestra (L). *Care selva* from "Atalanta"; Quartararo (V; 78 rpm).

Haydn: Symphony No. 99; London Symphony under Kisch (L). Symphony No. 103 ("Drum Roll"); London Philharmonic under Solti (L). Quartets Opus 64 No. 5 and Opus 76 No. 4; Budapest Quartet (C). Quartets Opus 54 No. 2 and Opus 77 No. 1; Kroll Quartet (A). Quartet Opus 64 No. 5; Hungarian Quartet (V; 78 rpm). Piano Sonatas Nos. 20 and 50; Virginia Pleasants (HS). "The Creation"; Vienna State Opera Orchestra and Chorus and soloists under Krauss (HS). "Lord Nelson" Mass; Viennese chorus, orchestra, soloists under Sternberg (HS).

Madrigals by Wilbye, Weelkes, Gibbons, etc.; Cambridge University Madrigal Society under Ord (HMV; 78 rpm).

Mozart: Divertimento K.287; Toscanini and N. B. C. Symphony (V). Horn Concertos K.417 and 495; Dennis Brain and Hallé and Philharmonia Orchestras (C). Requiem; Vienna Hofkapelle and soloists under Krips (L). Mass in C minor; Viennese chorus, orchestra, soloists under Von Zallinger (performance and recording not good) (HS). Mass K.317; Viennese chorus, orchestra, soloists under Gillesberger (HS). "Die Entführung aus dem Serail"; soloists, orchestra, and chorus of the Vienna State Opera under Krips (L). *Martern aller Arten* from "Die Entführung"; Berger with orchestra under Krips (V; 78 rpm). "Idomeneo"; soloists and chorus of Vienna State Opera, Vienna Symphony under Von Zallinger (HS).

Palestrina: Missa Brevis and Missa "Ascendo ad Patrem"; Welch Chorale (A).

Prokofiev: Piano Concerto No. 3; Kapell and Dallas Symphony under Dorati (V; 78 rpm). "Visions fugitives"; Pennario (CA).

Purcell: Songs; Brownlee (A).

Schubert: Piano Sonata in C minor; Aitken (Elaine Music Shop). "Unfinished" Symphony; London Symphony under Krips (L). "Suleika" I and II, "Der Hirt auf dem Felsen"; Berger (V; 78 rpm) with *L'amerò, sarò-costante* from Mozart's "Il Re Pastore," sung in German with piano accompaniment).

Schumann: "Dichterliebe"; Harrell (V; 78 rpm).

Schütz: "Weihnachts-Historie"; Bloecher, Hess, Cantata Singers under Mendel (R. E. B. Editions).

Strauss: Presentation of the Silver Rose from "Der Rosenkavalier"; Schwarzkopf, Seefried, Vienna State Opera Orchestra (C).

Stravinsky: "Petrouchka"; Orchestre de la suisse romande under Ansermet (L). "Apollon Musagete"; orchestra under Stravinsky (V).

Tchaikovsky: "Manfred" Symphony; Toscanini and N. B. C. Symphony (V).

Verdi: Sleepwalking Scene from "Macbeth" and *O don fatale* from "Don Carlo"; Nikolaidi (C). "Falstaff"; Taddei, Meletti, etc., under Rossi (some poor singers, some stylistic extravagances) (CE). Excerpts from "Falstaff"; Stabile, Palombini, Poli, La Scala

Writing a Book?

More than 300 first novels, poetry books, textbooks and scholarly studies are listed in our catalogue—all by authors who were unpublished before they came to us!

You, too, can benefit from our tested, profitable publishing plan which enables us to edit, design, produce, distribute and promote books of all types.

A minimum subsidy, which frequently proves profitable after the sale of as few as 600 copies, applies only to the first edition. Subsequent editions are published at a straight 20% royalty.

Write today for a free copy of our new 32-page brochure, We Can Publish Your Book.

Exposition Press
Dept. 33, 386 Fourth Ave., New York 16

Season's Greetings

Just now our shop is brimful with all sorts of gift books at money-saving prices. Prompt mailing on advertised books.

DOWNTOWN BOOK BAZAAR
212 Broadway, Cor. Fulton, N. Y. C. 7
Open 8 to 6 and Saturday

TOTAL PRE-XMAS CLEARANCE!
Imports, rarieties, LP's up to 60% off
Before buying any records, get our price list. Send 10¢ and self-addressed, stamped envelope for same.
LES DISCOPHILES, 1079 Lexington Ave., N.Y.C.
Hours 12 noon-10 p.m. daily RHinelander 4-9294

"One of the year's great events."
—B. H. Haggin.
SCHUBERT: SONATA IN C MINOR
(opus post.) Webster Aitken, Piano
$5.95 (postage free)
ELAINE MUSIC SHOP
9 EAST 44th STREET NEW YORK CITY 17
bet. Fifth & Madison MUrray Hill 2-6154

PULITZER PRIZE and CRITICS' AWARD
RICHARD RODGERS & OSCAR HAMMERSTEIN 2nd
present in association with
LELAND HAYWARD & JOSHUA LOGAN
MARY MARTIN
RAY MIDDLETON
IN
South Pacific
Music by RICHARD RODGERS
Lyrics by OSCAR HAMMERSTEIN 2nd
Book by
OSCAR HAMMERSTEIN 2nd & JOSHUA LOGAN
Adapted from JAMES A. MICHENER'S Pulitzer Prize Winning "TALES OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC"
Directed by JOSHUA LOGAN
Scenery & Lighting by Jo Mielziner
with MYRON McCORMICK
MAJESTIC Thea., 44 St. W. of B'way
Evenings 8:30 Matinees Wed. & Sat. 2:30

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RESORTS

CHRISTMAS at MUSIC INN

New Year's too.

Skating, skiing, ice-fishing, music, dancing, horse-drawn sleighing, relaxed people, interesting fireside entertainment.

Write Stephanie Frey Barber, MUSIC INN, Lenox, Mass., or 270 Madison Avenue, New York 16, MU 5-0866.

HATHAWAY LODGE

For a delightful rest midst the mountain grandeur of the "Hills of the Sky," vacation at Hathaway. You'll enjoy this magnificent lodge on the 592-acre former Macy estate 2500 ft. high atop the Northern Catskills. Luxurious rooms, many with open fireplaces. Our food is famed, bounteous and delicious. Winding mountain trails for horseback riding, hiking, strolling. Recordings, ping-pong, library, informal dancing. Easy transportation. For adults. Holiday reservations now.

ATTRACTIVE WINTER RATES

For reservations or booklet write or call

HATHAWAY LODGE, Haines Falls, N. Y.

Telephone Tannersville 299

LAKECREST

"Your Home in the Country"

Early Xmas Reservations Suggested

Colorful countryside • Seasonable sports
All comforts and conveniences • Moderate rates • Plus our traditional hospitality

On Hunn's Lake Stanfordville, N. Y.
Only 90 miles from N. Y. C.
EVA BERG, Director Stanfordville 2982-2098

Colorful! Gay! Exciting!

that's FALL at the Glenmere!

join wonderful people!

the Glenmere

Chester, N.Y. in the beautiful Ramapos
Phones: CHester 200 N.Y.: REctor 2-5047

WINTER VACATION NEARBY

A gay Winter holiday awaits you at Forest House. All sports in a winter wonderland at famous Lake Mahopac. Fine cuisine, excellent accommodations, warm hospitality.

FOREST House

LAKE MAHOPAC, N. Y., TEL. MAHOPAC 8-3688

ARE YOU ON YOUR CHRISTMAS LIST?

Treat Yourself To A Splendid Winter Vacation!

WINTER SPORTS . . . . . .
• ZUN-Bar (FOR COCKTAILS) . . . . .
. . . PAINTING & CRAFTS . . .
. . . . ENTERTAINMENT STAFF

OPENS DEC. 22

Easy To Reach by Bus, Train, or door-to-door Taxi Service

Write For Free Brochure

CHESTERS KUNBARO

WOODBOURNE, N.Y. Tel. WOODBOURNE 1150

Orchestra under Erede (CA; 78 rpm). *Tu che la vanita* from "Don Carlo"; Ellabelle Davis (L). *Ella giammai m'amò* from "Don Carlo"; Tajo, orchestra under Morel (V; 78 rpm). Excerpts from "Simon Boccanegra," "Otello," "La Forza del Destino," "La Traviata"; Warren, Varnay, orchestra under Cellini (V; 78 rpm). "Rigoletto"; Warren, Berger, Peerce, Shaw Chorale, orchestra under Cellini (V).

Vivaldi: Concerto Grosso Opus 3 No. 2; Orchestra of the Maggio Musicale Fiorentino under Guarnieri (CA; with *Alessandro Scarlatti:* Concerto Grosso in F minor; Wiesbaden Collegium Musicum under Weyns).

Wagner: Prelude and Good Friday Spell from "Parsifal"; Toscanini and N. B. C. Symphony (V).

Wolf: "Auf einer Wanderung," "Auf dem grünen Balkon," "Verschwiegene Liebe," etc.; Thebom (V; 78 rpm).

CONTRIBUTORS

ALBERT GUERARD, professor emeritus of comparative and general literature at Stanford University, is now lecturing at Brandeis University.

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH is Brander Matthews professor of dramatic literature at Columbia University and drama critic of *The Nation* (now on leave).

HAROLD STRAUSS is editor-in-chief of Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. He has spent a year in Japan and speaks Japanese.

J. B. BREBNER, professor of history at Columbia University, is the author of "North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States, and Britain" and other books.

ALAN BARTH, editorial writer on the Washington *Post*, is the author of "The Loyalty of Free Men," to be published in January.

WALTER ISARD, a specialist in economic history and theory, is a research fellow in economics at Harvard.

KEITH HUTCHISON is financial editor of *The Nation*. His most recent book is "The Decline and Fall of British Capitalism."

DEWEY ANDERSON, economist, is executive director of the Public Affairs Institute. During the war he was with the Office of Economic Welfare and other agencies and was chief of field operations for UNRRA.

RESORT

50 MI. FROM NEW YORK — MAMANASCO Lake Lodge

Ridgefield, Conn. • Phone 820
Reopening December 22nd for gala CHRISTMAS-NEW YEAR'S HOLIDAYS and WINTER season. All winter sports. Mile-long lake for skating. Roaring fireplaces, television, recordings. Informal, congenial atmosphere. Excellent cuisine and accommodations. Make early reservations. Rates moderate.

MEXICO ACCOMMODATIONS

NO WINTER, NO SUMMER in flower-bowered, fogless, frostless Cuernavaca. Cosy homespun apartments $48 mo. up; furnished, houses $68 up. (U. S. Cy.). Ken Beldin Pre-Columbian Arts Studios, Salinas 14-n, Cuernavaca, Mexico.

FARMS & ACREAGE

NEW 2-room pine-paneled cottage; electricity, phone, spring water, 4 acres. Unsurpassed view; 7 miles to Tanglewood, 5 to Pittsfield. $2,250. **Robert Waite, East Chatham, New York.**

SCHOOL

The MIDTOWN SCHOOL

• **Pre-School**
• **Kindergarten**
• **First and Second Grades**

All-Day or Half-Day Sessions
Openings for 1951 School Year
6 West 71 St., New York TRafalgar 7-5920

LANGUAGES

IT'S EASY TO LEARN A LANGUAGE BY LINGUAPHONE

At home, in leisure time, quickly, easily, correctly master Russian, French, German, —any one of 29 languages through Linguaphone WORLD'S STANDARD Conversational Method. Send for FREE book.

LINGUAPHONE INSTITUTE
81-W, Radio City, New York 20, N. Y.

PUBLISHING SERVICE

WRITERS!—Book mss. wanted for publication, fiction, non-fiction. Free booklet. Write today! **Daniel S. Mead Literary Agency, 419 Fourth Avenue, N. Y. C. 16.**

PERSONALS

WHAT IN THE WORLD

happened the day you were born? Colorful 8 x 10 scroll featuring significant events, best sellers, popular songs . . . dozens of fascinating facts about any birthday since 1865.

Only $2.00. Name inscribed. 5-day service.

Makes unique gift!

BIRTHDATE RESEARCH

Box 249-N, Wall Street Station, New York City

COLUMBIA, M.A. Will accept free-lance assignments. Writing, Editing, Research, Proof-Reading, Publicity. Experienced. Phone: OR 3-6126.

LADY, idealistic, intelligent, interested in Art, fine literature, world events, would discuss these with mature individual. Address: P. O. Box 234, Philadelphia 5, Pa.

Printed in the U. S. A. by STEINBERG PRESS, INC., Morgan & Johnson Aves., Brooklyn 6, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS

COLLECTED LATER POEMS

For this volume Dr. Williams, winner of The National Book Award for Poetry, has collected all of his shorter poems written during the decade of The Forties. Regular trade edition: $3.00. Deluxe edition, limited to 100 signed copies, in special binding boxed: $7.50.

APOLLINAIRE

Selected Writings

For the first time in English a representative selection of the writings of one of the great pioneers of the modern movement in literature. An intimate of the Cubist painters and forerunner of Surrealism, Apollinaire was the most colorful character of his day on the Paris Left Bank. Edited by Roger Shattuck. With illustrations. $3.50

a family romance

ELIZABETH POLLET

This brilliant first novel—a story of the hidden ties and tensions in a typical American family—is New Directions' "discovery" of the season. Miss Pollet's rare gifts—a lovely style and a pungent perception for feelings and motives—have produced a book that is compelling from first page to last. $2.50

Vaudeville For a Princess

Delmore Schwartz

"A skillful acrobat of the intellect with a warmth of humanity touched by the comic spirit"—so says *The Times* reviewer of Delmore Schwartz and his new book of poems and amusing prose sketches on divorce, promiscuity, jealousy, the ego, Existentialism, etc. $2.75

The Roman Spring of Mrs. Stone

TENNESSEE WILLIAMS

"The art of Tennessee Williams is so sane and vital that he can bring tragic beauty and humor to themes which lesser writers ought never to handle. This novel is one of the finest examples of his great and compassionate talent."—Christopher Isherwood. $2.00

AN EXAMINATION OF EZRA POUND

An anthology of essays on many different aspects of Pound's career as poet, translator and stimulator of the arts by a distinguished group of international literary figures, including T. S. Eliot, Edith Sitwell, Ernest Hemingway, Allen Tate, Wyndham Lewis, Hugh Kenner and others. $3.75

A Diary of Love

Maude Hutchins

A novel about a young girl's emotional awakening. Once again the creator of the fascinating, infuriating *Georgiana* whirls us off into the Hutchins-realistic world of her unique sensibility. This time her heroine is the lovely Noel, whose innocence survives every pitfall in the Freudian lexicon. $2.50

STENDHAL

The Telegraph

Political intrigue is always a fascinating subject for fiction. In the hands of a great master like Stendhal it can become utterly absorbing—as in this novel where we follow the adventures of young Lucien Leuwen, secretary to the Minister of Interior in the corrupt French government of Louis-Philippe. Louise Varèse translation. $3.50

New Directions 12

AN ANTHOLOGY

Our annual "exhibition gallery" collection of new and unconventional trends in writing here and abroad will be ready in time for Christmas, but place your order now with your bookstore. Nearly six hundred pages of stories, poems, plays and translations by 40 writers, including Bowles, Williams, Rexroth, Miller, Vidal, etc. $5.00

NEW DIRECTIONS

333 SIXTH AVENUE

NEW YORK CITY 14

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TO DEMONSTRATE the kind of worthwhile library volumes members regularly receive, FREE...

THESE TWO INVALUABLE REFERENCE BOOKS

Given to you

IF YOU JOIN THE BOOK-OF-THE-MONTH CLUB NOW
AND BUY AS FEW AS FOUR SELECTIONS A YEAR



HAMMOND'S COMPLETE World Atlas

216 PAGES OF FOUR-COLOR MAPS • 160 PAGES OF TEXT AND CHARTS • ACTUAL SIZE 6½" x 9½"

A BRAND-NEW atlas containing detailed maps of each state of the United States, individual countries of all continents, illustrated gazetteers, world statistics, etc. Makes the news more understandable; invaluable for children in schools; handy size . . . always convenient to use.

and

AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF World History

1270 PAGES • 60 PAGES OF MAPS

COVERS all of recorded history, from ancient times down to 1946 and World War II. Invaluable whenever you want to know the exact historical background of what you are reading, whether it is a book of fiction or non-fiction, a magazine or a newspaper article.

THE COMBINED RETAIL VALUE OF THESE BOOKS IS $11.00

As a member **YOU MAY BUY AS FEW AS FOUR BOOKS A YEAR . . . YOU BUY ONLY SELECTIONS YOU INTEND TO BUY ANYWAY . . . YOU USUALLY PAY LESS FOR THEM . . . YOU SHARE IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS WORTH OF BOOK-DIVIDENDS**

YOUR CHOICE IS WIDE: In addition to the monthly selections, the Club makes available Special Editions of widely-discussed books. *Thus your choice is wide, from 25 to 30 books a year.* Whenever you think the selection is a book you would *not* enjoy, you send back a form (always provided) specifying some other book you may want. Or you may simply say: "Send me nothing."

WHAT YOU PAY . . . AND HOW: You simply pay *the special members' price* for each selection you buy, which is usually lower than the regular retail price. A bill is mailed with each book you indicate you want. (A small charge is added to cover postage and mailing expenses.)

BOOK-DIVIDEND PLAN...WHAT IT IS: After your first purchase, with every second book you buy—from among the Club selections and Special Editions—you receive a Book-Dividend. This member-profit-sharing is similar to what happens in any consumer co-operative. A fixed percentage of what each member pays is invested in enormous editions of other books, and these are the Book-Dividends you receive as a member. *In the past five years alone over $61,500,000 worth of free books (retail value) were distributed among members.*

GOOD SENSE FOR READING FAMILIES: *Why not buy from the Club the monthly selections you would buy anyway?* You will usually pay less for them and you will share in the Club's Book-Dividends. And, not least, you will actually get and read particular new books, which you are anxious not to miss.

Begin your membership with any of these good books:

AS MY FIRST PURCHASE PLEASE SEND ME:

- ☐ THE HINGE OF FATE by Winston Churchill *Price (to members only) $4.00*
- ☐ THE DISENCHANTED by Budd Schulberg *$3.50*
- ☐ KON-TIKI by Thor Heyerdahl *Price (to members only) $3.60*
- ☐ THE MATURE MIND by H. A. Overstreet *Price $2.95*
- Double Selection:
  - ☐ BELLES ON THEIR TOES by F. B. Gilbreth, Jr. and E. G. Carey
  - *and* BLANDINGS' WAY by Eric Hodgins
  - *Combined price (to members only) $3.75*
- ☐ THE LITTLE PRINCESSES by Marion Crawford *Price (to members only) $3.25*
- ☐ THE EGYPTIAN by Mika Waltari *Price (to members only) $3.35*

BOOK-OF-THE-MONTH CLUB, Inc. A1712
345 Hudson Street, New York 14, N. Y.

Please enroll me as a member of the Book-of-the-Month Club.* I am to receive, free, HAMMOND'S COMPLETE WORLD ATLAS and AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD HISTORY. These will be sent with my first purchase indicated above. Thereafter for every two monthly selections—or Special Members' Editions—I purchase from the Club, I am to receive, free, the current Book-Dividend then being distributed. I agree to purchase at least four monthly selections—or Special Members' Editions—from the Club during the first year I am a member, and I may cancel my membership any time after buying four such books from the Club.

Name.....
(Please Print Plainly)

Address.....

City..... Postal Zone No. (if any) ..... *State*.....

Book prices are slightly higher in Canada, but the Club ships to Canadian members without any extra charge for duty, through Book-of-the-Month Club (Canada), Ltd.

*Trade-Mark of Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc. Reg. U. S. Pat. Off. and in Canada.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED